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Abstract 
The identification of hazards in chemical plants has become increasingly important. 
Not only have chemical plants become larger and more complex, but some countries 
now have regulations requiring that some form of formal hazard identification be 
carried out. With the increased speed of many other parts of the design process, 
hazard identification is becoming the log-jam in attempts to speed up the design of 
new plants still further. 
One of the most popular techniques for hazard identification is a hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP), in which a group of people attempt to identify creatively 
the possible hazards by applying a methodical process whereby the effect of 
deviations to every process variable is considered in every part of the plant. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore methods of improving hazard identification 
through the development of the HAZOP technique. This thesis examines possible 
improvements that can be made through a better understanding of activities and how 
they are carried out in HAZOP, discusses the possibilities of automated hazard 
identification based on HAZOP, and in particular presents a novel, modular HAZOP 
methodology. 
Modular HAZOP is based around identifying the modules that make up a chemical 
plant and then using previously generated HAZOP results associated with each of the 
modules. The hazards associated with these modules will therefore be known and 
rules are required to deal with the interconnections between modules. Application of 
these rules determines any additional hazards that might arise from the 
interconnection of modules. 
A number of important principles have been identified including, the level of 
decomposition required, the use of interchangeable sub-modules within modules, the 
fact that the majority of cause-consequence scenarios exist in adjacent modules, and 
the categorisation of locally and remotely propagated effects. These provide for a 
procedure which is adaptable to different plant configurations, but can also be quickly 
and easily applied. The latter principles enable the simpler fault paths, which make up 
most of the cause-consequence scenarios, to be identified quickly, leaving a much 
reduced number of fault paths which require a more thorough analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Project Overview 
The identification of possible hazards in chemical plants has become increasingly 
important. Not only have chemical plants become larger and more complex, but also 
some countries now have regulations requiring that some form of formal hazard 
identification be carried out. Moreover, environmental regulations have been 
tightened as the public has become aware of the dangers posed by large chemical 
plants. In the United States it is also a legal requirement to carry out some form of 
hazard identification retrospectively for plants already built and operating but which 
have not previously been subjected to any formal hazard identification (OSHA 1992). 
There are a number of hazard identification techniques available. These techniques 
consist of procedures, rules and guidelines to be followed in order to make the 
identification of hazards as efficient and as effective as possible. Over the years many 
companies have refined particular techniques to suit their own particular needs and to 
try to increase their effectiveness and efficiency. However, in general, this has not 
reduced the time taken to carry out hazard identification. 
With the increased speed of many other parts of the design process, hazard 
identification is becoming the logjam in attempts to speed up the design of new plants 
still further. The speeding up of hazard identification has become an urgent priority as 
the chemical industry seeks to speed up the building of new chemical plants. 
However, above all, it is necessary that any hazard identification procedure 
maximises the number of hazards identified and any improvement should not reduce 
the number of hazards identified. In order to improve hazard identification techniques, 
improvements need to be made to the procedures, rules and guidelines that make up 
these techniques. 
-I- 
There are three main techniques for hazard identification: 
Checklists -a list of haza dous plant arrangements, equipment designs, operating 
regimes, etc. are compared with the plant under consideration to see if similar 
circumstances exist which may give rise to hazards. 
What If -a group of people attempt to identify creatively the possibility for hazards 
by applying the question, "What if? ", in combination with known failure mechanisms 
for equipment and systems, to all the items in the plant. 
Haza d and Operability Studies (HAZOP) -a group of people attempt to identify 
creatively the possibility for hazards by applying a methodical process whereby the 
effect of deviations to every process variable is considered in every part of the plant. 
Following the identification of hazards, a combination of steps may be taken to reduce 
the likelihood of the hazard occurring and to minimise the effect of the hazard. What 
steps are required to be taken, and the effectiveness of these steps may be assessed by 
applying a rigorous, quantitative, analysis of the hazard, this is quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA). Typically, hazard identification techniques are essentially 
qualitative; a determination of the likelihood of causes and the effects of hazards 
based on a crude judgement made by the people involved. QRA includes techniques 
such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure modes, effects and criticality analysis 
(FNIECA). 
The aim of this thesis is to improve hazard identification through the development of 
the HAZOP technique. In considering how to improve HAZOP there would seem to 
be three options. Firstly there is the possibility that the methodology could be 
improved through a better understanding of activities and how they are carried out in 
HAZOP. Secondly there is the possibility that a methodology can be developed to 
allow HAZOP of chemical plants on a modular basis. Rather than carrying out 
HAZOP on a line by line basis, modules will exist which have already had a HAZOP 
carried out on them, and so the hazards associated with these modules will already be 
known. A few rules can then be applied to determine any additional haza ds that 
-2- 
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analyse how effective HAZOP is in practice, and whether there were any lessons to be 
learned. This was done by studying the original HAZOP results for part of a fairly 
complex plant and comparing the problems identified therein with problems that had 
subsequently come to light on the plant and trying to establish whether and/or how 
improvements could have been made (details confidential). 
1.3 Layout of the Thesis 
This thesis starts by detailing the HAZOP procedure and some of the history behind 
its development. Having dealt with this background information, an analysis of the 
possible improvements to conventional HAZOP is provided. In particular, this covers 
the composition and structure of HAZOP meetings and the use of computer tools. The 
development and role of automated HAZOP is then outlined. 
The latter half of this thesis deals with the theory and procedure of modular HAZOP. 
As identified above, this technique for hazard identification breaks the plant down 
into modules that have already been subject to some form of hazard identification and 
are provided with a set of HAZOP style results of this hazard identification. These 
latter chapters of the thesis deal with how the plant is broken down into modules, how 
the interconnection between modules is dealt with and gives an example of the 
application of this technique. The appendices provide a further example of the 
application of the modular HAZOP procedure and examples of HAZOP style results 
for some modules. 
-4- 
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2 Conventional HAZOP 
2.1 Origins of HAZOP 
The 1960s saw significant developments in the process industries. Throughout this 
period plants became more complex and significantly larger than previous chemical 
plants. In addition processes were developed which required higher pressures and 
temperatures placing additional demands on materials of construction and process 
control. It was during this time that it was recognised that the existing approach to 
dealing with hazards was no longer acceptable. With previous smaller plants, no 
attempt was made to identify the possibilities for hazards. Instead, hazards were 
allowed to occur, on the understanding that the losses would not be significant, and 
that subsequent development of the plant and the drafting of appropriate codes, meant 
it would not happen again. Process plant safety concentrated on minimising the effect 
of any hazards. Butler (1973) describes how Dow Chemical's safety policy is based 
upon, amongst other things, physically dividing the plant up so that damage due to 
fire or explosion does not exceed a certain limit, the wearing of safety goggles and 
helmets, training of new plant operators and anonymous reporting of near miss 
incidents. 
This trial and error approach to hazard identification was no longer justifiable given 
that losses resulting from hazards on new process plant could indeed be significant. 
This was brought sharply into focus following the Flixborough disaster in 1974. Kletz 
(1992) sums up the approach taken as follows: 
"The traditional method of identifying hazards - in use from the dawn of technology 
to the present day - was to build the plant and see what happens - 'every dog is 
allowed one bite'. Until it bites someone we can say that we did not know it would. 
This is not a bad method when the size of the incident is limited but is no longer 
satisfactory now that we keep dogs, which may be as big as Bhopal (over 2000 killed 
in one bite), or even Flixborough (28 killed). We need to identify hazards before the 
accidents occue'. 
-6- 
HAZOP was first developed and used by ICI in the late 1960s. HAZOP was a 
development of method studies and the earliest account of their use and evidence of 
their origins can be found in Elliot & Owen (1968). They describe a technique called 
critical examination and although the majority of their paper is concerned with 
optimising the design process, it does include a section discussing how the technique 
could be used to carry out gives "hazard surveys". In particular it describes its use as 
follows: 
"Another useful application of the questioning approach of critical 
examination is in the study of operability and hazards. Using the "finished" line 
diagram as a basis, the detailed operations required to start up, run, and shut down 
both normally and in emergency are examined for every item of plant. " 
They also identify that the value lies in the way the thinking is done 
"We re-emphasise that the techniques are an aid not a substitute for thinking. 
Their value ahnost always arises as a result of the manner in which the thinking is 
done - systematically, logically, and in depth, and yet retaining flexibility and 
imagination. " 
I believe that this is an important point, which seems to have been lost as HAZOP has 
developed. In many cases, it now seems that people expect that the application of the 
technique will automatically produce the answers. In developing the procedure some 
of the principles have been lost. 
Lawley (1973) published the first complete paper on the HAZOP technique. 
Originally referred to as an "operability study", it was developed on the supposition 
that the failure to identify most hazards was due to the complex nature of the plant, 
rather than a lack of knowledge on the part of the design team. It is summarised as 
follows: 
"In essence [an operability study] is an abbreviated form of "critical 
examinatiorf' based on the principle that a problem can only arise when there is a 
-7- 
deviation from what is normally expected. The procedure, therefore, is to search the 
proposed scheme systematically for every conceivable deviation, and then look 
backwards for possible causes and forwards for the possible consequences. " 
The reference to "critical examination7' clearly links this work to that of Elliot & 
Owen (1968) described above. As well as a thorough description of the "operability 
study" procedure, and a detailed set of results for an operability study of part of an 
olefm dimerisation plant, the paper also describes a technique called "hazard analysis" 
using logic trees to derive a quantitative assessment of serious hazards following their 
identification. This is easily recognisable as FTA. 
2.2 HAZOP Procedure 
The basic principle of HAZOP is to apply guide words to a model of the system being 
analysed. The guide words are applied on a section by section basis to appropriate 
system variables to generate relevant deviations. The size of sections is determined by 
the level of detail required for the study. For continuous process plant, the basic 
model of the system will be the finished piping and instrumentation diagram (MID) 
or engineering line diagram (ELD) and the sections will correspond to lines on the 
MID or ELD. For batch processes the model of the system may be the batch 
operating instructions and the sections will correspond to individual operations. 
There are numerous texts that give detailed instructions on how to carry out HAZOP 
in chemical plants (Chemical Industries Association Ltd, 1977; Kletz, 1992; 
Knowlton, 1992; Lees, 1996). The basic principle for a continuous plant is for a group 
of people to apply certain defined guide words to lines, on a piping and 
instrumentation diagram (P&ID) or engineering line diagram (ELD), on a line by line 
basis in an effort to identify causes and consequences of process deviations. The 
approach taken is outlined in figure 2.1. This figures is a modified version of that 
presented in the above texts. The two steps in the middle of the procedure, "Examine 
possible causes" and "Examine consequences" are normally illustrated by showing 
the latter following the former, i. e. indicating that the "Examine possible causes" step 
is carried out before the "Examine consequences" step. In practice these steps may be 
-8- 
applied, particularly by more experienced HAZOP teams, in either order. This is 
generally dependent on the likelihood of a particular cause or the severity of a 
particular consequence. Where likely causes are readily identified, time is spent 
subsequently on determining possible consequences. Alternatively, the ready 
identification of a moderate or serious consequence may then lead to time being spent 
on analysis of possible causes. 
-9- 
Select a 
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I 
Figure 2.1 - Basic method for conventional hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) 
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2.3 HAZOP Failings 
Before looking at how HAZOP has developed and the possible methods for 
improvement in the future, it is worth looking at the current failings of HAZOP and 
why these failing exist. Ironically HAZOP is now suffering from the same problem 
that chemical plants were suffering from 20 years ago. The problem used to be that 
because a chemical plant or process had never been involved in any incidents then it 
was assumed that there were no hazards associated with it. One of the reasons that 
HAZOP was introduced was to combat this attitude and provide a tool for deciding 
whether potential problems existed or not. The problem now is that because, on the 
whole, potential problems with the application of the HAZOP methodology have not 
been associated with any incidents, no one sees any need to change it. (See Crawley 
(1995) for an exception). 
The problem stems from the perceived high cost of HAZOP due to the length of time 
it takes to carry out HAZOP and the apparent lack of benefits. In fact, data collected 
from 125 HAZOP based hazard studies shows the cost of a hazard study is only 
0.16% of the capital cost of a project (Gillet, 1995). In addition, the tangible benefits, 
the benefits seen by project managers, the actual addition of safety measures and 
provision of protective equipment which safeguard the company assets, is only a 
small part of the total benefit. There are considerable intangible benefits including 
behavioural, quality and corporate image benefits (Gillet, 1995). The main intangible 
benefit realised by HAZOP is the training and knowledge gained by team participants. 
This translates into more efficient commissioning of plant and improved plant 
operation. For more intangible benefits see Pully (1993). Also, as designers, at least in 
some companies, are becoming more aware of possible hazards and are coming up 
with better designs, HAZOP identifies very few, if any, real hazards. 
This perceived high cost of HAZOP has resulted in companies using less experienced 
personnel to carry out HAZOP. In addition as any technique becomes more 
widespread the standard of performance fails (Kletz, 1995). HAZOP was developed 
by SHE experts and the guide words provided convenient handles on which they 
could hang their expertise. In effect, each guide word prompted the experts to 
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consider certain problems and HAZOP would have been just as effective whatever 
words were used. The guide words provided a convenient alternative to long 
checklists. In this way the HAZOP methodology also overcame one of the main 
drawbacks of checklists. It is very easy to prove that checklists are incomplete. It has 
never been possible to prove how complete HAZOP is. HAZOP also enables a certain 
amount of flexibility in its application. One of the advantages of this being that a 
certain amount of redundancy was introduced, so if a problem was missed first time 
round there was still likely to be the opportunity to pick it up elsewhere. However, 
this flexibility also introduces potential problems in the form of ambiguities. For 
example it is ambiguous when studying high flow whether that refers to high flow in 
to the line being studied or high flow out of it. Among experienced HAZOP leaders 
these ambiguities are realised and they have developed their own rules for dealing 
with them. This also relies on the leader having good control over the members of the 
team so that the team accepts the interpretation of the guide words supplied by the 
leader and they do not stray into considering interpretations that the leader feels are 
inappropriate. 
Less experienced HAZOP teams do not have the expertise to realise the problems 
associated with each of the guide words and have not developed rules for overcoming 
the ambiguities. The first of these problems means that HAZOP results are not as 
complete as they could be. The latter problem leads to HAZOP taking longer than it 
should. This only serves to reinforce the perception that HAZOP has a high cost for 
little benefit. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of adequate training 
available for HAZOP team leaders. Although there are plenty of courses available to 
teach the basics of leading HAZOP teams, the best training can only be through 
experience of HAZOP meetings. Further, this experience should go beyond simply 
contributing to HAZOP meetings. The ideal role to gain the necessary experience 
must be as a HAZOP secretary with appropriate coaching from the HAZOP team 
leader. However, in order to reduce the perceived cost of HAZOP meetings, the 
number of people involved in each meeting is being reduced and the first role to go is 
that of HAZOP secretary, often to be replaced by a computer. 
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2.4 HAZOP Effectiveness 
It is also worth trying to understand why HAZOP is so effective. Two primary factors 
have been identified for effective hazard identification (Lowe & Solomon, 1983). 
These are, the availability of appropriate information and having a systematic method 
for applying the knowledge. They also identify two different procedures, comparative 
methods, where a design is checked against codes, and fundamental methods, such as 
HAZOP. Obviously HAZOP studies satisfy the systematic requirement and, if 
conducted properly, all the appropriate information should be available. There are 
other methods that satisfy these requirements but the results are apparently not as 
good as those achieved with HAZOP. Systematic methods similar to HAZOP include 
WHATIF and checklist studies. Checklist studies are a comparative approach whereas 
WHATIF studies are another fundamental approach. 
How are WHATIF, checklist and HAZOP studies similar? The HAZOP and WHATIF 
techniques rely on stimulating thought amongst a team of people using a team leader 
to apply the method correctly and to ask questions as necessary. They can all be 
applied to study a detailed line diagram and their primary objective is to identify 
cause-consequence scenarios. The WHATIF study is based on asking questions about 
possible causes. What is really being asked is 'What are the consequences of..? ' The 
checklist study involves trying to identify whether or not certain circumstances exist 
that have been found to create possible hazards. These circumstances are identified on 
a list and the study requires comparison of the proposed plant with the list. Checklist 
studies are systematic but there are two important deficiencies using checklists. 
Firstly, creative input is limited. Secondly they can only be used to identify 
arrangements of components that have previously been shown to be possible causes of 
hazards. Checklists, however, provide a quick way of checking designs for basic 
errors. It is anticipated that computers could be used to check automatically P&IDs or 
ELDs generated using a computer aided design (CAD) system. 
The important point about HAZOP studies is that they can be used either to identify a 
consequence of a certain deviation or to identify a cause of a deviation. The team can 
move from a deviation forward to a consequence or backward to a cause. This would 
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seem to maximise the opportunities for creative input and reduce the possibilities of 
oversights. 
2.5 Development of HAZOP Procedure 
2.5.1 General Development of HAZOP Procedure 
The basic principles of HAZOP have remained unchanged since its development by 
the process industry, and in particular ICI, 25 years ago. However, it is now used by a 
wide range of industries extending far beyond the process industry including the 
construction, electrical and transportation industries (Eggert, 1995 & Sankaran 1993). 
Of course each industry and each individual company has made modifications to the 
procedure to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of HAZOP (Rushton et al., 
1994). 
Along with the development of the HAZOP procedure, ICI developed a six stage 
procedure designed to identify hazards at different stages in the life of the plant, from 
initial project exploration through to commissioning and normal plant operation 
(Gibson, 1976). Duxbury & Tumey (1989) give a more detailed description of this 
procedure. Haza d Study I is intended to make sure that the hazards associated with 
the materials present in the plant are understood. It provides the basis for a safe 
design. Hazard Study II is a top down consideration of the major haza ds that may 
exist within the plant. Potentially major events, such as fire, explosion, toxic release, 
etc., are analysed to see which represent hazards and suitable designs will be 
developed, if necessary, to reduce these hazards. The HAZOP Procedure is part three 
(Hazard Study 111) of this six stage process. However, there is little time saving gained 
by using this six stage approach. Haza d Studies I and 11 identify possibly problem 
areas and address particularly hazardous situations but they do not have the same 
rigorous and detailed methodology that lies behind the success of HAZOP in 
identifying possible hazards. Hazard Studies IV, V and VI exist to check that the plant 
is built as designed, that no new hazards have been introduced during commissioning 
and that any unforeseen hazards or operability problems are dealt with. 
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2.5.2 Development of Guide Words and Checklists 
The list of basic guide words for continuous process plant has remained generally 
unchanged since HAZOP originated. Table 2.1 gives a list of the guide words and 
their meanings taken from the CIA Guide (CIA, 1977). 
GUIDE MEANINGS COMMENTS 
WORDS 
NO or The complete negation No part of the intentions is achieved but 
NOT of these intentions nothing else happens. 
MORE Quantitative increase Increase in quantities and properties such 
as flow rates and temperature as well as 
activities like heat and react. 
LESS Quantitative decrease As above but decrease. 
AS WELL Qualitative increase All the design and operating intentions are 
AS achieved together with some additional 
activity. 
PART OF Qualitative decrease Only some of the intentions are achieved; 
some are not. 
REVERSE The logical opposite of Applies to activities such as flow or 
the intention reaction. It can also be applied to 
substances, e. g. poison instead of antidote 
or d instead of I optical isomers. 
OTHER Complete substitution No part of the original intention is 
THAN achieved. Something quite different 
happens. 
Table 2.1 - Guide words as originally applied in HAZOP. (From CIA 1977). 
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Having been developed largely in the petrochemicals division of ICI, the original 
HAZOP procedure (Lawley, 1973) was biased heavily towards continuous processes. 
This is illustrated by the types of deviation associated with each of the guide words: 
NONE - No flow. 
MORE OF - More of flow, temperature, pressure, viscosity, etc., i. e., higher flow, 
higher temperature, or whatever, than there should be. 
LESS OF - Lower flow, temperature, pressure, viscosity, etc., than there should be. 
AS WELL AS - Impurities present, e. g., ingress of air, water, acids. Extra phase 
present, e. g., vapour, solids. 
PART OF - Change in composition of the stream, e. g., ratio of components different 
from what it should be. 
REVERSE - Reverse flow. 
OTHER - What else apart from normal operations can happen, e. g., start-up, 
shutdown, maintenance, catalyst change, failure of plant services. 
These deviations are generated by combining the guide words with relevant process 
variables for continuous plant. Clearly however, there are certain combinations of 
guide word and process variable that are not valid. These would be things such as no 
temperature and no viscosity. The relevant deviations for continuous plant can be 
defmed explicitly, the above set being used for batch processes with a couple of 
additions. This eliminates the need to combine a guide word with an intention. For 
continuous plant the following list of deviations should be considered: 
HIGH FLOW 
LOW FLOW 
NO FLOW 
REVERSE FLOW 
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HIGH/LOW PRESSURE 
HIGH/LOW TEMPERATURE 
HIGH/LOW LEVEL 
HIGH/LOW MIXING 
STATIC 
HIGH/LOW CONCENTRATION 
CONTAMINANTS 
TESTING 
START-UP 
SHUT-DOWN 
COMMISSIONING & MAINTENANCE. 
Other deviations which have been suggested for consideration following hazards 
which have occurred and for which the potential was not identified in HAZOP 
(Crawley, 1995) are: 
VIBRATION 
IMPACT 
NATURALFREQUENCY 
ENTRAINMENT 
VORTEX 
Rushford (1977) took the development of deviations for continuous process plant 
further. Along with the guide words and the process deviations for continuous plant, 
there is also a list of possible causes and consequences that may need to be considered 
with respect to these deviations. This checklist type guide word aid was developed 
ftirther by ICI. Lees (1996) presents an extensive list, called a guide diagram, of the 
process deviations for continuous plant and possible causes of these deviations. Other 
companies have similarly developed guide word aids (Sweeney, 1993 & Kelly, 1991). 
Kelly (1991) details some changes that have been made to the HAZOP procedure 
within the company he works for (M. & M. Protection Consultants, Cedar Knolls 
N. J. ). They have developed three process hazards checklists to aid the HAZOP 
procedure. The first deals with initiating problems, the second with consequences and 
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the third with hazardous events. These checklists are then used at the appropriate 
point in the HAZOP procedure. The initiating problems checklist is used to try to 
identify causes of process deviations. The consequences list is used to try to identify 
consequences. Finally the hazardous events checklist is used to try to determine how 
serious the final outcome may be. One problem with Kelly's approach is that it places 
too much emphasis solely on the identification of hazards. HAZOP is important in 
that it also identifies operability problems. Indeed one of the main benefits of HAZOP 
is the reduction in the number of start-up modifications required. 
In addition to the guide diagram for continuous processes, ICI have subsequently 
developed guide diagrams for batch processes, mechanical handling equipment, 
computer control systems and building design and operability (ICI, 1993). A similar 
type of guide diagram is also available, developed by Unocal Corporation for 
electrical systems (Sankaran, 1993). 
More recent developments on the use of checklists to aid HAZOP of continuous plant 
have occurred during the last few years as computing tools have been developed to 
assist the carrying out of HAZOP (PrimaTech, 199?; LamdaDelta, 1995). Many of 
these tools contain databases of possible causes and consequences of deviations for 
many items of common process plant equipment. The use of computers to assist 
HAZOP is discussed later in Chapters 3.3. 
The process deviation is developed, if necessary, to define explicitly the problem in a 
meaningful way. For example if the guide word is high and the process variable under 
consideration is pressure, the process deviation is obviously high pressure. Then, for 
a long pipeline, possible distinct problem areas are, liquid hammer, delivery pump 
overpressure and thermal expansion of locked in liquid. Each of these distinct 
deviation scenarios would be addressed in turn by members of the HAZOP team. 
They are asked to try to identify possible causes and consequences of the deviation 
scenario under consideration. An evaluation is then carried out by the group to 
establish the need for action. This action could take the form of further analysis, such 
as fault tree analysis of any hazards identified, or suggestions for possible changes to 
the plant, such as addition of alarms or the provision of trace heating. 
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These checklists were introduced partly to address the lack of completeness noticed in 
some HAZOP results. However the checklists are by no means as rigorous as a proper 
checklist and there is still a reliance on the expertise of the team to fully realise 
possible consequences. In fact it is only likely to make things worse. There is the 
possibility that the checklist aspect becomes a crutch for inexperienced teams to lean 
on, and, because it is a very meagre checklist, the results cannot be expected to be 
complete. This use of lists is not helped by the computer HAZOP aids available, 
which present lists of relevant parameters, causes and consequences. It can restrict the 
study to the everyday parameters such as flow, pressure and temperature, when it may 
be more appropriate to consider alternative parameters which might be suggested if 
the original HAZOP procedure was applied. 
2.6 Worked Examples of HAZOP Application 
The following papers contain worked examples of the application of conventional 
HAZOP to chemical plant. 
Lawley (1974) presents the results of the application of HAZOP to the feed section of 
an olefm dimerisation plant. The part of the process studied is the transfer of olefin 
from storage to a buffer and settling tank where the water impurity is settled out. 
Although only a limited section of the plant is studied, the results given are thorough 
and detailed. 
Lawley (1976) gives the results for a study of an ethylene oxide feed system to a 
group of batch reactors. As with Lawley's other example, the scope is limited but the 
results given are detailed and thorough. 
Rushford (1977) gives the results for a simple section of a cracker unit. The section 
studied is the gas drying section where the gaseous product from the cracker is heated 
and passed through a suction catchpot before being fed to a compression train. The 
results are detailed and include a wide variety of problems, a significant number of 
which are generated by the consideration of the guide word "other thaif'. Relatively 
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few problems were identified by the consideration of the guide words "more" and 
"less". 
Austin & Jeffreys (1979) carry out a HAZOP on the reactor section of the methyl 
ethyl ketone plant described in their book. This HAZOP is interesting in that the 
reactor section operates in a semi-batch manner, that is the normal operating 
conditions of this part of the plant alter with time. There is plenty of background 
information included as part of this worked example, including the design intention 
and the design conditions for the different operating conditions of the part of the plant 
being studied. The results presented are quite extensive and detailed. However, there 
is no attempt made to identify any problems that may be due to such things as start- 
up, shut-down and, of particular importance, maintenance. Austin & Jeffreys note that 
this is a "truncated operability study" as only an isolated part of the plant is being 
studied. They recognise that this introduces difficulties because deviations originating 
upstream of the truncation point can only be specified in general terms. However, 
their intention for presenting the study is to illustrate the principle of HAZOP and so 
the completeness of the results is not paramount. 
Kletz (1985) analyses a lOkm cross-country pipeline which transfers liquid propane 
from a storage tank to a consumer plant buffer tank. This study generated 39 actions 
for just one line, the results generated being very clear and detailed. 
Ozog (1985) applies HAZOP to a flammable reagent storage tank. The tank has a 
nitrogen blanket to provide an inert atmosphere in the tank and a pump to deliver 
liquid to the process. However, the tank as drawn would appear to have two major 
safety flaws, one of which is not queried in the HAZOP results. Firstly there is no 
tank overflow; instead it seems from the HAZOP results that they are expecting the 
tank to overflow via the relief valve RV-1. The query (column G) relating to 
overfilling of the tank due to "unloading too much reagent from tank truck7 (cause 6 
in column C) is "Is RV- I designed to relieve liquid at loading rateT'. This is definitely 
not a safe way to design for overfilling. Many tanks are only designed to withstand a 
couple of inches of water head. If liquid is not allowed to overflow from a properly 
designed overflow below the top of the tank but instead is allowed to fill into 
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pipework above the top of the tank, then it is quite conceivable that the tank will 
rupture. Secondly there is a valve V-8 included between the tank and its relief valve. 
This leaves the tank without any overpressure rupture protection if V-8 is closed. This 
is not noted in the HAZOP results given, although it is present in the FTA analysis 
included in the paper. In addition to these problems the HAZOP results shown are 
lacking in detail. 
Although not presented as a set of HAZOP results McCluer & Whittle (1992) detail 
some important safety recommendations generated by HAZOP of fluid catalytic 
cracking units (FCCUs). HAZOP of three FCCUs yielded between 150 and 200 
recommendations for each unit. From these detailed, specific recommendations, II 
generalised recommendations were derived and these are outlined in the paper along 
with a brief description of the nature of the problem and how hazards may be realised. 
These generalised recommendations largely relate to hazards and not operability 
problems. Also included is a detailed description of the operation of an FCCU and a 
description of the structure of the HAZOP. 
Sankaran (1993) shows how HAZOP has been applied to some non-process related 
projects. Three different sets of results are illustrated. They are for an electrical 
distribution system, a urea storage and shipping operation, and an underground tank 
removal. Although the results are not complete for any of these projects, they are 
detailed and some background material is included discussing each of these projects 
and how the HAZOP meetings were conducted. This paper provides very good 
examples, which illustrate how HAZOP could be applied in a wide variety of 
industries and the benefits that are achievable. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter provided an extensive review of the development of the conventional 
HAZOP procedure. It also highlighted the failings and effectiveness of HAZOP. The 
next chapter will consider the different ways of improving the performance of 
conventional HAZOP. 
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BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
3 Improving Conventional HAZOP Performance 
This chapter looks at how conventional HAZOP performance can be improved. 
Firstly the composition of HAZOP teams is looked at to see how their effectiveness 
can be maximised. Secondly, lessons from HAZOP experts, people with many years' 
experience of carrying out HAZOP in industry are considered. Finally the role of 
computer aids in conventional HAZOP is looked at, and the pros and cons of their use 
considered. 
3.1 Effective HAZOP Teams 
3.1.1 HAZOP Team Composition 
One of the reasons that HAZOP is so effective is because it stimulates a group of 
people of different disciplines to creatively think about and discuss possible problems. 
To maximise this effectiveness the team composition is vitally important. Basically it 
is necessary that the team should have amongst them the appropriate knowledge and 
experience required to identify the problems that may exist with the system under 
consideration. Along with this requirement for knowledge and experience, the team 
should also include an experienced HAZOP team leader and a HAZOP secretary. 
However in order to remain disciplined and efficient it is necessary that the team 
should not be too large. It would be recommended that no more than six people made 
up the team. 
The members of the team should be selected to achieve the right balance of 
knowledge and expertise. For HAZOP of a new chemical plant design, the most likely 
composition of a HAZOP team would be, project engineer, process engineer, 
instrumentation design engineer, and an independent team leader. In addition it may 
include a research chemist if necessary. For HAZOP of an existing plant the team 
would normally consist of the following people, plant supervisor, plant foreman, plant 
engineer, instrument manager, process investigation manager and independent team 
leader. For HAZOP of a modification or extension to an existing plant then some 
combination of these two groups would be used, bearing in mind that the total ought 
not to exceed six (Kletz, 1985). 
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3.1.2 HAZOP Secretary 
The HAZOP secretary or scribe plays an important part in the team, particularly in 
recording, as appropriate, the discussions of the team as a whole. Goyal (1994) 
identifies the following requirements of a good scribe, basic engineering/technical 
knowledge, linguistic skills, ability to type reasonably fast and familiarity with the 
recording system. In addition the scribe should have the ability to listen and pay 
attention to detail. However, in order to reduce the number of participants in a team, 
some companies are combining the roles of the HAZOP leader and the HAZOP 
secretary (Kletz, 1985). Apart from the advantage of reducing the personnel 
requirement, there is also the advantage that the HAZOP leader knows what is being 
recorded and that nothing important has been missed out. There would seem to be one 
significant disadvantage with this method and that is the rest of the HAZOP study 
team are often left waiting whilst the HAZOP team leader writes up his notes. In 
particular, this may impact on the ability of the HAZOP team leader to effectively 
manage the team. With a separate secretary this is not so much of a problem. Having a 
separate secretary also provides a good platform for training novice HAZOP team 
leaders. Alternatively the project engineer could also be used as the secretary. He will 
already be familiar with the reference numbers for different parts of the plant and will 
have a good incentive to make sure that all relevant discussion is captured. 
3.1.3 HAZOP Team Leader 
The HAZOP team leader is mainly responsible for making sure that the team follows 
the HAZOP procedure. In addition he should make sure that the team works 
efficiently and effectively, primarily by controlling the discussion and stimulating 
team thinking. Although HAZOP studies have a definite systematic methodology it is 
widely recognised that many HAZOP team leaders adopt different approaches. It has 
also been shown (Freeman et al., 1992) that expert HAZOP team leaders will conduct 
a hazard study faster than their novice counterparts. Our own study (Jefferson et al, 
1995a) confirms the finding of Freeman et al. 
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The main question arising from our analysis is, "How can novice HAZOP team 
leaders be trained most effectively? " An important feature of HAZOP is that it can be 
applied flexibly, either to identify first a consequence of a certain deviation or to 
identify first a cause of a deviation. However, novices do not appreciate this 
flexibility. This does not necessarily compromise the integrity of the HAZOP but can 
lead to inefficient use of time. Proper training of novices is required to reduce this 
inefficiency. Expert team leaders are marked out by their ability to choose, by some 
mechanism, the most appropriate route for the team to follow to identify efficiently 
the cause consequence scenarios of interest. Novices should be made aware that they 
can be flexible when leading HAZOP meetings. It works most effectively when there 
is no prescribed direction to follow from deviation to cause or deviation to 
consequence. 
3.1.4 HAZOP Meetings 
One option for improving HAZOP is to make sure that the meetings are set up in such 
a way that the HAZOP team members are given the best opportunity to perform at 
their most effective. This includes things such as, making sure meetings are not too 
long, allowing sufficient breaks during meetings and having a good environment for 
the meeting. 
Determining the maximum length of individual HAZOP meetings would seem to be a 
compromise between reducing the overall time span required for the HAZOP and 
allowing HAZOP participants as much time as possible to carry out their normal 
duties. However, there is evidence that no such compromise is necessary. It has been 
noted (Pully, 1993) that for a complete HAZOP of similar units, the number of hours 
spent on the HAZOP was halved when meetings were held for only four hours per 
day rather than 8 hours per day (half day sessions as opposed to full day sessions). In 
other words the overall time span for the complete HAZOP was the same. Dowell 
(1994) suggests that meetings are restricted to 3-4 days per week with 6 hours of 
meeting sessions each day. The general consensus is that if any more hours per week 
are spent carrying out the meetings, the participants become fatigued and there is 
more pressure for them to miss HAZOP meetings in order to continue their normal 
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duties. Fatigue results in a lack of drive, enthusiasm and creativity, and makes for less 
efficient and effective meetings. The pressure to miss HAZOP meetings results in at 
least late arrivals and early departures, and this disruption further impedes the 
progress of the study. On the other hand, if any less time is spent per week, then a 
significant proportion of that time is spent getting back up to speed on the details of 
the P&IDs, the process and the HAZOP procedure. Sweeney (1993) suggests that if 8 
hours of meetings per day are required to facilitate an urgent HAZOP, then these 
should not extend beyond two weeks before a substantial break is provided. However, 
I think it is fairly clear given the observations above that unless the entire HAZOP can 
be completed within those two weeks then it is probably not worthwhile. Indeed, 
Jones (1992) reckons that in practice, for studies lasting more than about a week, a 
five hour per day meeting schedule can accomplish almost as much as one lasting 
eight hours per day. 
3.2 Lessons Learned from IIAZOP in Industry 
A number of papers exist, written by people who have carried out HAZOP for a 
number of years, detailing additional guide lines that they have developed over the 
years in order to make the HAZOP as efficient and effective as possible. 
These suggestions can usefully be differentiated into two main groups, those that are 
applicable in the setting up of the HAZOP meeting, those that are applicable in the 
carrying out of the meeting. Establishing a safe environment for team members is an 
example of a requirement that must be met in the setting up of a HAZOP meeting. 
This sort of requirement would need to be used by both HAZOP team leaders and 
managers in charge of setting up HAZOP meetings. Giving too little credit for 
safeguards is applicable to the carrying out of the meeting. Suggestions applicable to 
the carrying out of meetings would need to be recognised and utilised by HAZOP 
team leaders. 
There are a large number of papers available discussing the selection of members of 
the HAZOP team. These papers are written by experienced HAZOP practitioners, 
generally HAZOP team leaders, and provide valuable guidelines on how tearn 
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selection can affect HAZOP performance. 
Lihou (1986) gives some valuable insights into how team members should perform 
within a HAZOP team. He identifies the following roles and suggests team members 
should be able to move freely between roles: 
" Expert Informant: The person who can explain how a new process is 
intended to operate or how an existing plant is operated. 
" Experienced Unbeliever: The person who recognises similarities between 
the item being examined and others that have been problematical. 
" Enthusiastic Pupil: The person who asks from clarification from the 
-exper&' and/or the unbeliever thereby helping them to be sure that their 
advice is relevant in the current situation. 
" Logical Goalkeeper: The person who prevents fallacious solutions to 
possible hazards identified being included in the "action7' lists. 
These can be grouped together and I will refer to them subsequently as HAZOP team 
selection. 
He also details the responsibilities of HAZOP team leaders and gives some guidance 
on other aspects of carrying out effective HAZOP. 
Jones (1992) has put together a very detailed list of potential pitfalls and common 
mistakes made during HAZOP, as well as detailing some potential HAZOP benefits. 
The possible benefits of HAZOP that he identifies are: 
A systematic and thorough review can be made of existing plant. 
Evaluation of the consequences of human error can be made. 
Subtle sequences of events that lead to unique accidents are identified. 
Plant efficiency can be improved. 
A better understanding of plant operations is gained by operators and 
engineers. 
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Potential HAZOP pitfalls identified are: 
Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure and resources 
required. 
Inexperienced HAZOP team. 
Inadequately trained or inexperienced HAZOP team leader. 
Some of the mistakes he identifies are those associated with the role of the team 
leader. They are: 
Failing to establish a "safe" environment (in terms of being free from 
recriminations) for team members. 
0 Consequences of events not carried to conclusion. 
Giving unwarranted credit to safeguards. 
Too little or no credit given for safeguards. 
0 Making recommendations where follow-up is difficult. 
0 Poor recording of HAZOP. 
General mistakes that can occur and which can hamper the progress of HAZOP are: 
Failure to HAZOP start-up and shutdown procedures. 
Poorly updated P&lDs. 
Carrying out a HAZOP in place of properly executed design reviews. 
Wrong technique for the system being reviewed. 
HAZOP sessions that run too long each day. 
Using the recommendations from the above references and separating them into two 
groups, I have generated the following lists of suggestions for improving HAZOP. 
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Suggestions for HAZOP managers and HAZOP team leaders for setting up HAZOP 
meetings 
Select the correct HAZOP team. 
Establish a 'safe' environment for team members. 
Schedule HAZOP sessions in a reasonable way. 
Make sure proper resources are available. 
Use properly trained HAZOP team leaders. 
Make sure proper design reviews have been carried out. 
Use up-to-date P&IDs. 
Suggestions for HAZOP team leaders for carrying out HAZOP meetings: 
Make sure HAZOP sessions do not run on too long. 
Allow plenty of breaks at suitable intervals. 
Give appropriate credit for safeguards. 
Make sure recommendations are suitable. 
Make sure a proper record of the meeting is made. 
Make sure start-up and shutdown procedures are analysed. 
Make sure all necessary information is available. 
3.3 Computer Aids in Conventional HAZOP 
In the past few years, a number of computer programs have been developed to assist 
in the carrying out of HAZOP (e. g. PrimaTech, 1994; Sigma-Lambda, 1995). On the 
whole these are simple secretarial tools to provide a convenient way of turning the 
deliberations of a HAZOP meeting into a formal, structured report. They also provide 
a prompt for the team, suggesting the next guide word and process variable requiring 
consideration. However, these computer tools have also, in general, not reduced the 
time taken for hazard identification. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
The conventional HAZOP procedure has been established for a long time. Some work 
has been done on improving the HAZOP procedure and on shortening the time 
required for HAZOP meetings based on experience. However, there is a limit to what 
can be achieved due to the exhaustive nature of the approach taken in HAZOP. More 
radical approaches will need to be considered in order to bring about drastic 
improvements. 
In the future there is the possibility that HAZOP will be performed automatically by 
computer. Loughborough University is at the forefront of these developments (Chung, 
1993 & Jefferson et al., 1995b). Automated HAZOP offers a considerable reduction 
in the amount of time required for hazard identification, however it is unclear how 
effective it will be in identifying all hazards. The next chapter looks at the 
possibilities for improvement afforded by automating hazard identification. 
Chapters 5 to 7 will deal comprehensively with the idea and methodology of modular 
HAZOP that has been developed through this project. 
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4 Automated HAZOP 
One possible route for speeding up the identification of hazards in chemical plant is to 
use computers to identify hazards automatically. The pioneering work in this area was 
first carried out by Parmar and Lees (Parmar 1987; Parmar and Lees 1987a, 1987b). 
They set out to develop a hazard identification tool based earlier work by Lees and 
colleagues on fault propagation and fault tree synthesis (Martin-Solis et al 1977,1980, 
1982; Kelly and Lees 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d). They did not originally assume 
that it would necessarily emulate HAZOP. They considered variants more akin to 
fault trees and to failure modes and effects analysis, but concluded that the HAZOP 
approach of examining every potential deviation in every line does offer the best 
assurance of completeness and therefore developed their initial version of HAZID as, 
in effect, a HAZOP emulator. There are now a number of research prototypes 
described in the literature that adopt the same approach developed by Parmer and 
Lees (Zerkani and Rushton 1993; Venkatsubramanian and Vaidhyanathan 1994; 
Jefferson et al. 1995b; Larkin et al. 1997; Wakeman et al. 1997). 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a general description of the 
common approach that is used in many of the automated HAZOP systems developed 
so far. Second, it highlights the research issues that need to be addressed in order to 
build fully functional systems that will be accepted by engineers. 
4.1 Representing Causal Relationships 
To emulate HAZOP, a program needs to be able to infer how a process plant behaves 
in qualitative terms, i. e. how the increase, or decrease, in one process variable will 
affect other variables in the plant. Given a process plant description, it is possible to 
declare causal relationships between all of the process variables in the plant. Consider 
the small plant fragment shown in figure 4.1. If we only consider the property of flow 
in this system then we can define ten process variables, i. e. the flow at each inlet and 
outlet of each piece of equipment. Any given variable may depend on any of the other 
nine. There are ninety dependencies in all. Once these dependencies have been 
declared, then it becomes a simple task to see the effect that a change in one variable 
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has on other variables in the systern. 
in2 
in 
out m, out inl 11 -1 1 outl in 
vlol 
plol hIO1 I out2 
Figure 4.1 - Small plant fragment 
vl 02 
In a large plant it is unrealistic to expect that every causal relationship could be 
explicitly declared. A more economic approach, taken here, uses the assumption that 
the causal relationships within an item of equipment are independent of the context of 
equipment in the plant, together with a method of generating causal dependencies 
between adjacent equipment. This approach dramatically reduces the number of 
dependencies that need to be declared and still allows the dependencies between 
remote process variables to be deduced. Because the description of causal 
relationships is at the equipment level, rather than at the plant level, it is easier to 
ensure and to maintain correctness and completeness. 
A common representation for modelling causal relationships is the Signed Directed 
Graph (SDG). SDGs were first used for studying process plants by Iri et al. (1979). 
Since then the SDG representation has been widely used by other researchers. 
A directed graph consists of a network of nodes and arcs. A node represents a 
variable. An arc from a node, X, to another node, Y, indicates that a change in the 
variable X will cause a change in the variable Y. In other words, Y is dependent on X. 
Therefore, a directed graph can also be called an influence diagram or dependence 
diagram (MacCallum, 1981). An SDG is an extension of a directed graph. Each arc of 
the graph is labelled with a sign "-+-" or The sign "+" indicates a positive 
influence, i. e. Y will increase if X is increased and Y will decrease if X is decreased. 
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The sign 'V' indicates a negative influence, i. e. Y will decrease if X is increased and 
Y will increase if X is decreased. 
An SDG can be derived empirically or from conventional differential and algebraic 
equations that model the behaviour of a particular plant in numerical terms. However, 
as mentioned earlier, constructing a SDG from scratch for a complete plant can be a 
very time consuming process. Fortunately, process plants, like other physical systems, 
are built by connecting a set of smaller equipments together to perform the required 
functions. The behaviour of each of these equipments can be described in a system 
independent manner. By combining the equipment descriptions the behaviour of a 
whole plant can then be analysed. This idea of generating a complete plant model 
from equipment descriptions is used by a number of researchers (Lees and Kelly, 
1986; Oyeleye and Kramer, 1989; Catino, et al., 1991). For the SDG representation, 
an equipment description consists of a mini-SDG -a set of propagation arcs - which 
shows how a change in one process variable affects another variable within the same 
equipment. A deviation in one equipment can be propagated either upstream or 
downstream through the inport and outport connections. Therefore, the SDG for a 
complete plant is generated by joining the appropriate mini-SDGs together as 
appropriate for the plant topology. 
4.2 Automated HAZOP System Overview 
A general architecture for an automated HAZOP system is shown in figure 4.2. The 
unit library contains unit models, which are mini-SDGs of common items of 
equipment found in continuous plants. The unit model of an item of equipment 
describes the behaviour of process variables, failure modes and the consequences 
associated with the failure modes and deviations. The plant model is a description of 
the plant underanalysis based on the equipment in the plant and how it is connected. 
The equipment in the plant is declared by reference to unit models in the unit library. 
The main element of the system is the inference engine. It has three basic functions, 
which are: 
e Creation of the plant SDG from the information given in the plant model and 
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component library. 
Emulation of the conventional HAZOP procedure. 
Search of the plant SDG for causes and consequences for a given deviation. 
Component 
Library 
I 
Plant Inference Plant 
Model 
I 
Engine SDG 
Reiults 
Figure 4.2 - General Architecture for Automated HAZOP System 
4.2.1 Unit Models 
Unit models in the component library define the default behaviour and attribute values 
for different types of equipment. Each unit model is specified as a frame, which is 
similar to the idea of an object in object-oriented programming (Coad and Yourdon, 
1991). For example the unit model for a pipe is defined as: 
frame( pipe isa unit, 
[inports is [in], 
outports is [out], 
propLinks are [ 
arc([in, flow], +, [out, flowl), 
arc([out, flow], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fauIt, leakj, -, out, flowj), 
arc([fault, leak], +, [inflow]), 
arcQfault, leak], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]), 
arc([in, temp], +, [out, temp]), 
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arc([in, pressure], +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([in, composition], +, [out, composition]), 
other arcs] 
other attributes related to a pipe 
*11]), 
This says that a pipe is a sub-class of unit, i. e. it inherits the attributes and the default 
values associated with a unit. A pipe has one inport called in and one outport called 
out. The attribute propLinks stores a list of arcs that define, the mini-SDG related to a 
pipe. The first eight lines represent the SDG fragments shown in figure 4.3. 
[consequence, contaminate environment] -d + [fault, leak] 
[out, flow] + [in, flow] 
[in, temp] [out, temp] 
[in, pressure] -*[out, pressure] 
[in, composition] [out, composition] 
Figure 43 - Partial signed directed graph for a pipe 
4.2.2 Plant Description 
The plant model is a description of a plant constructed with respect to. the way in 
which its process equipment is connected. The equipment in the plant is declared by 
referencing unit models in the unit library. The description file can be generated from 
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a CAD system or constructed using a text editor. The plant fragment shown in figure 
4.1 is described as: 
instance(p 10 1 isa pump, outports info [out is [vI 0 ljnfl). 
instance(vlOl isa valve, outports info [out is [hl0l, inlfl). 
instance(hlOl isa heatExchanger, outports info [outl is [v102, infl). 
instance(v102 isa valve). 
4.2.3 Inference Engine 
The inference engine takes a plant description as input and builds up the plant SDG 
from the textual representations of arcs in the unit library with regard to the unit 
models and their connections as specified in the plant description. The inference 
engine also has a HAZOP emulation driver. By searching the plant SDG in an 
appropriate manner it effectively emulates conventional HAZOP. The detail of 
HAZOP emulation is described in the following sections. 
4.3 HAZOP Emulation - PRELIMINARY STEPS 
Figure 4.4 illustrates steps in the method used to emulate conventiortal HAZOP. 
Conventional HAZOP is a powerful technique and has been developed for use on 
both continuous and batch processes. However, automated HAZOP systems have so 
far only been developed to handle continuous processes. This reduces the number of 
guide words and intentions that need to be handled. For continuous plant the main 
process deviations that can be generated from the combination of guide word and 
intention are: 
IRGII/LOWFLOW 
NO FLOW 
REVERSE FLOW 
1-UGII/LOW PRESSURE 
I-HGHJLOW TENTERATURE 
IUGH/LOW LEVEL 
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These process deviations are considered in turn for every port, although there is an 
exception with HIGH and LOW LEVEL which are applied to vessels only. 
Start 
Select a 
Dlant unit 
Select a 
Select a 
vrocess deviation 
Find all faults leadiýg I 
to the process deviation I 
I 
r Find all consequences of 
faults and of deviation 
Repeat for I 
all faults 
I 
Repeat for 
all deviations 
Repeat for 
all ports 
Repeat for 
all lines/main units 
End 
Figure 4.4 - Basic method for automated HAZOP 
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4.4 HAZOP EMULATION - Identifying Faults and Consequences 
4.4.1 Representing Faults and Consequences 
Figure 4.5 shows part of the SDG of a plant fragment with two pipes and a valve. 
Pipel is connected to the inport of valvel and the outport of valvel is connected to 
the inport of pipe 2. The top, middle and bottom parts of the figure are the mini-SDGs 
for pipel, valvel and pipe2 respectively. The three parts are joined together by 
linking the appropriate interfacing nodes. 
[in, flow] 4 [out, flow] Pipel 
-+ AL 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
[consequence, contaminate environment] 
+ [fault, leak] 
4+ 
Valvel 
[out, flow] [in, flow] 
........................................... ................... ...... . .... . .................... . .................... . ...... . ... ............. . ............ , 
I** 
T-1-11-1-111-1--- 
4 
[in, flow] [out, flow] Pipe2 
Figure 4.5 - Signed Directed Graph 
In the notation that is used here, each node in the graph that makes reference to a 
process variable has two parts. The first part specifies the port and the second the 
particular process variable. When a node represents a fault condition, the first part is 
the word 'fault' and the second part is the fault description. When a node represents a 
consequence, the first part is the word 'consequence' and the second part is the 
consequence description. Note that only nodes related to flow, and only one fault 
condition and one consequence are shown in the figure. 
4.4.2 Identifying Process Variable Influences 
Given the SDG of a plant, the way in which one variable affects another can be 
established by identifying an acyclic path joining the two nodes of interest. An acyclic 
path has no node repeated in it. The sign of the influence that a change in the initial 
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node has on the fmal node in the path is the product of all the signs in the path. For 
example, given the SDG in figure 4.5, the way in which the change in pipel [in, flow] 
affects pipe2 [in, flow] is determined by the following acyclic path: 
Pipel 1 Valvel I Pipe2 
[in, flowl±--o. [out, flowl±-L[in, flowj±-+[out, flowl±4 [in, flow] 
The product of all the signs in the path is 'Y'. Therefore, an increase in pipel [in, 
flow] will give rise to an increase in pipe2 [in, flow]; a decrease in pipel [in, flow] 
will give rise to a decrease in pipe2 [in, flow]. If we consider the effect of a leak in 
Valvel then it has a positive influence on the in flow of pipel upstream but has a 
negative influence on the outflow of pipe2 downstream, i. e. a leak will result in more 
flow in pipe I but less flow in pipe2: 
Pipel I Valvel I Pipe2 
[out, flow]+'-+ [in, flow]*-±- [fault, leakT: -"[out, flowjLo. [in, flow] 
If there does not exist a path joining any two nodes then the two nodes are 
independent. 
4.4.3 Search Strategies 
Given the ability to represent local causal relationships for a process plant, what will a 
system need in order for it to be able to reason about those dependencies? At the most 
fundamental and general level, two types of questions exist in hazard identification: 
e What can cause event A to happen? Example questions include "What could cause 
the storage tank to rupturcT and "What could cause high temperature at the heat 
exchanger outletT 
o What will happen as a result of event B happening? An example question is "What 
-41- 
will happen if this pump stopsT 
The answers to each type of question are found by using two different search 
strategies, known as backward and forward searches respectively. To answer the first 
type of question, we construct a path from the final event by following the arcs 
backwards in order to determine what sequence of influences could have caused it. To 
answer the second type of question, we construct a path from the initial cause by 
following the arcs forward to determine any consequences of that event. 
In emulating HAZOP we are interested in exploring all the faults that will lead to a 
particular deviation and all the consequences associated with the deviation. Therefore, 
searches have to be done exhaustively, whether searching forward or backward from a 
given node. The term exhaustive here refers to the requirement that from some point 
in the graph we must ensure that all possible paths through the graph to its boundaries 
are developed. Only by doing this can we be sure that all influences between the given 
node and every other node have been considered. 
Two common search strategies, which can be used to traverse a graph exhaustively, 
are the breadth first search and the depth first search (Winston, 1984). The breadth 
first search method proceeds from some start point and develops all paths from that 
point in parallel. If the start point has N arcs connecting it to other nodes then the first 
step of the search will produce N paths of length 1. If each of those N arcs lead to 
nodes which have M arcs leaving, then the next step will produce N*M Paths of 
length 2. 
The depth first search method proceeds from some start point by first developing a 
singl. e. path as deeply as possible. When that path reaches a terminating node, the 
algorithm will backtrack to the last node from which a new sub-path remains to be 
developed and attempt to extend from that node. Again this new development will go 
as deep as possible before backtracking. 
For an exhaustive search there is no difference in the efficiency of these two 
strategies. Both will traverse the same number of arcs and produce the same end 
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result. 
4.4.4 Linking Causes and Consequences 
In conventional HAZOP, having established a possible process deviation from a guide 
word and intention, the team will simultaneously attempt to identify possible faults 
that give rise to this deviation and consequences of this deviation. The intention is to 
come up with a realistic cause-consequence scenario. If no consequences are found 
then causes are not a problem and if no causes can be found the consequences should 
never occur. If no realistic cause-consequence scenario can be found then the HAZOP 
team will move on to consider the next process deviation. 
In the SDG representation consequences can be linked to both faults and process 
deviations. The inference engine is directed to search backwards first, from a process 
deviation to a cause. Having established different faults as causes, then a fairly simple 
method is used for identifying consequences. Firstly, consequences are identified if 
they are directly linked to the process deviation, at the item of equipment and the port 
under consideration. Secondly, consequences are identified if they are directly linked 
with any faults leading to the process deviation under consideration. Thirdly, 
consequences are identified if they are linked to any of the deviations between any of 
the faults and the process deviation under consideration. 
Considering figure 4.6, if the original query was made concerning deviation 3, then 
the inference engine traces back and finds two faults: cause I and cause 2. Having 
found these faults it looks for consequences. Consequence 5 is directly linked to 
deviation3. Consequences I and 2 are directly linked to cause 1. Consequence 4 is 
also identified as it is linked to deviation I which is in the path between the fault and 
deviation 3 (the deviation under consideration). Consequence 3 is identified as it is 
linked to cause 2. The output generated is shown in table 4.1. 
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cause 3 consequence 7 
deviation 5 deviation 6----o- 
consequence 4 consequence 5 
dcvilonl 0- deviation 2--P-d: 
ýa'ý-tion 
3-0- deviation 40 
co 
cause cause 2 consequence 6 
consequence consequence 2 consequence 3 
Figure 4.6 - Connection between faults and consequences 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences 
deviation 3 cause I 
cause 
consequence 1,2,4 &5 
consequence 3&5 
Table 4.1- Partial output from hazard identification system 
4.5 Research and Development Issues 
The preceding sections have given a general overview of the basic features of an 
automated HAZOP system. This section highlights the research and development 
issues that typically arise in developing a tool of this kind. 
4.5.1 Conflguration Defects 
A particular class of problem in plant design is that associated with the configuration 
of the units. There are certain configurations which may be questioned, based on 
experience of problems with similar configurations, without resort to fault 
propagation. An example is the case of a control valve at the end of a long pipeline 
containing liquid. This configuration immediately suggests potential for water 
hammer. This type of situation can therefore be dealt with by a simple configuration 
rule. 
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4.5.2 Data Acquisition 
A common problem in computer aids for process plant design is that of data 
acquisition. The value of the tool is greatly reduced or even negated if the data input 
overheads are excessive. It might be expected, since computer aided design (CAD) 
systems have been around for some time, that there should be little problem in 
downloading basic plant data, but in fact this is not the case. CAD systems are still 
fragmented and there is not a universal interface into which a computer aid of the kind 
described can be "plugged". The designer of such a system is therefore faced with the 
need to provide the interfaces necessary for the acquisition of the required data. The 
main pieces of information required to represent a chemical plant are: 
Plant Description: Essential data are those given in the Engineering Line Diagram 
(ELD) of the plant, namely the constituent units, including the controls, and their 
connectivities. Equally essential are data on the properties, state and composition of 
the fluids in the plant and the design envelope of the plant defined in terms of 
pressure, temperature, etc. It is also necessary to have what may be termed 
"configurational" information. For example, it is necessary to know whether a set of 
two pumps shown piped up in parallel is to be run as a set of two pumps operating in 
parallel or as a set with one normally operating and one on standby. Likewise, if there 
are two pressure relief valves in parallel it is necessary to know their duty and 
capacity. 
Operating Instructions: It is then necessary to create within the program a plant 
representation which conforms with the method of analysis to be used. This also is not 
a trivial problem. For example, a plant is, or should be, designed to be operated in a 
particular way. The operating procedures therefore constitute a further set of 
information required for effective hazard identification. 
Unit Models: In the methodology used, the individual units are each represented by a 
unit model. Each unit model is a set of qualitative relations equivalent to a signed 
directed graph. The formulation of high quality models requires some experience and 
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effort. The provision of a unit model library is a partial solution, but experience shows 
that in most cases when constructing a new plant description it is necessary to 
configure one or two new models. It is necessary therefore to provide some form of 
tool to assist the user in creating these models. The user can expect to find in the unit 
model library the great majority of the models required. Guidance, however, should 
be provided to ensure a correct selection. This points to the need for a sound structure 
for the library. 
4.5.3 Protections 
HAZOP record sheets often have a column which indicates the protections available 
for the deviations examined. These protections are typically alarms, pressure relief 
devices, controls and trips. A computer aided method is more complete if it can 
identify where such protections exist. Early work on dealing with control in the 
context of fault tree synthesis was carried out by Shafahi et al. (1984). Chung (1993) 
has developed an algorithm for analysing the propagation of control signals using 
signed directed graphs. The algorithm is used in the CHEQUER system (Jefferson et 
al., 1995 (b)) for generating the protection column entries for HAZOP. 
4.5.4 Search Efficiency 
Another issue is search efficiency and program run time. Despite the power of current 
PCs, it is still necessary to try to limit the searches and to make them as economical as 
practical. Some work on improving the search algorithm was carried out at 
Loughborough University under the STOPHAZ project (McCoy, 1999). 
4.5.5 Output Quality 
With regard to the format of the output record, the intent is that an automated hazard 
identification system should broadly follow that of a conventional HAZOP. It is 
characteristic of computer generated searches that they tend to produce output which 
users do not find "naturar'. The issue of casting the output in a form acceptable to 
users should be specifically addressed. 
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Another characteristic of computer-generated output in HAZOP emulations is that it 
tends to include an excessive number of unimportant consequences. In a conventional 
HAZOP these are "filtered out", often almost unconsciously. Handling of the large 
number of "false positivee' is perhaps the single most significant problem in 
developing an acceptable tool. It is necessary to rank the consequences and to remove 
the less significant, though the user can be given some control over the threshold for 
reporting consequences. (McCoy et al. 1999) 
Even if a consequence is retained as significant, there can still be a problem with an 
excessive number of causes, most of which arc unimportant. This again requires 
specific treatment. 
Another aspect of quality in the output is completeness in identifying important 
consequences. Such completeness is largely a function of the quality of features such 
as the unit models and fluid model. 
Finally, the output needs to be as free as possible of the outright errors and nonsenses 
to which computer-generated output tends to be prone. The only solution to this 
problem is high quality work throughout the system. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter described how hazard identification can be automated by emulating 
conventional hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). There are a number of major 
research projects that have been carried out in this area. Although the basic fault 
propagation methodology is simple, there are major research and development issues 
that need to be addressed before such a tool will reach a level that is acceptable and 
used by engineers. 
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5 Modular HAZOP Theory and Principles 
The first section of this chapter gives a summary of what has been done in modular 
HAZOP related work to set the scene. The rest of the chapter discusses the theory and 
principles behind the modular HAZOP approach. In particular it sets out definitions 
that are used in modular HAZOP. 
5.1 Literature Relating to Modular HAZOP. 
There is no literature that I am aware of that makes reference to the form of modular 
HAZOP developed in this thesis. The most similar developments of HAZOP appear 
to be those described by Black & Ponton (1993) and Toola, (1992). 
Black & Ponton describe a method for hierarchical HAZOP which is based upon the 
decomposition of process plant according to Douglas (1988). However, the type of 
decomposition he describes is not suitable for the type of modular HAZOP we are 
interested in. The levels of decomposition described by Douglas are: 
1. Process input-output structure. 
2. Recycle structure. 
3. Separation sequence. 
4. Energy integration. 
For hierarchical HAZOP, Black & Ponton, apply the HAZOP procedure to each level 
of the above decomposition of the plant as it is designed. Although, as they identify in 
their conclusion, this form of HAZOP enables hazards to be identified earlier, it 
would seem more appropriate to apply a method like the ICI six stage hazard study 
procedure (Duxbury & Turney, 1989). There are two possible advantages of the 
hierarchical HAZOP approach over the ICI six stage hazard study. Firstly it may be 
able to identify hazards due to interactions between equipment at an earlier stage. 
Secondly, it may make the final HAZOP simpler. On the first of these points, I 
suspect that very few interaction hazards are apparent until the detail of equipment is 
known and for the other point it is unclear whether the time saved in the final HAZOP 
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is either significant or is not negated by additional time spent on earlier HAZOP. 
Toola (1992) describes an approach to hazard identification at the plant level. This 
plant level safety analysis includes a HAZOP of the plant using a functional block 
diagram as the model of the system rather than a MID or ELD. This approach was 
compared by Toola with a conventional detailed HAZOP of the plant using a P&ID. 
The differences in hazards identified reflected the level of detail presented in each 
case. For the plant level analysis, hazards were more easily identified where they were 
due to the interaction between the blocks making up the functional block diagram. 
Although detailed HAZOP of a plant should identify haza ds due to the interaction 
between distant units, the sheer scale of the plant and size of the drawings involved 
makes this a difficult task. For the detailed analysis the hazards were more easily 
identified at the component level. A modular HAZOP methodology ought to be able 
to identify both of these types of hazards. 
5.2 Decomposition of Plant for Modular HAZOP 
The principal reason for developing modular HAZOP is to reduce the time taken for 
effective haza d identification through the use of sets of previously generated HAZOP 
results. These sets of results will be referred to as preHAZOPed results. These 
preHAZOPed results are generated for equipment modules. In order for there to be 
any significant time saving, these preHAZOPed results must be of reasonably sized 
sections of plant. Conversely, they must not be so large as to make the preHAZOPed 
results useless with regards to applicability to new plant. This section looks at the 
problems that need to be addressed in looking at the level of decomposition required 
in creating equipment modules for the generation of preHAZOPed results. To some 
extent in existing HAZOP meetings, the plant may be broken into modular sections in 
order to simplify the study procedure. For example, a pump set is unlikely to be 
decomposed into its component parts - valves, impeller, motor, etc. - and each 
considered separately. Instead, a set of knowledge relevant to the module will be used. 
in the case of a pump this would include knowledge of motor failure and impeller 
failure. 
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5.2.1 Levels of Decomposition 
Firstly at the lowest practical level of decomposition (figure 5.1) we can break each 
item of a plant up into its basic constituent elements. These component modules are 
connected either by electrical, hydraulic or mechanical links. A pump may be broken 
down into a motor, gearbox, impeller, etc. This level of decomposition goes even 
further than the line by line decomposition employed, certainly by experienced 
HAZOP teams, in conventional HAZOP. 
Figure 5.1 - First level of decomposition. Component level. 
At the next level of decomposition (figure 5.2) we can consider the plant being made 
of equipment modules. These are groups of components which perform functions at a 
very simple level. These equipment modules may be pumps, heat exchangers, 
pipelines, vessels, etc. Included within these modules will be the relevant valves and 
connecting pipes. This is the level at which experienced HAZOP leaders conduct their 
meetings. They know that they do not need to consider each valve or pipe and they 
have built up a set of knowledge, particularly of faults and consequences for many of 
these equipment modules. 
-3rl - 
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Figure 5.2 - Second level of decomposition. Equipment modules. 
The next level of decomposition (figure 5.3) is to consider the plant as being made up 
of a set of functional modules. These might be functions such as reaction, separation, 
storage, refrigeration etc. These modules will be interconnected in some way and they 
may also have connections to the outside world. The main problem here would seem 
to be defining exactly what constitutes a functional module. For example, a separation 
module may be defined as being made up of pumping equipment, vessels, and 
condensers, or it may be more simply defined as just a separating vessel. From a 
hazard identification point of view the main problem is whether or not it is possible to 
identify all the hazards within these functional modules. In terms of reducing the time 
taken to perforrn hazard identification the larger the modules are the less time it is 
likely to take to carry out modular HAZOP. On the other hand, the larger the modules 
are the less likely it is that they will be re-used in future plants. 
This level of decomposition may be used in conventional HAZOP in certain 
circumstances. For example, some of the connections to the plant may not be subject 
to rigorous HAZOP, only known causes and consequences will be considered based 
on the functionality of the system connected. Examples might be cooling water 
supplies, nitrogen supplies and power supplies. In the case of a power supply the 
HAZOP team would probably only consider complete failure. Although other failure 
modes could be conceived, based on their previous experience of power supplies, only 
complete failure would be considered. No consideration is normally given to the 
components making up the power supply, it is treated strictly on a functional basis. 
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Figure 53 - Third level of decomposition. Functional modules. 
At the highest level of decomposition (figure 5.4) we can take a plant as a complete 
entity with connections to the outside world. These connections to the outside world 
will include the environment and operating personnel as well as physical connections 
to other plants or tanker loading and unloading facilities. Hazard identification is 
applied to try to identify the possible haza dous effects that the plant may have on 
people and the environment. However, unless the plant is identical to one for which 
all the possible hazards are known then there is no way to identify the hazards at this 
level of decomposition. Figure 5.4 illustrates this top level of decomposition. 
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Figure 5.4 - Fourth (highest) level of decomposition. Plant level. 
It should be noted that there is some overlap between each of these levels of 
decomposition as illustrated above. For example, a valve could be considered as an 
equipment module and broken down into its component parts or it may be considered 
as a component of say a pump module. A condenser could be considered as either a 
functional module or an equipment module. It may be considered an equipment 
module when it forms part of a distillation column, but a functional module if it 
occurs in isolation. There are no formal defmitions of where the boundaries between 
these different levels of decomposition lie. Nor is any needed as the different levels of 
decomposition are intended as illustration only. 
This discussion illustrates several things. Modules must contain sufficient detail that 
the results generated are accurate and complete. In terms of time saving, ideally we 
would like to be able to identify hazards in modules at the functional level. The larger 
the modules that we use, the more time can be saved over conventional HAZOP. This 
will reduce considerably the number of items studied at HAZOP while still 
identifying (hopefully) all the possible hazards. However, the larger the module, the 
less likelihood there is that it can be reused in future projects. If the module cannot be 
reused then there is potentially no time saving, although the overall time taken for 
modular HAZOP of a complete plant may still be less than the time taken for 
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conventional HAZOP of the same plant, even if time is spent generating 
preHAZOPed results for modules which may have no or limited possibility of reuse. 
5.2.2 Sub-modules 
To solve the conflicting requirements of making the modules as large as possible to 
save time but small enough to be useful in numerous projects and to be sufficiently 
detailed, the concept of sub-modules was introduced. The aim is to optimise the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the modules while minimising the number required. 
The intention is that rather than having a large number of different preHAZOPed 
module results, one for every variation of equipment and its arrangement that might 
make up a module, it should be possible to create these results by piecing together 
results for sub-modules. The approach taken is that, modules are defMed on a 
functional level and are made up of a number of sub-modules which are defmed 
substantially at an equipment level. The connections between sub-modules within a 
module are defined explicitly so there is no significant time taken up in generating the 
preHAZOPed results for a module from the preHAZOPed results for each sub- 
module. 
As an example of the use of sub-modules and particularly how they introduce 
flexibility for applying the same sub-modules to analysis of different plants, consider 
a stock tank. The basic stock tank module consists of the following sub-modules, inlet 
sub-module, tank itself, outlet sub-module and a vent sub-module. The outlet sub- 
module could be a single pump, or two pumps operating continuously or two pumps, 
one running, one spare. The inlet sub-module could be a continuous feed from another 
part of the plant or it may be a batch feed from a tanker. The vent sub-module could 
either be an open vent to atmosphere or an inert gas blanket. These few simple 
examples provide 12 different stock tank arrangements. As a further example, the 
preHAZOPed results for a stock tank with a heating coil would only require the 
addition of the results for a heating coil sub-module to be added to the standard stock 
tank results. 
In some cases it may not be necessary to create new preHAZOPed results for each 
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variation of a sub-module as the effects on the module may be very slight and the 
same results could be used for a variety of different sub-module configurations. If we 
consider an inert gas venting sub-module for a stock tank module, it is possible to 
envisage a couple of different control strategies. However, in this case, similar 
problems are encountered whatever arrangement is used, so it would not seem 
necessary to have a different set of sub-module results for each, though some 
additional comments may be appropriate. 
The main problem envisaged is dealing with the interaction between sub-modules. It 
is foreseeable that there are cases where the choice of one sub-module affects the 
preHAZOPed results of another sub-module. It is hoped that through appropriate 
comments in the preHAZOPed results most problems can be overcome. However 
there may be cases where it is necessary to select different sub-module results for a 
given sub-module depending on the selection of other sub-modules that make up a 
particular module. 
5.3 Principles of Hazard Identification Using Modular HAZOP 
5.3.1 Dealing with Interconnections 
The approach taken in modular HAZOP for dealing with the interconnections 
between modules is to consider the effects modules will have on each other. For each 
module there will be four sets of effects that will need to be considered. These effects 
are illustrated in figure 5.5. 
1. Effects from the module -a set of possible effects on other modules. 
2. A set of module vulnerabilities - effects (from outside the module) that have an 
effect on the module. These can either give rise to hazards inside the module or new 
effects on other modules. 
3. A set of internal module problems. 
4. Effects (from another module) which will pass straight through the module. 
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Figure 5.5 illustrates these sets of effects with respect to a module. 
latemal 
Effects 
Standard 
Module 
cq 2ý! S(Ldffirogh 
Effects From 
Figure 5.5 - Four sets of effects need to be considered for each module 
If modules are connected together, then to identify hazards due to this relationship we 
need to match the possible effects from one module with the vulnerabilities in another 
module. For example effects from one module may be less flow and high temperature. 
The vulnerabilities of another module may be high flow and high temperature. 
Connecting these two would immediately lead us to the consideration of high 
temperature as being a problem. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show what effects would need to 
be considered if two or three modules are connected in series. 
Internal Internal 
Effects 
I 
Effects 
Standard Effects ftom I Effects on 2 Standard 
Effe Module I 
:: 
cts ftom 2 Module 2 
Figure 5.6 - Effects needing consideration when two modules are connected. 
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2 
Figure 5.7 - Effects needing consideration when three modules are connected in series. 
This propagation of faults has been used as the basis for attempts to automate hazard 
identification procedures (Parmar & Lees, 1987), and forms the core of current 
attempts to automate HAZOP (Jefferson et al, 1995b). The originating causes are 
defined as initial causes and the realisable consequences are defined as end effects. 
The possible effects and vulnerabilities are defined as variable deviations. An initial 
cause may be connected either directly or via any number of variable deviations to an 
end effect. Of course, many initial causes will not connect to any end effects and vice 
versa. Figure 5.8 illustrates possible paths that may exist between different initial 
causes, variable deviations and end effect ' s. 
Obviously for hazard identification, the 
paths of interest are complete paths that start at initial causes (causes) and. end at end 
effects (consequences). Asterisks indicate incomplete paths. 
Initial cause (a) -* 
Initial cause (a) -> 
Initial cause (a) -> 
*Initial cause (b) -+ 
End effect (d) 
End effect (e) 
Variable deviation 
Variable deviation (g) 
*Variable deviation (c) -> End effect (h) 
End effect 6) 
Figure 5.8 Possible paths between initial causes, variable deviations and end effects. 
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For the variable deviations, we will use applicable process . However, in order to 
reduce the number of matches and hence the number of effects that are propagated 
between modules these may be qualified where appropriate by the addition of the 
state of the material involved, i. e. liquid or vapour. If no qualification is given then 
the effect applies to all material states. Possible hazards are generated when either an 
initial cause is linked to a end effect within a module or an initial cause in one module 
is linked via matching variable deviations to a end effect in another module. 
5.3.2 Cause and Consequence Types in Conventional HAZOP 
it has already been discussed how simply providing HAZOP results of individual 
modules that make up a plant, without dealing with the connections, would probably 
not save much time in identifying the hazards present in the plant. It would be 
necessary to explore the whole plant again to determine any possible effects that there 
may be due to the connection of modules. There is a requirement therefore to develop 
rules so that any problems there may be with connection can be identified simply and 
effectively. 
In order to illustrate how a cause in one part of a plant can have a consequence in a 
different part of a plant, a study was made of conventional HAZOP results. Causes 
and consequences are defmed as either being local or distant. Local causes or 
consequences occur somewhere on the line being studied. Distant causes or 
consequences occur on a different line to that being studied. This results in four 
possible combinations of cause consequence scenario 
Local cause - local consequence (local - local). The cause and the consequence 
are in the same line. 
Local cause - distant consequence (local - distant). A cause identified in the 
line under consideration gives rise to a consequence in another line. 
Distant cause - local consequence (distant - local). A consequence identified in 
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the line under consideration is due to a cause in another line. 
Distant cause - distant consequence (distant - distant). A deviation in the line 
under consideration is due to a cause in another line and gives rise to a consequence 
also in a different line. 
These can be divided into two categories. Local cause consequence scenarios and 
remote cause consequence scenarios. Local cause consequence scenarios consist only 
of local cause - local consequence type scenarios. Remote cause consequence 
scenarios make up the remainder where the cause and consequence are in different 
lines. 
Table 5.1 illustrates local and distant causes and consequences for one of the lines in 
the HAZOP results presented by Lawley (1974). This set of HAZOP results generates 
8 remote cause consequence scenarios and 9 local cause consequence scenarios. 
Investigation of numerous other sets of HAZOP results, from HAZOP studies carried 
out by ICI, reveals that on average one third of the cause consequence scenarios 
generated are remote. However, no attempt was made in this investigation to try and 
establish whether either of these scenarios gave rise to consequences which were 
generally more severe than consequences of the other scenario. This could form the 
basis of future work. If the more severe consequences were due to local cause 
consequence scenarios then a checklist approach may be acceptable for hazard 
identification. If not then some form of configuration checking is necessary for 
adequate hazard identification. 
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Line from intermediate storage to bufferisettling tank 
Guide Cause Local/dist Consequence Local/dis 
vmrd antcause tant 
consequ 
ence 
No Flow 1 No hydrocarbon at Local Loss of feed to reaction Distant 
intermediate storage section and reduced 
output. Polymer formed in 
heat exchanger under no 
flow conditions 
2 J1 Pump fails (motor fault, Local As for I Distant 
loss of drive, impeller 
corroded away etc. ) 
3 Line blockage, isolation Local As for 1 Distant 
valve 
closed in error or LCV fails Local J1 pump overheats. Local 
shut 
4 Line fracture Local As for 1 Distant 
Local Hydrocarbon discharged Local 
into area adjacent to public 
highway. 
More 5 LCV fails open or LCV Local Settling tank overfills Local 
Flow bypass 
open in error. Local Incomplete separation of Distant 
water phase in tank, 
leading to problems on 
reaction section. 
More 6 Isolation valve closed in Local Transfer line subjected to Local 
Pressure error or LCV closes, with JI full pump delivery or surge 
pump running pressure 
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7 Thermal expansion in an Local Line fracture or flange leak Local 
isolated valved section due 
to fire or strong sunlight 
More 8 High intermediate storage Local Higher pressure in transfer Local 
Temperat temperature line and settling tank 
ure 
Less 9 Leaking flange or valve stub Local Material loss adjacent to Local 
Flow not blanked and leaking public highway 
Less 10 Winter conditions Local Water sump and drain line Local 
Temperat freeze up. 
ure 
High 11 High water level in Local Water sump fills up more Distant 
water intermediate storage tank quickly. Increased chance 
conc. in of water phase passing to 
stream reaction section. 
High 12 Disturbance on distillation Distant Higher system pressure Local & 
conc. of columns upstream of distant 
lower intermediate storage. 
alkanes 
or 
alkenes 
organic 13 As for 12 Distant Increased rate of corrosion Local 
acids of tank base, sump and 
present drain line 
Maintena 14 Equipment failure, flange Local Line cannot be completely Local 
nce 
I 
leak, etc. 
I --- I 
drained or purged. 
I II 
Table 5.1 Example of HAZOP results (from Lawley, 1974), illustrating local and 
distant causes and consequences. 
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5.4 Cause and Consequence Types in Modular HAZOP 
On the face of it the same definitions for cause consequence scenarios could be used 
for modular HAZOP. However, there is an important difference in the types of causes 
or consequences that would be considered local or distant for modular HAZOP and 
the types of causes or consequences that would be considered local or distant for 
conventional HAZOP. This is because the conception of locality in relation to 
modular HAZOP is at the level of modules and sub-modules and in conventional 
HAZOP it is at the level of lines. A line in a conventional HAZOP would include the 
items of equipment at either end of it. Therefore a fault in an item of equipment at one 
end of the line leading to a consequence in an item of equipment at the other end of 
the line would still be considered a local cause consequence scenario in conventional 
HAZOP. Modular HAZOP would consider the items of equipment at either end of the 
line as distinct modules and therefore the above cause-consequence scenario would be 
either local-distant or distant-local depending upon the viewpoint. In order to make 
this distinction clear, cause consequence scenarios are defted in a different manner 
for modular HAZOP. 
The types of causes defmed for modular HAZOP are initial causes, and 
vulnerabilities. 
The types of consequences defmed for modular HAZOP are end effects, directly 
propagated effects and indirectly propagated effects. 
An initial cause is a fault within a module that gives rise to some effect, either a 
propagated effect or an end effect. This terminology is used to explicitly define its 
position as the potential start of a fault path. 
An end effect is a realisable consequence. This terminology is used to explicitly 
defme its position as the potential end of a fault path. 
A directly propagated effect is a variable deviation, representing a type of 
consequence, which will give rise to an effect in an adjoining sub-module of an 
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adjoining module to that being studied, equivalent to an effect in the other end of a 
line in a conventional HAZOP. It is either a consequence of a vulnerability or a 
consequence of an initial cause. 
An indirectly propagated effect is a variable deviation, representing a type of 
consequence, which will give rise to an cffect in a non-adjoining sub-module. This 
will lead to an end effect equivalent to a distant consequence in conventional HAZOP. 
It may be a consequence of a vulnerability but in the majority of cases it will be a 
consequence of an initial cause. 
A vulnerability is a variable deviation, representing a type of cause, which has effects 
on a sub-module. Le. The sub-module is vulnerable in some way to the variable 
deviation specified. This vulnerability gives rise either to an end effect or to some 
type of propagated effect. 
The term propagated effect without an initial qualification is used to indicate that the 
source of the effect is unknown. It could either be local or remote. 
The relationships generated by combining the cause and consequence types will have 
the following representations in modular HAZOP: 
initial cause - end effect. The cause and consequence lie entirely within one module. 
For example, in a heat exchanger this might be a shell side leak giving rise to 
environmental contamination (figure 5.9). This is a subset of conventional local-local 
cause-consequence relationships. 
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-- ----------- ---------- 
Shellside Shellside Environmental 
leak (IC) inlet contamination (Ec) 
S-M 
Tubeside FIX Tubeside 
inlet c re outlet 
S-M S-M S-M 
Heat 
exchanger I 
module 
EE=E,, J crreat 
IC = Initial cause 
Figure 5.9 An example of an initial cause-end effect type of cause-consequence 
relationship. 
Initial cause - directly propagated effect. A cause in one sub-module gives rise to a 
consequence in an adjacent sub-module of an adjoining module. The sub-modules are 
directly connected and represent either end of a conventional line. For example this 
might be fouling of heat exchanger tubes leading to low flow out of tube side of heat 
exchanger (figure 5.10). Given a vulnerability in the directly adjoining sub-module to 
the propagated effect we can develop three different possible scenarios. If the 
vulnerability has an end effect associated with it, then a conventional local cause 
consequence relationship is formed. If the vulnerability is associated with a directly 
propagated effect (which will only occur rarely), then this may give rise to additional 
local-local cause-consequence scenarios. Finally, if the vulnerability leads to an 
indirectly propagated effect this may give rise to local-distant cause-consequence 
scenarios. Of course if there is no vulnerability to any of the propagated effects 
involved then there is no end effect linked to the initial cause, there is no complete 
fault path and no cause consequence relationship exists. 
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r----------------- -------- Heat 
exchanger 
Shellside module I 
inlet 
S-M 
Fouling of 
HX tubes(IC) 
Tubeside HX Tubeside I 
Inlet care 
D 
outlet I ( 
S-M S-M S-M I 
I I Low flow ýM 
Shellside - (LPE) I 
outlet 
I 
I IC Initial cause S-M I 
I LPE = Local 
---------------- --------I propagated effect 
Figure 5.10 - An example of an initial cause-directly propagated effect type of cause- 
consequence relationship. 
Initial cause - indirectly propagated effect. Cause in one sub-module gives rise to 
consequence in an unconnected sub-module. For example fouling of heat exchanger 
tubes gives rise to high/low temperature (depending on heat exchanger duty) out of 
shell side of heat exchanger (figure 5.11). This combination of cause and 
consequence types will typically give rise to local-distant cause-consequence 
scenarios if a complete fault path exists. 
r ---------------------- Heat 
exchanger 
Shellside module 
inlet 
S-M 
Fouling of 
HX tubes(IC) 
Tubeside HX Tubeside 
inlet core outlet 
S-M S-M S-M 
Shellside Hig /low 
outlet temperature 
S-M 
L----------- --- - 
W 
(RPE) 
---------- 
IC = Initial cause 
RPE = Remote 
propagated effect 
Figure 5.11 - An example of an initial cause-indirectly propagated effect type of cause- 
consequence relationship 
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Any 
High S-M S-M 
pre sure 
(P Any I 
module I 
r---------- --- ---------- 
High Shellside Shellside I t ur pressure inlet ure rup 
(I VUL) S-M 
Tubeside HX -Tutýesý- I 
inlet core outlet I 
S-M S-M S-M 
Shellside 
outlet 
S-M Heat 
exchanger I 
module 
_I 
E: E= F-,, JI FFec. L 
PE = Propagated 
effect 
VUL = Vulnerability 
Figure 5.12 - An example of a vulnerability-end effect type of cause consequence 
relationship 
Vulnerability - end effect. Vulnerability in one sub-module gives rise to a 
consequence in that sub-module. For example high pressure in a sub-module upstream 
of the shellside of a heat exchanger leads to heat exchanger rupture (figure 5.12). This 
combination of cause and consequence types may give rise to either local-local or 
distant-local cause-consequence scenarios depending on the type of cause in the 
connecting sub-module. For example polymerisation of fluid in tubeside of heat 
exchanger due to low flow of cooling stream at sub-module downstream of shellside 
of heat exchanger (figure 5.14). This is an example of a distant-local cause- 
consequence scenario. 
-67- 
r ---------- ----- ---------- Heat 
exchanger 
Shellside module I 
inlet 
S-M 
Tubeside HX Tubeside I 
inlet core outlet 
S-M S-M 
* 
S-M 
Shellsid High/ ow C 
outlet temperature e M e l High flow M s ( L pE ) LI LI (VUL) 
--------- -- --- - ---------- 
------ -- --- ---- 
L 
------ A-ny ---I 
module I 
PE Propagated 
High flow Any effect 
(PE) m S-M LPE = Local 
propagated effect 
VUL = Vulnerability 
Figure 5.13 - An example of a vulnerability-directly propagated effect type of cause 
consequence relationship. 
Vulnerability - directly propagated effect. Vulnerability in one sub-module gives rise 
to a propagated effect which affects a directly adjoining sub-module. For example, 
high flow in sub-module downstream of shellside of heat exchanger leads to high/low 
temperature (depending on heat exchanger duty) in that downstream sub-module 
(figure 5.13). This combination of cause and consequence types can give rise to any 
type of cause-consequence scenario depending on the type of cause and the type of 
consequence in connecting sub-modules. 
-68- 
r---------- ------- -------- 
Heat 
Shellside exchanger I 
inlet module I 
S-M 
Tubeside HX Tubeside I 
inlet core outlet i ýO 
S-M S-M S-M 
High/low 
- temperature hellside [S (RPE) 
OL I outlet 
High flow S-M 
(VUL) 
-- -- --- --- -------- 
Any PE Propagated 
High flow module effect 
(PE) Any 
S S-M -M RPE = Remote I propagated effect 
I VUL = Vulnerability 
Figure 5.14 - An example of a vulnerability-end effect type of cause-consequence 
relationship. 
Vulnerability - indirectly propagated effect. Vulnerability in one sub-module leads to 
consequence in unconnected sub-module. For example, high flow in sub-module 
downstream of shellside of heat exchanger leads to high/low temperature (depending 
on heat exchanger duty) in sub-modules downstream of tubeside of heat exchanger 
(figure 5.15). This will form either local-distant or distant-distant scenarios. 
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r ---------- ------- -------- Heat 
exchanger 
Shellside module 
inlet 
S-M 
Tubeside HX 
inlet core 
S-M S-M 
ýolymer- 
isation in 
Shellside HX tubes CW I 
outlet 
Low flow S-M 
(VUL) 
k---- -- --- --- -------- 
----- --- -- -- --- --- ----- A-ny ---I 
I module I Low flow Any I (ofcooling S-M 
stream) 
(PE) 
Fc= Enj E FFec-L 
PE = Propagated 
effect 
VUL = Vulnerability 
Figure 5.15 - An example of a vulnerability-indirectly propagated effect type of cause- 
consequence relationship. 
Figure 5.16 gives examples of possible fault paths that can be generated. The asterisks 
indicate incomplete paths, i. e. where there is no link between an initial cause and a 
end effect. 
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Initial cause (a) end effect (b) 
Initial cause (c) propagated effect (d) vulnerability (d) 
end effect (e) 
*Initial cause (i) propagated effect (g) 
Initial cause (g) -4 propagated effect (h) vulnerability (h) 
-> propagated effect (i) vulnerability (i) 
-4 end effect (j) 
*Vulnerability(k) -> end effect (1) 
Figure 5.16 - Possible paths between cause and consequence types in modular 
HAZOP 
5.4.1 Cause - Consequence Types in Hybrid HAZOP 
Hybrid HAZOP occurs when a line that is being studied using conventional HAZOP 
joins a module that has a set of preHAZOPed results associated with it. The line being 
studied should be defted so that the appropriate sub-module forms one end of the 
line. The definitions used for types of causes and consequences in conventional and 
modular HAZOP apply in hybrid HAZOP as appropriate. The sub-module end of the 
line has types of causes defmed as initial causes and vulnerabilities. For the other end 
of the line two types of causes will need to be considered, local causes and distant 
causes. Similarly for types of consequences, at the sub-module end they are defmed as 
locally propagated effect, remotely propagated effects and end effects. For the other 
end of the line local consequences and distant consequences will need to be 
considered. 
As well as the combinations of causes and consequences that arise entirely within the 
conventional section or entirely within the module, combinations exist where the 
cause and consequence are in different sections. The following combinations of 
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causes and consequences exist where the cause and consequence are in different 
sections. 
Cause in conventional section - Consequence in module 
Local cause - Locally propagated effect 
Local cause - Remotely propagated effect 
Local cause - End effect 
Distant cause - Locally propagated effect 
Distant cause - Remotely propagated effect 
Distant cause - End effect 
Cause in module - Consequence in conventional section 
Initial cause - Local consequence 
Initial cause - Distant consequence 
Vulnerability - Local consequence 
Vulnerability - Distant consequence 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has looked at the theory behind modular HAZOP and provides 
definitions of terms used in modular HAZOP. This terminology will be used in the 
following chapters in which the modular HAZOP procedure is further explained. In 
particular, this chapter provides an analysis of the size and form of modules used in 
the modular HAZOP procedure and how these modules are broken down into sub- 
modules. It also shows how fault paths are built up between initial causes and end 
effects through propagated effects and vulnerabilities. These fault paths enable the 
determination of effects due to the connection of modules and the particular procedure 
adopted is explained in the next chapter. 
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BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
6 Modular HAZOP Procedure 
This chapter looks at the practicalities of applying modular HAZOP using the 
theoretical ideas explored in the previous chapter. This chapter is divided into three 
parts. The first part gives an overview of how the theory from the previous chapter 
can be used as a general method for modular HAZOP. The second part details the 
specific method developed. It is anticipated that modular HAZOP can be used in a 
variety of situations in a similar way to conventional HAZOP. The third part outlines 
some of these applications. 
6.1 Outline of Modular HAZOP Procedure 
As with all hazard identification procedures, the first requirement is to have up-to- 
date information on the plant to be studied. 
The first step in the modular HAZOP procedure is to select the required modules and 
then the appropriate sub-modules that make up the plant under consideration. The 
modules and sub-modules selected should be documented and the connections 
between them need to be made explicit. Except for the simplest plants it is quite likely 
that preHAZOPed results will not exist for some modules and particularly for certain 
sub-modules. For these modules and sub-modules it is necessary to draw up the 
required preHAZOPed results and record them for future use. In the most preferred 
cases, the plant will have been designed on a modular basis, wherein detailed pre- 
designed and preHAZOPed modules are put together to form the required plant, and 
the modules and sub-modules will already be known. 
In order to lessen the time taken to perform hazard identification, it is necessary that 
the majority of sub-modules should already have preHAZOPed results preferably 
taken from a module library. Such a library should include a description of the 
module, the sub-modules making up the module, a representation of the sub-modules 
and, of course, the preHAZOPed results for each sub-module. It is not necessary that 
the plant sub-modules be identical to library sub-modules. Variation in the indication, 
alarm and manual valving arrangements is generally acceptable. The main similarities 
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that must be satisfied are, that for control valves, the same control variable is being 
used, for pumps, the same type of pump is being used, for single or multiple pumps, 
the appropriate sub-module is used, and for any vessels similar vent arrangements are 
used. Requirements for matching sub-modules should ideally be included in the 
module library. 
Required Available Specific Sub- HAZOP- Comments 
generic sub- Modules PC Node 
modules No. 
Storage tank Storage tank vessel 5 
vessel 
Storage tank Storage tank feed with flow 10 Use as many as are 
feed(s) control (No required to represent 
Storage tank feed with level 1 different reactor 
control feeds. 
Storage tank feed without 13 
control valve 
Storage tank outlet with flow II 
Storage tank control 
outlet Storage tank outlet without 4 
control valve 
Storage tank vent to 2 For a simple vent to 
Storage tank atmosphere atmosphere 
vent system Nitrogen blanket supply, 6 For a nitrogen 
continuous feed through RO. blanketed vent 
Nitrogen blanket supply with 7 system use one 
pressure control blanket supply node 
Vent to header without 8 and one vent to 
control valve header node from 
Vent to header with pressure 9 these nodes. 
control 
Storage tank Storage tank overflow 3 
overflow 
Additional None. 
generic sub- 
modules 
Table 6.1 - Module library contents - atmospheric pressure storage tank. 
Table 6.1 gives an example of the sub-modules available for a storage vessel module 
in a module library. For each sub-module there exist line diagrams and preHAZOPed 
results. 
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The next step is to use the preHAZOPed results to generate the HAZOP results for the 
plant. The HAZOP results are created by identifying all possible cause consequence 
scenarios which exist either within modules or through the connection of modules. 
Any causes which do not lead to consequences or consequences which have no cause 
are generally eliminated. This is done by tracing paths forward from all the initial 
causes to see if they lead to terminal consequences. 
Many of the initial causes will be linked explicitly to terminal consequences within 
the same module. These are obviously the simplest fault paths as there are no 
propagated effects or vulnerabilities between the initial cause and terminal 
consequence. 
At a slightly more complex level are those initial causes and terminal consequences, 
which occur, in directly adjacent sub-modules. These are however, relatively easy to 
identify. It is only necessary to match locally propagated effects due to initial causes 
with vulnerabilities, which give rise to terminal consequences in the directly adjacent 
sub-module. These cause consequence scenarios are equivalent to causes and 
consequences at either end of a line in conventional HAZOP. 
The most complex cause consequence scenarios to identify are those where the initial 
causes and terminal consequences exist in sub-modules which are not directly 
adjacent. In order to identify cause consequence scenarios of this type, it is necessary 
to match remotely propagated effects with vulnerabilities. 
The suggestion is that any remaining consequences, which are not linked to causes, 
are reviewed to determine if the vulnerability leading to that consequence could have 
some cause. This is particularly appropriate where the consequences could have 
severe effects. As an example consider a pump handling a flammable fluid. One 
vulnerability associated with the pump is that no flow at downstream units causes the 
pump to cavitate, overheat and the pump seals fail leaking flammable fluid. Clearly 
this could have devastating consequences and although no particular cause of noflow 
may have been identified in the particular plant being studied, it is nevertheless a 
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realistic occurrence. Hazardous scenarios such as this should be recorded as part of 
the modular HAZOP results. 
Any conventional HAZOP results proforma can be used to record cause-consequence 
scenarios from the preHAZOPed results. The guide word, process parameter, 
deviation, cause and consequence are recorded along with the safeguards and any 
actions or recommendations. The safeguards are taken from the preHAZOPed results. 
These are considered in the normal HAZOP manner to determine what action may be 
necessary. Recommendations are entered in the appropriate column. 
Recommendations may either be taken from the preHAZOPed results or entered by 
the user. Table 6.2 illustrates headings that may be found on a conventional HAZOP 
proforma. 
Guide Para- Devia- Causes Consequences Existing Actions and 
Word meter tion 
Protections and Recommend- 
Safeguards ations 
More Flow I I-Egh I. I 11igh 1.1.1 Inadequate 1.1.1.1 Relief 1.1.1.1 Ensure 
flow supply venting. Vessel valve vent is sized 
pressure overpressure rupture. adequately. 
1.1.2 Static build up. 1.1.2.1 Dip 
tubes 
1.2 Level 1.2.1 Tank overflows 1.2.1.1 Mgh 1.2.1.1 Tank to 
control level alann be bunded, if 
valve fitils necessary. 
open 1.2.1.2 
Overflow 
Table 6.2 - Conventional HAZOP profonna. 
As stated above, the first step in the modular HAZOP procedure is to select the 
required modules and then the appropriate sub-modules that make up the plant under 
consideration. The modules and sub-modules selected should be documented and the 
connections between them need to be made explicit. 
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As part of a modular design procedure the selection of modules and sub-modules 
would be relatively simple, as the design would be based on appropriate modules and 
sub-modules. Any description of the plant would reference the selected modules and 
sub-modules and would include information on the connections between them. 
Given that modular design procedures do not yet exist for chemical plant the selection 
of modules and sub-modules would have to be made based upon traditionally 
available design documents. For conventional HAZOP a detailed ELD is required, 
however, for modular HAZOP, the same level of detail is not required, indeed it may 
not be desirable. This is because a large amount of detail can be encompassed within 
the sub-modules. All that is required is enough information to be able to select the 
correct sub-modules. A process flow diagram may be a little short of information for 
this selection of sub-modules. PFDs will generally only have enough information to 
define the modules involved. This is not to say that a modular HAZOP cannot be 
performed with just a PFD. If information is available on which sub-modules should 
be used in particular situations, based on connecting modules and chemicals involved, 
then it should be possible to select the required sub-modules. This approach would 
only be recommended as part of a unified modular design and modular HAZOP 
approach. This thesis is not concerned with modular design though the use of sub- 
modules can be seen to be a useful technique in a modular design procedure. 
one possible approach may be to adopt a semi-modular design philosophy. Modules 
are determined according to the PFD and sub-modules are roughly outlined based on 
the process requirements and normal company practice. Details are then filled in by 
reference to the appropriate sub-modules in the sub-module library. 
The intention is that specification of sub-modules either as part of a modular HAZOP 
library of modules or a modular design library of modules will include a detailed 
MID, a checklist of necessary design considerations and the preHAZOPed results. 
The preHAZOPed results should be a complete and accurate HAZOP of the sub- 
module within the context of the relevant module including the vulnerabilities and 
propagated effects that need to be taken into consideration. 
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Given that modular HAZOP does not require as much ELD detail as conventional 
HAZOP, then it can be applied at an earlier stage of design. This has numerous 
benefits. In particular it is easier to include any modifications suggested and the 
overall design time required can be reduced with significant savings. Because 
conventional HAZOP can only start once a complete ELD has been produced, design 
and HAZOP cannot be carried out in parallel, and, in order to have the plant 
operational as soon as possible, ordering and construction often start while HAZOP is 
still on-going. 
The next step in the modular HAZOP procedure is the use of preHAZOPed results to 
generate the HAZOP results for the plant. In the outline of the modular HAZOP 
procedure above, it is stated that the identification of cause consequence scenarios is 
done by starting with initial causes and following deviations through to terminal 
consequences. In fact, the identification of cause consequence scenarios can be done 
in two ways, either by starting with all the initial causes and tracing paths forward to 
see if they lead to terminal consequences or starting with all the terminal 
consequences and tracing backwards to see if there are any initial causes. However, 
the way that cause and consequence types have been defmed and the effect this has on 
the generation of preHAZOPed results, means that it is only sensible to trace forward 
starting from initial causes. To trace backwards would have required direct and 
indirect vulnerabilities to have been defined with just one type of propagated effect, 
rather than one type of vulnerability and two types of propagated effect. This change 
of definition would also affect the preHAZOPed results. Providing the correct 
definitions are used then there are no advantages or disadvantages in the amount of 
work required whether paths are traced forwards or backwards. However, I would 
suggest that it is more intuitive to trace paths forward from initial causes and this is 
the method that has been adopted and expounded here. 
6.2 PreHAZOPed Modules 
In order to provide some flexibility within the preHAZOPed module results, the 
concept of sub-modules has been introduced. The aim is to optimise the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the modules while minimising the number required. 
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In developing preHAZOPed module results, work was carried out at two levels. The 
level of detail required differs depending on what is trying to be achieved. At a low 
level of detail, generic preHAZOPed module results were developed to provide a 
general framework on which more detailed modules can be built. However, they are 
still useful for assessing the potential of modular HAZOP, in particular how well the 
faults and deviations are propagated through the plant. At this level of detail, it is 
mainly just the susceptibilities and propagated effects that are required, and it is only 
necessary to defme the module by its function and its inlets and outlets. At a high 
level of detail fully preHAZOPed module results were developed. This requires that 
modules are fully defmed in order that accurate and complete results can be drawn up. 
The generic preHAZOPed modules have been developed with one primary aim. The 
aim is to illustrate how the different module interactions behave when modules are 
connected. To this end effort was concentrated on using guide words which are most 
likely to give rise to interactions. This has meant concentrating on the NoALess/More 
guide words. However, for those guide words, which have been considered, the 
corresponding causes, consequences and safeguards should be complete. Obviously in 
order to complete the generic preHAZOPed modules and convert them to fully 
preHAZOPed modules, other guide words such as start-up, shut-down and 
maintenance need to be considered. 
The fully preHAZOPed results are intended to combine the detail of a checklist for 
each module with the interface information using the standard HAZOP guide words. 
The checklist approach enables past experience and expert knowledge to be included. 
This means that less experienced engineers can perform competent hazard 
identification. In these cases it is proposed that a substantially complete modules are 
developed. Specification of these modules will include a detailed MID, a checklist of 
necessary design considerations, a complete and accurate HAZOP of the module itself 
and the vulnerabilities and propagated effects that need to be taken into consideration. 
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6.3 Computer support 
Any modification to the HAZOP procedure should be easy to use. In order to make 
the system as easy to use as possible, HAZOP-PC (PrimaTech, 1994) was used for 
development and recording of the preHAZOPed module results. HAZOP-PC was 
chosen primarily because it was available in the Department of Chemical Engineering 
at Loughborough University, having been provided at a substantial discount by 
PrimaTech. In the event, the ability with HAZOP-PC to categorise causes and 
consequences, and to subsequently generate a HAZOP report filtered on these 
categories, proved to be of significant value. It would therefore be recommended that 
any computerised HAZOP recording tool used for modular HAZOP should have a 
similar functionality. 
HAZOP-PC is a computer tool for conventional HAZOP. Essentially it is used to 
record the deliberations of HAZOP teams in conventional HAZOP and it provides an 
efficient alternative to more conventional documentation means. In particular it 
provides for the generation of various formatted reports from the inputted data. In 
addition to being a recording tool HAZOP-PC will also provide prompts for guide 
words and parameters. It can also provide information on causes and consequences 
that should be considered. There are a large number of columns that can be used not 
only for recording HAZOP meetings but also for recording the progress of actions 
subsequent to any meeting. HAZOP-PC can also generate various types of report. 
Using some of the features of HAZOP-PC it has been possible to make the modular 
HAZOP method fairly user friendly. In particular HAZOP-PC can be used to filter the 
output of the preHAZOPed modules in various ways so that only particular sets of 
causes and consequences are generated. This has advantages when it comes to 
matching propagated effects with vulnerabilities in order to try to identify links 
between initial causes and terminal consequences. Other advantages are the 
availability of extensive areas of help in HAZOP-PC and the ability to generate 
reports easily. 
HAZOP-PC has been used to store the preHAZOPed module results. The 
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preHAZOPed results are intended to combine the detail of a checklist for each module 
with the interface information using the standard HAZOP guide words. The checklist 
approach enables past experience and expert knowledge to be included. This means 
that less experienced engineers can perform competent hazard identification. 
HAZOP-PC has a large number of columns that can be used for recording HAZOP 
information. For preHAZOPed results the following columns are used. 
Guide word 
Parameter 
Deviation 
Cause 
Cause category 
Consequence 
Consequence category 
Safeguards 
Safeguards category 
Recommendations 
These HAZOP-PC columns are used in the following manner. 
The guide word column is used for the guide words, as in conventional HAZOP, no, 
more, less, reverse, other than, etc. 
The parameter column is used in the same way as it would be for conventional 
HAZOP, for the parameters, flow, pressure, temperature, composition, etc. 
The deviation column is derived by developing the guide word with the parameter, 
again as in conventional HAZOP. 
The causes column is used in a different way to normal and contains two types of 
information which have particular meaning in modular HAZOP. Firstly there are the 
initial causes. These are in lower case letters and represent possible faults that may 
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occur within the module. Secondly there are vulnerabilities. These are in capital 
letters and represent deviations which have some effect on the module. 
The next column is the cause category column. This column is important as it is used 
as a basis for filtering the HAZOP-PC output to facilitate the modular HAZOP 
procedure. The two categories are IC and VUL. IC represents types of cause which 
are initial causes and VUL represents types of causes which are vulnerabilities. 
The consequences column contains three types of consequences. Firstly there are the 
terminal consequences. Again these are in lower case letters and represent 
consequences that manifest themselves within the module. Then there are local and 
remote propagated effects. These are in capital letters and represent deviations, which 
are transferred beyond the module boundary. 
The consequence category column is used in a similar way to the cause category 
column. The categories are TC, LPE and RPE. These represent terminal consequence, 
local propagated effect and remote propagated effect types of consequences. 
The safeguards column is intended to give some idea of possible safeguards, which 
may already exist, or which maybe required either to protect against the consequences 
or to remove a particular cause. 
The safeguards category column is intended to show whether the safeguard reduces 
the likelihood of a particular cause or whether it reduces the severity of a 
consequence. 
Finally the recommendations column details design and operating procedure 
considerations which should be taken into account in order to reduce hazards and 
operability problems. 
Using HAZOP-PC it is possible to generate from the preHAZOPed results a sub-set 
of these results which is made up of only those types of causes which are initial 
causes. The remaining sub-set of the preHAZOPed results contains only those types 
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of causes that are vulnerabilities. It is then necessary to match propagated effects and 
vulnerabilities to determine if fault paths exist. 
The practical use of HAZOP-PC to carry out the modular HAZOP procedure is 
discussed more in the following chapter. 
6.4 Applications of Modular HAZOP Procedure 
A procedure has been developed for identifying hazards in process plant using results 
of hazard studies carried out on the modules that make up the plant. These 
preHAZOPed results can be developed from results for generic modules, modified 
from existing specific modules or existing module results can be reused. Which of 
these is used may depend on the situation in which modular HAZOP is being applied. 
Four anticipated applications for modular HAZOP, which illustrate how the different 
developments of preHAZOPed modules are used, are: 
1. Application of existing preHAZOPed module results to new plants. 
2. Replacement of one module with a different module in an existing plant. 
3. Modification of a module within the context of an existing plant. 
4. Addition of a module to an existing plant. 
For example a plant may contain a number of similar heat exchangers HX101- 
HX106. PreHAZOPed results will be similar for each of these heat exchangers and 
can be developed from the master heat exchanger preHAZOPed results document. 
When preHAZOPed results have been developed for all modules that make up the 
plant, the modular HAZOP procedure will then be applied. This will take in to 
account the different surroundings of each of the modules. If a new plant is developed 
with similar heat exchangers then the preHAZOPed results can be reused. On the 
other hand if one of the heat exchangers is to be replaced, say with IM01, then 
preHAZOPed results for this module can be compared with the original preHAZOPed 
results. The full modular HAZOP procedure can then be applied to the differences 
found between the two sets of preHAZOPed results. Similarly, if a plant is modified 
by the addition of a new module, the modular HAZOP procedure can be used to 
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determine the possible effects of the new module on the rest of the plant. Finally, if a 
module is modified, the existing preHAZOPed results can be modified and the 
modular HAZOP procedure applied to the differences again. 
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BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
Case study 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how the modular HAZOP procedure is used to carry out 
hazard identification for chemical process plant. 
7.2 Procedure 
For this exercise, the preHAZOPed results were generated by myself, with some input 
from more experienced personnel at ICI Technology and Loughborough University, 
using PrimaTech's HAZOP-PC v3.02. 
PrimaTech's HAZOP-PC v3.02 is essentially a prompting and recording tool for 
conventional HAZOP study meetings. However, it is particularly useful in this 
application because it is possible, when generating reports, to use user defined filters. 
In particular, it is possible to categorise causes and consequences and then generate a 
report filtered on these categories. In generating preHAZOPed results, the causes 
were categorised as either "VUL", for vulnerabilities, or "IC", for initial causes. 
Consequences were categorised as either "EE" for end effects, "DPE" for directly 
propagated effects, or "IPE" for indirectly propagated effects. Each of these 
categories corresponds to the previously defined cause-consequence associations. For 
efficiently carrying out modular HAZOP, two reports were generated to make up the 
preHAZOPed results for a sub-module. The first report, the initial causes report, was 
filtered on "IC" and the second, the vulnerabilities report, on "VUL". The reports 
generated comprise all the columns associated with conventional HAZOP study 
meetings with the addition of the cause and consequence category columns so that the 
type of cause-consequence association could be easily ascertained. Table 7.1 
illustrates a typical initial causes report, the filtering have been carried out to include 
only those sections of the report where a cause having a cause categorised as "IC" 
exists. The vulnerabilities report has the remaining sections of the preHAZOPed 
results where a cause having a cause categorised as "VUL" exists, see table 7.2. 
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Cooling ter top up - single supply, sing le pump and float valve. 
DEVIATI CAUSES CAT 1 CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS 
ON 
1. No I. I. Wine IC 1.1.1. Level in EE 
Flow filter blocked. cold well cannot 
Float valve fails be maintained. 
shut. Cooling water 
Pump failure. supply may be 
restricted. 
2. More 2.1. Float valve IC 2.1.1. Cold well EE 2.1.1.1. Suitable 
Flow fails open. overflows. overflow to drain. 
Contamination due 
to dosing 
chemicals. 
2. Lower 2.1. Low ambient IC 2.1.1. Prolonged 
Temperatu temperature leads cold weather may 
re to freezing, reduce 
particularly as availability of 
there may be no cooling water. 
flow for long 
periods of time. 
Table 7.1 - Example of initial causes filtered results. 
Cooling ter top up - single s upply, single pump and float valve. 
DEVIA- CAUSES CAT I CONSEQUENCES CAT I SAFE- RECOMMENDATIONS 
TION GUARDS 
1. No 1.2. NO VUL 1.2.1. Level in cold well EE 1.2.1.1. If the supply is 
Flow FLOW FROM cannot be maintained. unreliable consider the 
UPSTREAM Cooling water supply need for a backup supply. 
SUPPLY 
_ _ 
maybe r cted. See appropriate node. 
Table 7.2 - Example of vulnerability filtered results. 
To make the modular HAZOP procedure as easy as possible, all sub-module 
vulnerabilities are included in the vulnerabilities report against their corresponding 
deviation. For example, a sub-module's vulnerability to low pressure will be included 
in the causes column of the preHAZOPed results alongside the deviation less 
pressure, even though it, may have a low flow related consequence. Such a cause- 
consequence relationship might, in a conventional HAZOP study meeting, be 
identified under the deviation less flow. This is part of the redundancy associated with 
conventional HAZOP guide words which is not needed with modular HAZOP. 
instead, in order to achieve an efficient and effective alternative, less flexibility in the 
procedure is required. 
To generate the completed modular HAZOP report, it is necessary to find and detail 
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all the possible initial cause to end effect paths in the plant. This is done by finding 
where propagated effects in one sub-module have corresponding vulnerabilities in 
another sub-module, and replacing the propagated effect by the consequences 
associated with the vulnerability. In this way, the steps in the paths between initial 
causes and end effects, where they exist, are eliminated until the report consists 
substantially only of initial causes and end effect pairs. 
To this end, it is first necessary to collate all the preHAZOPed results relating to the 
plant being examined based on the modules and sub-modules identified. The above 
procedure can then be carried out relatively simply by going through the initial causes 
report and for each propagated effect, recognised by either "DPE" or "IPE" in the 
consequences category column, determining whether a corresponding vulnerability 
exists in the appropriate sub-module, by referring to the vulnerabilities report of the 
preHAZOPed results of that sub-module, and replacing the propagated effect by all 
the consequences associated with the vulnerability, including any propagated effects. 
When including indirectly propagated effects it will be useful to add a label 
specifying which sub-module they were originally associated with. This will help in 
identifying the appropriate sub-module to refer to when determining whether or not 
there is a corresponding vulnerability. 
The easiest way of achieving this is to edit the initial causes report using a word 
processor, the HAZOP-PC generated reports having been suitably converted. 
Any propagated effects which do not have a corresponding vulnerability can be 
deleted, except for propagated effects which have effects beyond the boundaries of 
the plant being scrutinised. These should be left in the final report until their effects 
can be determined either by conventional HAZOP, by linking up with a modular 
HAZOP report for a different plant, or by some other means. 
Similarly, vulnerabilities which exist at the plant boundaries should be transferred into 
the final modular HAZOP report so that effects on the plant from causes originating 
beyond the plant boundary can be determined. 
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Such vulnerabilities and effects should be highlighted for future action. 
Once the modular HAZOP report has been reduced to initial cause-end effect pairs, it 
is necessary to review the report to remove any of these pairs that are irrelevant to the 
plant being studied. This procedure can be aided by incorporating into the 
preHAZOPed results appropriate remarks. For example, certain end effects may be 
applicable only if a flammable material is being used. This fact can be included in a 
remarks column and the modular HAZOP report can be reviewed on the basis of the 
comments in this column. 
The preHAZOPed results may also be provided with a list of safeguards that can be 
used to warn of impending problems or mitigate consequences. These may be used in 
one of two ways. Either preexisting plant safeguards only may be left in this column 
in which case once the modular HAZOP report is analysed the efficacy or otherwise 
of these preexisting measures can be determined, or all the safeguard may be included 
in the final modular HAZOP report in which case the need or otherwise of the 
specified safeguards can be determined when the modular HAZOP report is analysed. 
7.3 Results 
For the purpose of this exercise a simple plant was devised on a modular basis using 
modules and sub-modules from the module library. 
The plant is a waste acid treatment plant. Waste acid from the waste acid storage tank 
is reacted with alkali supplied via a pipeline in a reactor provided with a cooling 
recycle arrangement. The neutralised product of this reaction is stored before being 
transferred to tankers for disposal. A cooling water system is provided to provide 
coolant for the reactor recycle. 
This is an imaginary plant and was used as an example as part of a presentation and 
workshop that I gave to ICI personnel. The modules that make up the plant are 
considered to be relatively common modules with a large degree of similarity and it is 
for this reason that I put these modules together to form the plant. Furthermore, during 
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the development of preHAZOPed results, I had concentrated on developing such 
common modules and there was therefore little further work required in developing 
these modules for the presentation. These common modules are ones that offer the 
greatest potential time savings as the preHAZOPed results can be frequently reused. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the plant configuration. 
Tables 7.3 to 7.6 give the modules and sub-modules chosen to represent the plant. 
The results of the modular HAZOP procedure are given in table 7.7. 
Module Name: Waste acid storage 
Module Type: Atmospheric liquid storage tank 
Generic Sub- Speciflc sub-modules selected Connectivity 
modules required 
(Refer to module Name Node Module sub-module 
library) no. 
Storage tank inlet Storage tank inlet w/o control II 
valve 
Storage tank outlet Storage tank outlet, parallel 4 Neutralisation Reactor feed 
pump W/o reactor 
control valve 
Storage tank Storage tank vessel 5 
vessel 
Storage tank vent Storage tank vent to 2 
system atmosphere 
Storage tank Storage tank overflow to seal 3 
overflo pot I 
Table 7.3 - Sub-modules for waste acid storage module. 
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Module Name: Neutralisation reactor 
Module Type: Exothermic liquid phase reactor 
Generic Sub- Specific sub-modules selected Connectivity 
modules required 
(Refer to module Name Node Module sub-module 
library) no. 
Reactor feed (1) Reactor feed with flow control I Waste acid Storage tank 
storage outlet 
Reactor feed (2) Reactor feed with 12 
concentration control 
Reactor outlet Reactor liquid outlet with level II Treated waste Storage tank 
control storage tank inlet 
Reactor vent Reactor vent to atmosphere 14 
system 
Reactor cooling Reactor cooling via recycle 6 
system 
Cooling stream in Cooling water CWS Main 
supply 
Cooling stream out Cooling water CWS Return 
supply 
- 11 
Table 7.4 Sub-modules for neutralisation reactor module. 
-92- 
Module Name: Treated waste storage 
Module Type: Atmospheric liquid storage tank 
Generic Sub- 
modules required 
Specific sub-modules Connectivity 
(Refer to module 
library) 
Name Node 
no. 
Module sub-module 
Storage tank inlet Storage tank inlet w/o control 
valve 
II 
I 
Ncutralisation 
reactor 
Reactor 
outlet 
Storage tank outlet Storage tank outlet, parallel 
pump w/o control valve 
4 Treated waste Tanker 
loading 
Storage tank 
vessel 
Storage tank vessel 5 
Storage tank vent 
system 
Storage tank vent to 
atmosphere 
2 
I 
Storage tank 
overflow 
Storage tank overflow to seal 
pot 
3 
I 
I 
II 
Table 7.5 - Sub-modules for treated waste storage module. 
Module Name: Cooling water supply 
Module Type: Cooling water system 
Generic Sub- 
modules required 
Specific sub-modules selected Connectivity 
(Refer to module 
library) 
Name Node 
no. 
Module sub-module 
Cooling water top 
up 
Water top up from reservoir I 
Cooling water 
return 
Cooling water return 2 Neutralisation 
reactor 
Cooling 
stream out 
Cooling water 
main 
Cooling water main with 
multiple pumps 
5 Neutralisation 
reactor 
Cooling 
stream in 
Dosing Dosing 4,6 
& 
Purge 9 
Table 7.6 - Sub-modules for cooling water supply module. 
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Figure 7.1 - Modular HAZOP example - U- t-0 
waste acid plant configuration. 
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0 
Waste Acid Neutralisation Plant 
Node: lCooling Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
DEVIA CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUAR RECONMENDATI 
TION DS ONS 
No Inline filter blocked. Level in cold well cannot be 
Flow Float valve fails maintained. 
shut. Cooling water supply may be 
1 Pump failure. restricted. 
NO FLOW FROM Level in cold well cannot be If the supply is 
UPSTREAM maintained. unreliable consider the 
SUPPLY Cooling water supply may be need for a backup 
restricted. supply. See 
appropriate node. 
More Float valve fails Cold well overflows. Suitable 
Flow open. Contamination of environment overflow to 
by dosing chemicals. drain. 
Node: I Cooling Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
Lower Low ambient Prolonged cold weather may 
Temper temperature leads to reduce availability of 
ature freezing, particularly cooling water. 
as there may be no 
flow for long periods 
of time. 
Node: 2Cooling water return to tower. 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: Maintain circulation of cooling water. 
Less Purge to drain valve Cooling water tower Regualr 
Flow left open or fails performance falls off. Cooling inspection. 
open. water supply may be restricted 
during periods of high demand. 
Node: 3Cooling Water Dosing - Chromate Dosing Outlet. Feed controlled by automatic dosing control. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
- 1 -7 
Node: 4Cooling wat r supply main -2 or more pumps. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Less Pump failure. Reaction in reactor does not Appropriate Only likely to be a 
Flow proced as required. Poor alarms on problem during 
conversion side reactions, etc. pumps. periods of high 
demand. 
Low flow 
alarm on 
supply main. 
Table 7. 7 Waste acid treatme at plant modular HAZOP resuh s. 
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DEVIA I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARD I RECOMMENDATIO --TA 
TION S NS 
High 
temperature 
alarm 
Possible runaway reaction. High 
Possible explosion temperature 
alarm. 
Low flow 
alarm 
Inadequate venting of storage Storage tank 
tank. Vessel overpressure relief valve. 
rupture. 
Static build up in storage tank. Dip tubes for Flammable fluids 
filling storage only. If filling is not 
tank. done via dip tubes 
check design 
assumptions. 
Reverse Pump not running Reverse flow through pump Separate non- 
Flow back into cooling water pond. return valves 
on all pump 
discharges. 
Node: 4 Cooling water supply main -2 or more pumps. 
Parameter: Maintenance 
Intention: 
Mainte High cooling water Unable to meet demand due to Planned maintenance 
nance demand e. g. due to pump down for maintenance. should be scheduled 
hot weather. Unable to carry out maintenance for 
due to high periods of low cooling 
I cooling water demand. water demand. 
Node: 5Cooling Water Purge to drain - manually adjusted. 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: 
More Chemical Wastage of cooling water and Orifice plate 
Flow concentration dosing chemicals. to 
monitoring fails minimise 
requiring purge maximum 
valve to be opened possible flow 
more than necessary. rate. 
Purge valve 
Inadvertantly left 
further open than 
Ire uired. 
Less Purge valve Increased scaling, general 
Flow insufficiently solids deposition, and fouling 
open. problems. 
Node: 6Cooling Water Acid dosing - automatically controlled. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Less Automatic dosing pH should be maintained Routine and 
Flow control fails, between pH7-8 to maintain non- regular 
delivering less acid scaling, non-corrosive testing. 
than required. conditions in the system. 
I 
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I- 7ý 1 
Low level 
alarm. 
Acid supply 
exhausted. 
More 
Flow 
Automatic dosing 
control fails, 
delivering more acid 
than required. 
pH should be maintained 
between pH7-8 to maintain non- 
scaling, non-corrosive 
conditions in the system. 
Routine and 
regular 
testing. 
Node: 7 Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No/Les 
s 
Flow 
Vent line blocked or 
partially blocked 
Tank overpressure rupture on 
filling. 
Relief valve Minimise 
opportunities for vent 
blockage 
Ensure flame arrestor 
is maintained 
correctly. 
Tank vacuum 
collapse on 
discharge 
Vacuum 
relief 
valve. 
Minimise 
opportunities for vent 
blockage. 
Ensure flame arrestor 
is maintained correctly 
Node: 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: Maintain temperature tank 
_Kode: 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Pressure 
intention: Maintain atmospheric pressure in tank 
II 
ITo-de: Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: Allow tank to overfl safel 
NoALJ 
s 
Fv low 
Overflow blocked or 
partially blocked 
No/partial tank overflow 
available. 
Possible tank rupture on 
Level control Ensure opportunities 
for overflow blocking 
are minimised. 
overfilling Level 
indicator 
High level 
alarm 
Node: Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention : 
Node: Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
Node: Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
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Intention: Allow continuous flow of material to process 
No Outlet line blocked No reaction in reactor. Low flow 
Flow between tank and alarm 
pump. 
Pump fails. Composition 
control 
Flow control valve No reaction in reactor. Low flow 
fails shut. alarm 
Outlet line blocked Composition 
downstream of control 
pump. Full head pump pressure Kick back ýonsider designing 
developed. High pressure line. equipment to 
rupture risk to outlet line. Low flow withstand maximum 
Pump overheats, seals damaged, alarm. pump delivery 
possible leak. pressure. 
More Control valve fails Incomplete conversion of Composition 
Flow open reactants. control 
Spare pump running Incomplete conversion of Flow control. Ensure operating and 
in error reactants. Maintenance 
Composition 
control. 
instructions preclude 
running parallel 
pumps 
Incorrectly. 
Outlet line ruptured Tank contents lost to Emergency Ensure tank is 
environment isolation valve adequately bunded. 
Locate isolation valve 
as near as possible to 
tank. 
Consider need ior 
remote operation of 
Isolation valve. 
Pump seals fail. Environmental contamination Emergency Use canned or seat- 
isolation less pump if 
valve. appropriate. 
Pump to be adequately 
bunded. 
Consider need for 
remote operation of 
Isolation valve. 
Less Outlet line partially Reaction in reactor does not Flow control 
Flow blocked. proceed as required. Poor 
Pump running conversion rate. 
incorrectly. Low flow 
alarm 
Composition 
I control 
Control Reaction in reactor does not Low flow 
valve fails proceed as required. Poor alarm. 
insufficiently conversion rate. 
open. 
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Composition 
control 
As Contamination of Unwanted reaction. Consider testing tank 
Well tank contents contents on a routine 
As basis. 
Flow 
Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention : 
Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
Lower Storage tank inlet Low tank level leading to low Low flow 
Pressur line blocked. pressure, low flow and poor alarm 
e Level control valve conversion in reactor. 
fails shut Low level 
alarm 
Level 
indicator 
Composition 
control 
Node: IO Waste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No Feed line blocked. Possible inability to continue 
Flow process at normal production 
rates 
Low tank level leading to Low level 
outlet pump cavitation. alarm 
Level 
indicator 
NO FLOW AT UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
NO FLOW FROM Possible inability to continue 
UPSTREAM UNIT process at normal production 
rates. 
Low tank level leading to outlet Low level 
pump cavitation. alarm 
Level 
indicator 
-More HIGH FLOW Inadequate venting. Vessel Relief valve. 
Flow FROM UPSTREAM overpressure rupture. 
UNIT 
Static build up. Dip tubes for Flammable fluijs- 
filling. only. If filling is not 
done via dip tubes 
check design 
assumptions. 
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Less Feed line partially LOW FLOW FROM Level 
Flow blocked. UPSTREAM UNIT indicator. 
As WRONG Material incompatability Ensure appropriate 
Well MATERIAL AT measures exist to 
As SOURCE check incoming 
Flow material. 
CONTAMINATION Material incompatibility 
OF MATERIAL AT 
SOURCE 
Reverse REVERSE FLOW Liquid siphoned out of Siphon break 
Flow ATSOURCE tank. on dip tubes. I 
Non-return 
I valve 
Node: 1OWaste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Ta-rameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
Higher HIGH Rapid evaporation of Temperature For system with vent 
Temper TEMPERATURE tank contents. indicator header system, can 
ature FROM UPSTREAM system cope with 
UNIT increase in venting 
due to hot weather 
acting on several 
tanks? 
High 
temperature 
alarm 
Increased vapour Temperature Only a problem for 
concentration around tank, indicator. tanks with open vent. 
possibly rising to a hazardous Consider installing 
level. appropriate gas 
detection equipment if 
appropriate. 
High 
temperature 
alarm. 
Node: IOWaste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
intention: 
Higher Feed line isolated. Expansion of locked in fluid Hydraulic Ensure operating 
Pressur causes hydraulic overpressure pressure relief instructions preclude 
e rupture of line. deliberate isolation of 
line without having 
first drained line. 
Ensure design 
minimises 
opportunites for 
isolation in error due 
to control valves 
failing etc. 
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Manual valve on Liquid hammer. Only a problem for 
storage tank inlet long 
closes quickly. pipelines. Ensure 
closing time on 
control 
valves and manual 
valves is long enough 
to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
HIGH PRESSURE Vessel overpressure Relief valve. Ensure adequate 
FROM SOURCE rupture venting. 
Pressure 
indicator. 
Node: II Treated waste Inlet to t anker, controlled by batch meter ( tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention : 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
II I I 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
I I I I 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No Feed line blocked. Reaction does not proceed Low flow 
Flow Control valve fails as required. Poor conversion, alarm 
shut. side reactions etc. 
Full head pump pressure High Design equipment to 
developed in storage tank outlet pressurellow withstand maximum 
pump. High pressure rupture flow pump cut pump delivery 
risk to downstream equipment. out switches. pressure. 
Pump overheats, seals damaged, 
possible leak. 
Kick back line 
Integral pump 
high pressure 
relief 
valve 
Pressure 
indicator 
Low flow 
alarm 
More Control valve fails Incomplete conversion of 
Flow open reactants 
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NS 
Inadequate storage tank venting. Relief valve 
Storage tank overpressure 
rupture. 
Static build up in storage tank. Use dip tubes Flammable fluids 
for filling only. If filling is done 
storage tank. via dip tubes check 
design assumptions. 
Less Control valve fails Reaction does not proceed Low flow 
Flow insuff iciently open as required. Poor conversion, alarm 
side reactions etc. 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
II I I 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
Lower Feed line leaking. Reaction does not proceed as Pressure 
Pressur required. Poor conversion, side control 
e reactions etc. 
FLow control 
Environmental 
damage. 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
As CONTAMINATION Reaction may not proceed as 
Well FROM UPSTREAM required. 
As UNITS 
Compo 
sition I 
Node: BNeutralisation Reactor liquid outlet with level control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No Outlet line blocked.. Reactor overflows Low flow 
Flow Pump failure. atram 
Level control valve 
fails shut. 
High level 
alarm 
Low storage tank level leading Low flow 
to outlet pump cavitation. alarm 
More Level control valve Level lost in reactor. 
Flow fails open. Possible overheating, poor 
conversion, side reactions, etc. 
Inadequate venting of storage Storage tank 
tank. Vessel overpressure relief valve. 
rupture. I I 
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Static build up in storage tank. Dip tubes for Flammable fluids 
filling storage only. If filling is not 
tank. done via dip tubes 
check design 
assumptions. 
Outlet line ruptured. Reactor contents lost to Emergency 
environment. isolation may 
be 
required. 
Less Level control fails to Possible reactor overflow. High level 
Flow open control valve alarm 
sufficiently. Low flow 
alarm 
Reverse Pump failure Liquid siphoned out of storage Siphon break 
Flow tank. on dip tubes. 
Non-return 
valve 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No Feed line Reaction Low flow 
Flow blocked. does not proceed alarm 
Control valve as required. Poor 
fails shut. conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
NO FLOW FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
NO FLOW FROM Reaction does not proceed as 1.2.1.1. Low 
UPSTREAM required. flow alarm 
UNITS 
More Control Incomplete conversion of 
Flow valve fails open reactants 
Inadequate venting of storage Storage tank 
tank. Vessel overpressure relief valve. 
rupture. 
Static build up in storage tank. Dip tubes for Flammable fluids 
filling storage only. If filling is not 
tank. done via dip tubes 
check design 
assumptions. 
HIGH FLOW FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
HIGH FLOW Incomplete conversion of 
FROM UPSTREAM reactants 
UNITS 
Inadequate venting of storage Storage tank 
tank. Vessel overpressure relief valve. 
rupture. 
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Static build up in storage tank. Dip tubes for Flammable fluids 
filling storage only. If filling is not 
tank. done via dip tubes 
check design 
assumptions. 
Less Control valve fails Reaction does not proceed as Low flow 
Flow insuff iciently open required. Poor conversion, side alarm 
reactions etc. 
LESS FLOW Low flow 
FROM UPSTREAM UNIT alarm 
LESS FLOW FROM Reaction does not proceed as Low flow 
UPSTREAM required. Poor conversion, side alarm 
I UNITS I reactions etc. I 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention : 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
As CONTAMINATION Reaction may not proceed as 
Well FROM UPSTREAM required. 
As UNITS 
Compo, 
sition I 
Node: 15Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream in with temperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No/Lcs Control valve fails Runaway reaction. Low flow 
s Flow shut or fails to open Possible explosion. alarm 
sufficiently. High 
temperature 
alarm. 
High pressure 
alarm. 
Install relief 
valve 
Catalyst destroyed. Low flow If present. 
alarm 
High 
temperature 
alarm. 
High pressure 
alarm. 
Reaction does not proceed Low flow 
As required. Poor conversion, alarm 
side reactions, etc. High 
temperature 
alarm. 
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High pressure 
alarm. 
Rapid evaporation of storage Low flow Only a problem for 
tank contents. alarm tanks with open vent. 
Increased vapour concentration Consider installing 
around storage tank, possibly High appropriate detection 
rising to a hazardous level. temperature equipment if 
alarm. appropriate. 
High pressure 
alarm. 
More Control valve fails Reaction does not proceed as 
Flow open required. Poor conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
High cooling water demand. Can cooling water 
system maintain 
adequate supply to 
remaining systems? 
Node: 15Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream in with temperature control 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
I I I I 
Node: 16Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream out with temperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
- No Recycle isolation Reaction temperature too high. Low flow Check operating 
Flow valve closed in error. Reaction does not proceed as alarm proc dures. 
required. Poor conversion, side High 
reactions, etc. temperature 
Catalyst destroyed alarm 
Possible explosion risk. Relief valve 
Low flow 
alarm 
High 
temperature 
alarm 
Rapid evaporation of storage Low flow Only a problem for 
tank contents. alarm tanks with open vent. 
Increased vapour concentration Consider installing 
around storage tank, possibly High appropriate detection 
rising to a hazardous level. temperature equipment if 
alarm appropriate. 
Node: 17Neutralisation Reactor cooling via recycle 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No/Les Pump failure or poor Reactor begins to overheat. Some form of 
s pump performance. Reaction may begin to run emergency cooling 
Flow away. Possible risk of may be necessary to 
explosion. avoid explosion where 
I that possibility exists. I 
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As 
Well 
As 
Flow 
I 
Contamination of 
recycle stream by 
cooling water due to 
heat exchanger 
interface failure. I 
Reaction does not proceed 
as required. Poor conversion, 
side reactions, etc. 
Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Enable flow into or out of tank to maintain atmospheric pressure 
No/Les 
s 
Flow 
Vent line blocked or 
partially blocked 
Tank overpressure rupture on 
filling 
Relief valve Minimise 
opportunities for vent 
blockage 
Ensure flame arrestor 
is maintained 
correctly. 
Tank vacuum 
collapse on 
discharge 
Vacuum 
relief 
valve. 
Minimise 
opportunities for vent 
blockage. 
Ensure flame arrestor 
is maintained correctly 
Node: 1 8Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: Maintain temperature tank 
Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Pressure 
intention: Maintain atmospheric pressure in tank 
Node: 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
No 
Flow 
Feed line blocked. Possible inability to continue 
process at normal production 
rates 
Low tank 
level leading to 
Low level 
alarm 
outlet pump 
cavitation. 
Level 
indicator 
Reactor overflows. 
-- I 
Provide suitable 
overflow arrangement. 
Node: 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
II I I 
Node: 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
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Higher Feed line Expansion of locked in fluid Hydraulic Ensure operating 
Pressur isolated. causes hydraulic overpressure pressure relief instructions preclude 
e rupture of line. deliberate isolation of 
line without having 
first drained line. 
Ensure design 
minimises 
opportunites for 
isolation in 
error due to control 
valves failing etc. 
Manual valve on Liquid hammer Only a problem for 
storage tank inlet long 
closes quickly. pipelines. Ensure 
closing time on 
control 
valves and manual 
valves are long 
enough to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
Node: 20 Treated Waste Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Allow tank to overf! safely 
No/Les Overflow No/partial tank overflow Level control Ensure opportunities 
s 
Flow 
blocked or 
partially blocked 
available. Possible tank rupture 
on overfilling 
for overflow blocking 
are minimised. 
Level 
indicator 
High level 
alarm 
Node: 20Treated Waste Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
Node 20Treated Waste Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
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8 Conclusions 
This chapter provides some conclusions relating to the work described in this thesis 
and in particular the modular HAZOP procedure. The final part of this chapter looks 
at how this work may be taken forward in the future. 
8.1 Contributions 
In looking at how to improve hazard identification of chemical plant through the 
HAZOP procedure, three possible areas for improvement were identified. Firstly 
possible improvements to the conventional procedure were reviewed. Secondly, the 
role of automated HAZOP was discussed and finally a new, modular HAZOP 
procedure was put forward. 
It is fairly clear that minor modifications to the conventional HAZOP procedure will 
have only a marginal impact on the overall time taken to complete the hazard 
identification of chemical plant. However, there may be useful lessons which should 
be borne in mind, particularly by inexperienced HAZOP teams. There being no 
substantial time gains foreseen by improving HAZOP in this way, this thesis has been 
restricted largely to reviewing the literature relating to such improvements. 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, automated HAZOP is an area that has attracted 
much research effort. It offers potentially the greatest timesaving but a large amount 
of further work is necessary before automated hazard identification of a chemical 
plant produces complete and reliable results. Because of the large amount of work 
being done by other people in this field, this thesis has been restricted to reviewing the 
state of the art. 
The development of a modular HAZOP procedure has formed the major part of this 
thesis. In developing this procedure a number of important principles have been 
identified. Firstly, the level of decomposition required, and in particular the use of 
interchangeable sub-modules, provides for a procedure which is adaptable to different 
plant configurations but can also be quickly and easily applied. This is particularly 
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important for a procedure which, as developed, is carr icd out manually by only one or 
two people. This contrasts starkly with the level of decomposition used in automated 
HAZOP, which requires that each pump, valve, etc. be modelled. In particular it 
allows for known problems with combinations of equipment to be represented. As 
such, it is possible to include much more expert knowledge in a sub-module than in a 
collection of more detailed models making up that sub-module. Secondly, the fact that 
the majority of cause-consequence scenarios exist in adjacent modules, and the 
categorisation of locally and remotely propagated effects, reduces the complexity of 
the procedure. It enables the simpler fault paths, which make up most of the cause- 
consequence scenarios, to be identified quickly, leaving a much reduced number of 
fault paths which require a more thorough analysis. Finally, I think the usefulness of 
the categories and a filtering tool, such as that provided by HAZOP-PC, in 
simplifying the application of the procedure should not be underestimated. 
I believe that the modular HAZOP procedure detailed in this thesis can be used to 
provide quick hazard identification of chemical plant. Its application may be limited 
to plant that have a large number of fairly standard items, but in such cases it can 
provide a significant improvement in the time taken for haza d identification. The size 
and structure of the models, and in particular the preHAZOPed results, allows a large 
amount of information, and in particular expert knowledge regarding known hazard 
and operability problems, to be represented, whilst retaining the flexibility that 
enables their use on a wide variety of chemical plant. 
8.2 Limitations 
The main limitation surrounding this work at present is the lack of a substantial 
library of sub-modules and corresponding preHAZOPed results. 
It should also be noted that the current preHAZOPed results should be treated as 
examples only. They are by no means complete, and a fair amount of technical expert 
input is required to develop them and bring them to an acceptable and industrially 
applicable standard. 
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As identified above, the modular HAZOP procedure is not going to be universally 
applicable. For certain plant, particularly where they are new, complex or otherwise 
unique, the required preHAZOPed results may not exist and it may not be worth 
compiling them. In such cases, the conventional HAZOP procedure provides the best 
route for hazard identification. 
It should also be noted that the procedure described for modular HAZOP is applicable 
only to continuous process plant. 
8.3 Further Work 
One of the main problems to be overcome in modular HAZOP is how to use the 
results. In particular, how to make sure that consideration is given to whether or not 
sufficient protection exists to prevent or reduce the effects of a possible hazard. 
In terms of reducing the amount of time taken to carry out hazard studies it would 
seem best to use the results as follows. The preHAZOPed results will contain all 
protections necessary for safe operation of the module when considered in isolation. 
No further consideration will need to be given to the need for additional protections 
due to hazards arising entirely within the module. For faults that have been 
propagated to find distant consequences then consideration will have to be given to 
determine whether the existing protections are adequate or not. The main drawback 
with this approach is that modules may contain protective systems that are not 
actually required and the capital and operating costs of the module will be higher than 
necessary. However, it may be possible to reduce the number of protections necessary 
through reference to remarks in the preHAZOPed results. For example, a stock tank 
containing a non-flammable non-toxic substance may not require a high level alarm 
and the possibility for this alarm to be omitted will be included in the preHAZOPed 
results (table 8.1 ). 
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Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendations Remarks 
High level Level Tank contents Overflow Overflow to be High level alarm 
control lost to below tank roof may not be 
fails environment High level alarm required for non- 
Tank to be flammable, non- 
Level indicator adequately bunded I toxic liquids. 
Table 8.1 - Part of preHAZOPed results for storage tank showing how remarks 
column can be used. 
The alternative approach is to make it a requirement that all the results should be 
checked to ensure that safeguards and protections are adequate and not excessive. 
However this will dramatically increase the time taken to carry out modular HAZOP 
and there will no significant time benefit over conventional HAZOP. The advantage 
with this approach is that the preHAZOPed results do not need to be as detailed as for 
the first method given that there is scope for whoever is checking the results to add 
safeguards as necessary. 
It may of course be possible to combine the two above approaches. The former 
approach could be used for modules that occur commonly and for which we can draw 
up the detailed preHAZOPed results required. The latter approach can be used for 
modules which do not yet have detailed preHAZOPed results though it is still 
necessary that all vulnerabilities and propagated effects are included. Detailed results 
can be drawn up for modules during a conventional. HAZOP study of the module and 
these can subsequently be used (modified slightly if needed) whenever similar 
modules are considered in the future. 
As identified above, the procedure is currently applicable only to continuous process 
plant. In order to be able to be used for batch plant, appropriate terms would have to 
be defined to describe the effects transmitted between modules, so that correct 
matching across module boundaries could be caff ied out and fault paths developed. It 
would probably also be necessary to have modules, or possibly sub-modules, 
connected in time as well as space, i. e. each different operation carried out in a 
particular item of equipment would require a different set of preHAZOPed results, 
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and the effect of following one operation by another in the same item of equipment 
need to be considered. This is also likely to require, as its basis, a more systematic 
approach to HAZOP of batch process plants than that originally specified. Work on 
developing such an approach has only recently begun (Mushtaq and Chung, 2000). 
It is not clear how applicable the modular HAZOP procedure is to other similar 
continuous process industries, for example food processing. In fact the modular 
HAZOP procedure may be more applicable to such industries where a modular 
approach to design is already taken. The identification of particular industries, 
chemical, chemical related and other, where the modular HAZOP procedure could be 
more easily and productively applied could form the basis of useful investigations. 
8.4 Implementing Modular HAZOP in an Industrial Environment 
A further problem to be overcome is the transfer of the modular HAZOP procedure to 
a real environment. Following the initial development of the HAZOP procedure and 
its acceptance as the standard technique for hazard identification, changes have been 
adopted gradually and slowly, mainly as individual hazard study leaders applied new 
techniques they regarded or found to be improvements over the old techniques. The 
modular HAZOP procedure is however more of a fundamental change and its 
acceptance will require the support of senior SHE personnel. This of course requires 
that the modular HAZOP procedure gives results at least as good as can be expected 
from conventional HAZOP. It will also be necessary to show a significant time saving 
over conventional HAZOP. One possibility is that modular HAZOP will be used by 
an individual prior to a formal HAZOP meeting. It will be used to develop questions 
and possible solutions for problems that will later be identified in the HAZOP 
meeting. 
Further examples will need to be tested before the completeness and ease of 
application of modular HAZOP are fully known. In particular this requires the further 
development of modules. Examples of modules that would be particularly useful are 
sought. Furthermore, as I identified at the start, modular HAZOP will become more 
effective and attractive as the design procedure becomes more modular in nature. 
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8.5 Automated modular HAZOP 
Because of the simplicity and methodical nature of the modular HAZOP procedure, it 
should be possible to automate it. This would provide another route to automating the 
HAZOP procedure. The level of decomposition chosen for modular HAZOP is 
considered to be much more useful for representing expert knowledge relating to 
hazards in chemical plant, and this route may therefore have advantages over the 
automated HAZOP routes currently being investigated. 
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Appendix 1- Case Study preHAZOPed Results 
This appendix contains the full list of preHAZOPed results used to generate the 
results of the case study of Chapter 7. 
Table Al. I gives the preHAZOPed results generated by filtering to include only those 
cause-consequence scenarios having an initial cause (IC) type of cause. 
Table Al. 2 gives the preftAZOPed results generated by filtering to include the 
remaining cause-consequence scendios, i. e. those having a vulnerability (VUL) type 
of cause. 
Al - 
Waste Acid Neutralisation Plant 
Node: I Cooling Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS 
DEVIAT RECOMMEND 
ION ATIONS 
1. No I. I. Inline IC 1.1.1. Level in EE 
Flow filter blocked. cold well cannot 
Float valve fails be maintained. 
shut. Cooling water 
Pump failure. supply may be 
restricted. 
2. More 2.1. Float valve ic 2.1.1. Cold well EE 2.1.1.1. Suitable 
Flow fails open. overflows. overflow to drain. 
Contamination due 
to dosing 
chemicals. 
Node: I Cooling Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
2. Lower 2.1. Low ambient ic 2.1.1. Prolonged 
Temperat temperature leads cold weather may 
ure to freezing, reduce 
particularly as availability of 
there may be no cooling water. 
flow for long 
Lperiods of time. 
______ Node: 2Cooling water return to tower. 
Fa-r-ameter: Flow 
Intention: Maintain circulation of cooling water. 
1. Less I. I. Purge to IC I. I. I. Cooling EE I. I. I. I. Regualr 
Flow drain valve left water tower inspection. 
open or fails performance falls 
open. off. Cooling water 
supply may be 
restricted during 
periods of high 
deamand. 
Node: 3Cooling Water Dosing - Chromate Dosing Outlet. Feed controlled by automatic dosing control. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Node: 4Cooling water supply main -2 or more pumps. 
Parameter: Flow 
Table Al. I- Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A2 
Intention: 
1. Less I. I. Pump ic I. I. I. LESSFLOW DPE 1.1.1.1. 
Flow failure. TO Appropriate 
DOWNSTREAM alarms on pumps. 
UNITS. Only likely 
to be a problem 
during periods of 
high demand. 
1.1.1.2. Low flow 
alarm 
on supply main. 
2. 2.1. Pump not Ic 2.1.1. Reverse EE 2.1.1.1. Separate 
Reverse running flow through pump non- 
Flow back into cooling return valves on 
water pond. all pump 
1 discharges. 
Node: 4Cooling water supply main -2 or more pumps. 
Parameter: Maintenance 
Intention: 
I. partOf I. I. Highcooling ic 1.1.1. Unable to EE I. I. I. I. Planned 
Maintena water demand e. g. meet demand due to maintenance 
nce due to hot pump down for should be 
weather. maintenance. scheduled for 
Unable to carry periods of low 
out maintenance cooling water 
due to high demand. 
cooling water 
f demand. Vode: 5Cooling Water Purge to drain - manua lly adjusted. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. More 1.1. Chemical ic 1.1.1. Wastage of EE I. I. I. I. Orifice 
Flow concentration cooling water and plate to 
monitoring fails dosing chemicals. minimise 
requiring purge maximum 
valve to be possible 
opened more than flow rate. 
necessary. 
Purge valve 
inadvertantly 
left further open 
than required. 
2. Less 2.1. Purge valve ic 2.1.1. Increased EE 
Flow insufficiently scaling, general 
open. solids deposition, 
and fouling 
problems. 
Node: Kooling Water Acid dosing - automatically controlled. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Table Al. I (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A3 
1. Less 1.1. Automatic IC 1.1.1. pH should EE I. I. I. I. Routine 
Flow dosing control be maintained and 
fails, delivering between pH7-8 to regular testing. 
less acid than maintain non- 1.1.1.2. Low 
required. scaling, non- level alarm. 
Acid supply corrosive 
exhausted. conditions in the 
system. 
2. More 2.1. Automatic IC 2.1.1. pH should EE 2.1.1.1. Routine 
Flow dosing control be maintained and 
fails, delivering between pH7-8 to regular testing. 
more acid than maintain non- 
required. scaling, non- 
Acid supply corrosive 
exhausted. conditions in the 
system. 
Node: 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. 1.1. Vent line IC 1.1.1. Tank EE I. I. I. I. Relief I. I. I. I. Minimise 
No/Less blocked or overpressure valve opportunities for 
Flow partially blocked rupture on Iling vent blockage 
1.1.1.2. Ensure 
flame arrestor is 
maintained 
correctly. 
1.1.2. Tank vacuum EE 1.1.2.1. Vacuum 1.1.2.1. Minimise 
collapse on relief opportunities for 
discharge valve. vent blockage. 
1.1.2.2. Ensure 
flame arrestor is 
maintained 
correctly 
_jýode- 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: aintain temperature tank 
_ - 1 F Node. 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
parameter: Pressure 
Intention: Maintain atmospheric pressure in tank 
I I I I- I 
ITo-de. 8Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Allow tank to overflow safe y 
1. 1.1. Overflow IC I. I. I. No/partial EE 1.1.1.1. Level I. I. I. I. Ensure 
No/Less blocked or tank overflow control opportunities for 
Flow partially blocked available. overflow 
Possible tank 1.1.1.2. Level blocking 
rupture on indicator are minimised. 
overfilling 
Table Al I (cont. ) - Waste acid pl I nt prel AZOPed results -I filtere 
A4 
1.1.1.3. High 
level alarm 
Node: 8Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
Node: 8Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Allow continuous flow of material t process 
1. No I. I. Outlet line IC 1.1.1. NO FLOW DPE 1.1.1.1 Low flow 
Flow blocked between TO alarm 
tank and pump. DOWNSTREAM 
Pump fails. UNIT 
1.2. Flow control IC 1.2.1. NO FLOW DPE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
valve fails shut. TO alarm 
Outlet line DOWNSTREAM 
blocked UNIT 
downstream of 1.2.2. Full head EE 1.2.2.1. Kick 1.2.2.1. Consider 
pump. pump pressure back line. designing 
developed. High 1.2.2.2. Low flow equipment to 
pressure rupture alarm. withstand 
risk to outlet maximum 
line. pump delivery 
Pump overheats, pressure. 
seals damaged, 
possible leak. 
2. More 2.1. Control IC 2.1.1. HIGHFLOW DPE 
Flow valve fails open TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT 
2.2. Spare pump IC 2.2.1. HIGHFLOW DPE 2.2.1.1: Flow 2.2.1.1. Ensure 
running in error TO control operating and 
DOWNSTREAM maintenance 
UNIT instructions 
preclude running 
parallel pumps 
incorrectly. 
2.3. Outlet line IC 2.3.1. Tank EE 2.3.1.1. 2.3.1.1. Ensure 
ruptured contents lost to Emergency tank is 
environment isolation valve adequately 
bunded. 
2.3.1.2. Locate 
isolation valve 
as near as 
possible to tank. 
Table Al. 1 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A5 
2.3.1.3. Consider 
need for remote 
operation of 
isolation valve. 
2.4. Pump seals ic 2.4.1. EE 2.4.1.1. 2.4.1.1. Use 
fail. Environmental Emergency canned or seal- 
contamination isolation valve. less pump if 
appropriate. 
2.4.1.2. Pump to 
be adequately 
bunded. 
2.4.1.3. Consider 
need for remote 
operation of 
isolation valve. 
3. Less 3.1. Outlet line IC 3.1.1. LESSFLOW DPE 3.1.1.1. Flow 
Flow partially TO control 
blocked. Pump running DOWNSTREAM 
incorrectly. UNIT 
3.1.1.2. Low flow 
alarm 
3.2. Control IC 3.2.1. LESS FLOW DPE 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
valve fails TO alarm. 
insufficiently DOWNSTREAM 
open. UNIT 
4. As 4.1. IC 4.1.1. DPE 
Well Contamination of CONTAMINATION 
As Flow tank contents OF 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT 
5. 5.2. Outlet line ic 5.2.1. REVERSE DPE 
Reverse ruptured. FLO 
Flow W FROM 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT 
Node 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Ta-rameter. Temperature 
intention: 
Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
2. Lower 2.1. Storage tank Ic 2.1.1. Low tank DPE 2.1.1.1. Low flow 
Pressure inlet line level leading to alarm 
blocked. LOW PRESSURE 2.1.1.2. Low 
AT level alarm 
Level control DOWNSTREAM 
valve fails shut. UNIT 
2.1.1.3. Level 
I I I 1 
1 
indicator 
. I Node: IOWaste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Table Al. 1 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A6 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No I. I. Feed line IC 1.1.1. Possible EE 
Flow blocked. inability to 
continue process 
at normal 
1 production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank EE 1.1.2.1. Low 
level leading to level alarm 
outlet pump 1.1.2.2. Level 
cavitation. indicato 
1.1.3. NO FLOW DPE 
AT 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel EE 3.1.1.1. Level 
Flow partially takes longer to indicator. 
blocked. fill than normal 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW DPE 3.1.2.1. Level 
FROM UPSTREAM indicator. 
UNIT f -R-ode. - I OWaste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Intention: 
ENoddEljýasteid 
Stora ge ynk fee inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
lffiýer 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion IC 1.2.1.1. 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
ess Pressure isolated. of locked in fluid Hydraulic operating 
r 
causes hydraulic pressure relief instructions 
overpressure preclude 
rupture of line. deliberate 
isolation of line 
without having 
first drained 
line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure 
design minimises 
opportunites for 
isolation in 
error due to 
control valves 
failing etc. 
Table Al. I (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A7 
1.3. Manual valve IC 1.3.1. LIQUID 1.3.1.1. Only a 
on storage tank HAMMER. HIGH problem for long 
inlet closes PRESSURE TO pipelines. 
quickly. UPSTREAM Ensure closing 
UNITS. time on control 
valves and 
manual 
valves is long 
enough to avoid 
liquid hammer. 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controll ed by batch meter (tan ker loadi ng ope ations) 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
parameter: Pressure 
intention: 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No I. I. Feed line IC I. I. I. Reaction EE I. I. I. I. Low flow 
Flow blocked. does not proceed alarm 
Control valve as required. Poor 
fails shut. conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
1.1.2. NO FLOW DPE 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
FROM UPSTREAM alarm 
UNITS 
1.1.3. LOW IPE 1.1.3.1. Low flow 
CONCENTRATION alarm 
OF 1.1.3.2. 
REACTANT/ Concentration 
CONTAMINATION alarm 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
, OUTLETS 
1.1.4. LESS FLOW IPE 1.1.4.1. Low flow 
TO UNITS alarm 
DOWNSTREAM 
OR 
REACTOR LIQUID 
OUTLET 
'Table Al. I (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A8 
2. More 2.1. Control IC 2.1.1. Incomplete EE 
Flow valve fails open conversion of 
reactants 
2.1.2. HIGH 
CONCENTRATION 
OF 
REACTANT/ 
CONTAMINATION 
TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.1.3. HIGH FLOW IPE 
TO UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR LIQUID 
, OUTLET 
2.1.4. HIGH FLOW DPE 
FROM UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Control IC 3.1.1. Reaction EE 3.1.1.1. Low flow 
Flow valve fails does not proceed alarm 
insufficiently as required. Poor 
open conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.1.2. LESS IPE 3.1.2.1. Low flow 
CONCENTRATION alarm 
OF 3.1.2.2. 
REACTANT/ Concentration 
CONTAMINATION alarm 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWSNTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
, 
OUTLET 
3.1.3. LESS FLOW DPE 3.1.3.1. Low flow 
FROM UPSTREAM alarm 
UNIT 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed wi th flow control 
parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
2. Lower 2.2. Feed line IC 2.2.1. Reactionn EE 2.2.1.1. Pressure 
Pressure leaking. does not proceed control 
as required. Poor 2.2.1.2. FLow 
conversion, side control 
reactions etc. 
Table Al. I (cont. ) - Waste acid Plant PreHAZOPed results - IC filtered. 
A9 
2.2.2. EE 
Environmental 
damage. 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
1. More I. I. HIGH 1.1.1. Reaction 
Composit CONCENTRATION does not proceed 
ion FROM UPSTREAM as required. 
UNITS 
1.1.2. 
CONTAMINATION 
(BY 
REACTANT)TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR 
OUTLETS. 
(Unless some form 
of concentration 
control is used). 
2. Less 2.1. LOW 2.1.1. Reaction 
Composit CONCENTRATION does not proceed 
ion FROM UPSTREAM as required 
UNITS 
2.1.2. 
CONTAMINATION 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
OUTLETS. (Unless 
some form of 
concentration 
control is used). 
3. As 3.1. 3.1.1. Reaction 
Well CONTAMINATION may not proceed as 
As FROM UPSTREAM required. 
Composit UNITS 
ion 
3.1.2. 
CONTAMINATION 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
OUTLETS. 
Node: 13N eutralisation Reactor liquid outlet with level control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
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1. No 1.1. Outlet line IC I. I. I. Reactor EE 1.1.1.1. Low flow 
Flow blocked. overflows alram 
Pump failure. 1.1.1.2. High 
level alarm 
Level control 
valve fails shut. 1.1.2. NO FLOW IPE 1.1.2.1. Low'flow 
FROM UNITS alarm 
UPSTREAM OF 
REACTOR FEED 
2. More 2.1. Level IC 2.1.1. Level lost 
Flow control valve in reactor. 
fails open. Possible 
overheating, poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
2.1.2. HIGH FLOW DPE 
TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.2. HIGH FLOW TO 2.2.1. Level lost 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS in reactor. 
Possible 
overheating, poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
2.3. Outlet line IC 2.3.1. Reactor EE 2.3. 
ruptured. contents lost to Emergency 
environment. isolation may be 
required. 
3. Less 3.1. Level IC 3.1.1. Possible EE 3.1.1.1. High 
Flow control fails to reactor overflow. level alarm 
open control 3.1.1.2. Low 
valve flowalarm 
sufficiently. 3.1.2. LESS FLOW DPE 3.1.2.1. Low flow 
TO alarm 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
4. 4.1. Pump failure IC 4.1.1. REVERSE DPE 
Reverse FLOW FROM 
Flow DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
Node: 14N eutralisation Reactor liquid feed wit h concentration control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No I. I. Feed line IC I. I. I. Reaction EE I. I. I. I. Low flow 
Flow blocked. does not proceed alarm 
Control valve as required. Poor 
fails shut. conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
1.1.2. NO FLOW DPE 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
FROM UPSTREAM alarm 
UNITS 
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1.1.3. LESSFLOW IPE 1.1.3.1. Low flow 
TO UNITS alarm 
DOWNSTREAM 
OR 
REACTOR LIQUID 
OUTLET 
2. More 2.1. Control IC 2.1.1. Incomplete EE 
Flow valve fails open conversion of 
yreactants 
2.1.2. HIGH FLOW IPE 
TO UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR LIQUID 
, OUTLET 2.1.3. HIGH FLOW DPE 
FROM UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Control IC 3.1.1. Reaction EE 3.1.1.1. Low flow 
Flow valve fails does not proceed alarm 
insufficiently as required. Poor 
open conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.1.2. LESS FLOW DPE 3.1.2.1. Low flow 
FROM UPSTREAM alarm 
f UNIT 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
parameter: Composition 
intention: 
1. As I. I. I. Reaction 
Well CONTAMINATION may not proceed as 
As FROM UPSTREAM required. 
Composit UNITS 
ion 
CONTAMINATION 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
OUTLETS. 
Node: 15N eutralisation Reactor Cooling stream in with temperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No I. I. Control 1.1.1. Runaway I. I. I. I. Low flow 
Flow 
I 
valve fails shut. reaction. alarm 
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1.1.1.2. High 
temperature 
alarm. 
1.1.2. Possible 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
explosion. I alarm 
1.1.2.2. High 
temperature 
alarm 
1.1.2.3. High 
pressure 
alarm 
1.1.2.4. Install 
relief 
valve 
1.1.3. Catalyst 1.1.3.1. As for 
destroyed. consequence 
1.1.4. Reaction 1.1.4.1. As for 
does not proceed consequence 
as required. Poor 1.1.1 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
1.1.5. NO FLOW 1.1.5.1. As for 
DOWSNTREAM consequence 
OF 
COOLING 
STREAM OUT 
1.1.6. NO FLOW 1.1.6.1. As for 
FROM UPSTREAM consequence 
UNITS 
1.1.7. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR LIQUID 
. OUTLET 1.1.8. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR 
VAPOUR 
, OUTLET 
1.2. NO FLOW FROM 1.2. L As for 1.2.1.1. As for 
UPSTREAM UNITS cause 1.1 except cause 1.1 
as for consequence 
1.1.6 
2. More 2.1. Control 2.1.1. Reaction 
Flow valve fails open does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
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2.1.2. MORE FLOW 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
COOLING 
STREAM OUT 
2.1.3. MORE FLOW 
FROM UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.1.4. LOW 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR LIQUID 
, OUTLET 2.1.5. LOW 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REATOR VAPOUR 
, OUTLET 2.2. MORE FLOW 2.2.1. As for 2.2.1.1. Flow 
FROM UPSTREAM cause 1.1 except control. 
UNIT as for consequence 2.2.1.2. 
2.1.3 Temperature 
control. 
3. Less 3.1. Control 3.1.1. Possible 3.1.1.1. High 
Flow valve fails to runaway reaction. temperature 
onen sufficiently alarm. 
3.1.1.2. Low flow 
alarm 
3.1.2. Possible 
explosion 
3.1.3. Reaction 
does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
3.1.4. LESS FLOW 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
COOLING 
STREAM OUT 
3.1.5. LESS FLOW 
FROM UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
3.1.6. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
REACTOR LIQUID 
J . 
OUTLET 
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3.1.7. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
COOLING 
STREAM OUT 
3.2. LESS FLOW 3.2.1. As for 3.2.1.1. Flow 
FROM UPSTREAM cause 2.1 except control 
UNIT as for consequence 
3.1.5 
Node: 15Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream in with temperature control 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH I. I. I. Reaction 1.1.1.1. 
Temperat TEMPERATURE FROM does not proceed Temperature 
ure UPSTREAM UNIT as required. Poor control 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
1.1.2. Cooling 
capacity reduced. 
1.1.3. HIGH 1.1.3.1. 
TEMPERATURE Temperature 
TO control 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF COOLING 
STREAM 
OUT 
1.1.4. HIGH 1.1.4.1. 
TEMPERATURE Temperature 
TO control 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
LIQUID 
OUTLET 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW 2.1.1. Reaction 2.1.1.1. 
Temperat TEMPERATURE FROM does not proceed Temperature 
ure UPSTREAM UNIT as required. Poor control. 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
2. I. T Reaction 2.1.2.1. 
proceeds slower Temperature 
than expected. control. 
2.1.3. LOW 2.1.3.1. 
TEMPERATURE Temperature 
TO control 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF LIQUID 
OUTLET 
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2.1.4. LOW 2.1.4.1. 
TEMPERATURE Temperature 
DOWNSTREAM control 
OF 
COOLING 
STREAM OUT 
Node: 16N eutralisation Reactor Cooling stream out with temperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: 
1. No I. I. No FLOW TO 1.1.1. Reaction I. I. I. I. Low flow 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT temperature too alarm 
high. 1.1.1.2. High 
temperature 
alarm 
Explosion. 
Catalyst 
destroyed. 
1.1.2. Reaction 1.1.2.1. As for 
does not proceed consequence 
as required. Poor 1.1.1 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
1.1 . 3. NO FLOW 1.1.3.1. As for FROM UNITS consequence 
UPSTREAM OF 1.1.1 
COOLING 
STREAM IN 
1.1.4. HIGH 1.1.4.1. As for 
TEMPERATURE consequence 
DOWNSTREAM 1.1.1 
OF 
LIQUID OUTLET 
1.1.5. HIGH 1.1.5.1. As for 
TEMPERATURE consequence 
DOWNSTREAM 1.1.1 
OF 
VAPOUR OUTLET 
2. More 2.1. HIGH FLOW TO 2.1.1. Low 2.1.1.1. 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT reaction Temperature 
temperature control 
2.1.2. Reaction 2.1.2.1. as for 
does not proceed consequence 
as required. Poor 1.1.1 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
2.1.3. HIGH FLOW 2.1.3.1. As for 
FROM UNITS consequence 
UPSTREAM OF 1.1.1 
COOLING 
STREAM IN 
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2.1.4. LOW 2.1.4.1. as for 
TEMPERATURE consequence 
TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.1.5. LOW 2.1.5.1. As for 
TEMPERATURE consequence 
DOWNSTREAM 1.1.1 
OF 
LIQUID OUTLET 
3. Less 3.1. LOW FLOW TO 3.1.1. High 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNITS reaction 
temperature. 
3.1.2. Possible 
1 runaway reaction. 
3.1.3. Reaction 
does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
3.1.4. LOW FLOW 
FROM UNITS 
UPSTREAM OF 
COOLING 
STREAM IN 
3.1.5. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
3.1.6. HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF 
LIQUID OUTLET 
-Toý eutralisation Reactor cooling via recycle 
Pnrameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. 1.1. Pump failure IC I. I. I. Reactor EE I. I. I. I. Some 
No/Less or poor pump begins to form of 
Flow performance. overheat. Reaction emergency 
may begin to run cooling may be 
away. Possible necessary to 
risk of explosion. avoid explosion 
where that 
possibility 
exists. 
3. AS 3.1. IC 3.1.1. Reaction EE 
Well Contamination of does not proceed 
As Flow recycle stream by as required. Poor 
cooling water due conversion, side 
to heat exchanger reactions, etc. 
Table Al 
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3.1.2. IPE 
CONTAMINATION 
WITH 
COOLING WATER 
TO 
UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM 
OF REACTOR 
OUTLET 
Node: 18Treated, Waste Storage tank vent to at mosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Enable flow into or out of tank to maintain atmospheric pr sure 
1. 1.1. Vent line IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Relief 1.1.1.1. M inimise 
No/Less blocked or overpressure valve opportunities for 
Flow partially blocked rupture on filling vent blockage 
1.1.1.2. Ensure 
flame arrestor is 
maintained 
correctly. 
1.1-2. Tank vacuum EE 1.1.2.1. Vacuum 1.1.2.1. Minimise 
collapse on relief opportunities for 
discharge valve. vent blockage. 
1.1.2.2. Ensure 
flame arrestor is 
maintained 
correctly 
Node: 18T reated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Fair-ameter: Temperature 
intention: Maintain temperature tank 
Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Faýr-ameter Pressure 
Intention: Maintain atmospheric pressure in tank 
]Rode. - 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention. 
1. No I. I. Feed line IC I. I. I. Possible EE 
Flow blocked. inability to 
continue process 
at normal 
I production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank EE 1.1.2.1. Low 
level leading to level alarm 
outlet pump 1.1.2.2. Level 
cavitation. indicator 
1.1.3. NO FLOW DPE 
AT 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
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3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel EE 3.1.1.1. Level 
Flow partially takes longer to indicator. 
blocked. fill than normal 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW DPE 3.1.2.1. Level 
FROM UPSTREAM indicator. 
UNIT I I 
Node: 19T reated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intemt-ion: 
Node: 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
1. Higher 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion IC 1.2.1.1. 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
Pressure isolated. of locked in fluid Hydraulic operating 
causes hydraulic pressure relief instructions 
overpressure preclude 
rupture of line. deliberate 
isolation of line 
without having 
first drained 
line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure 
design minimises 
opportunites for 
isolation in 
error due to 
control valves 
failing etc. 
1.3. Manual valve IC 1.3.1. LIQUID 1.3.1.1. Only a 
on storage tank HAMMER. HIGH problem for long 
inlet closes PRESSURE TO pipelines. 
quickly. UPSTREAM Ensure closing 
UNITS. time on control 
valves and 
manual 
valves is long 
enough to avoid 
liquid hammer. 
ode: 20Treated Waste Storage tank overfl= 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Allow tank to overflow sa y 
1. 1.1. Overflow IC I-I-I- No/partial EE 1.1.1.1. Level I. I. I. I. Ensure 
No/Less blocked or tank overflow control opportunities for 
Flow partially blocked available. overflow 
Possible tank 1.1.1.2. Level blocking 
rupture on indicator are minimised. 
overfilling 1.1.1.3. High 
level alarm 
Node: 20 Treated Waste Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
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Project Name: Waste Acid Neutralisation Plant 
Node: I Cooling Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS 
RECOMMENDA 
TIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
SUPPLY 
. 
VUL 1.2.1. Level in cold 
well cannot be 
maintained. 
Cooling water supply 
may be restricted. 
EE 1.2.1.1. If the 
supply is 
unreliable 
consider the need 
for a backup 
supply. See 
I appropriate node. 
Node: lCoolin g Water top up - single supply, single pump and float valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
Node: 2Cooling water return to tower. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Maintain circulation of co ling wat 
Node: 3Cooling Water Dosing - Chromate Dosing Outlet. Feed controlled by automatic dosing control. 
. Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Node: 4Cooling water supply main -2 or more pum s. 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: 
Node: 4Cooling water supply main -2 or more pumps. 
parameter: Maintenance 
intention: 
Node: 5Cooling Water Purge to drain - manually adjusted. 
parameter: Flow 
intention: 
I II I I 
Node: 6Cooling Water Acid dosing - automatically controlled. 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: 
Node: 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Enable flow into or out of tank to maintain atmospheric pressure 
I Nocle: '/ Waste acia blorage tanK vent to atmosphere 
Table Al. 2 - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - VUL filtered. 
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Parameter: T 
: Maintain temperature tank 
I II -- T- I I 
Node: 7Waste acid Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: Maintain atmospheric ess e. n tank 
--- 1 7 ý 11 T 
Node: 8Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: Allow tank to overflow safely 
I I I II -I 
Node: 8Wastc acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
Node: 8Waste acid Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Allow continuous flow of material to process 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDA 
TIONS 
1. No Flow 1.3. NO FLOW 
TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
VUL 1.3.1. Full head pump 
pressure developed. 
High pressure rupture 
risk to downstream 
equipment. Pump 
EE 1.3.1.1. High 
pressure/low flow 
pump 
cut out switches. 
1.3.1.1. Design 
equipment to 
withstand 
maximum 
pump delivery 
overheats, seals 
damaged, possible leak. 
1.3.1.2. Kick back 
line 
pressure. 
1.3.1.3. Integral 
pump 
high pressure relief 
valve 
1.3.1.4. Pressure 
indicator 
1.3.1.5. Low flow 
alarm 
5. Reverse 
Flow 
5.1. Pumpfailure 
and REVERSE 
FLOW 
FROM 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT. 
VUL 5. I. I. Material 
incompatability 
EE 5.1.1.1. Non-return 
valve. 
F-Node: Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: T 
Intention: 
erature 
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Node: 9Waste Acid Storage tank outlet 
parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. LOWFLOWTO DPE I. I. I. I. Flow 
Pressure PRESSURE AT DOWNSTREAM control 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
UNIT 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW VUL 2.1.1. HIGH FLOW DPE 2. I. I. I. Flow 
pressure PRESSURE AT TO DOWNSTREAM control 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
UNIT 
e: I OWaste Acid Storage tank f eed inlet without control valve. 
meter: Flow Par rai 
el , 
ýa [ 
Inter tion: niti 
=on: en 
I 
N0 Flow o, Flow 1.2. NO FLOW VUL 1.2.1. Possible inability EE 
FROM to continue process 
UPSTREAM at normal production 
UNIT rates. 
1.2.2. Low tank level EE 1.2.2.1. Low level 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 1.2.2.2. Level 
indicator 
2. -M-o-re- 2.1. HIGH FLOW VUL 2.1.1. Inadequate EE 2.1.1.1. Relief 
Flow FROM venting. Vessel valve. 
UPSTREAM overpressure rupture. 
UNIT 
-------- 2.1.2. Static build up. EE 2.1.2.1. Dip tubes 2.1.2.1. 
for filling. Flammable fluids 
only. If filling is 
not done via dip 
tubes check 
design 
assumptions. 
. 3. 
Less 3.2. LOWFLOW VUL 3.2.1. Vessel 3.2.1.1. Level 
Flow FROM SOURCE takes longer to indicator. 
fill than normal. 
4. As Well 4.1. WRONG VUL 4.1.1. Material EE 4.1.1.1. Ensure 
As ]Flow MATERIAL AT incompatability appropriate 
SOURCE measures exist to 
check incoming 
material. 
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4.2. VUL 4.2.1. Material EE 
CONTAMINATI incompatibility 
ON OF 
MATERIAL AT 
SOURCE 
5. Reverse 5. I. REVERSE VUL 5.1.1. Liquid EE 5.1.1.1. Siphon 
Flow FLOW siphoned out of break on 
ATSOURCE tank. dip tubes. 
5.1.1.2. Non-rcturn 
valve 
Node: IOWaste Acid Storage tank f eed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Rapid EE 1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.1. For 
Temperature TEMPERATURE evaporation of Temperature system with vent 
FROM tank contents. indicator header system, 
UPSTREAM can system cope 
UNIT with increase in 
1.1.1.2. High venting due to 
temperature hot weather 
alarm acting on several 
tanks? 
1.1.2. Increased EE 1.1.2.1. 1.1.2.1. Only a 
vapour Temperature problem for tanks 
concentration indicator. with open vent. 
around tank, 1.1.2.2. High Consider 
possibly rising to temperature installing 
a hazardous level. alarm. appropriate gas 
detection 
equipment if 
appropriate. 
Node: IOWaste Acid Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Vessel IC I. I. I. I. Relief I. I. I. I. Ensure 
Pressure PRESSURE overpressure valve. enting. 
FROM rupture 1.1.1.2. Pressure 
SOURCE indicator. 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No Flow L I. NO FLOW VUL I. I. I. Tankernot EE 
FROM filled as 
UPSTREAM required. 
UNIT 
2. More 2.1. MORE VUL 
Flow FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
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3. Less 3.1. LESSFLOW VUL 3.1.1. Tanker EE 3.1.1.1. Overdue 
Flow FROM takes longer to filling 
UPSTREAM fill than normal. alarm. 
UNIT 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Tanker EE Relief 
Pressure PRESSURE overpressure valve 
FROM rupture. 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW VUL 2.1.1. Vessel EE 
Pressure PRESSURE takes longer to 
FROM fill than normal 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
Node: I ITreated waste Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW VUL 1.2.1. Reaction EE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
FROM does not proceed alarm 
UPSTREAM as required. 
UNITS 
1.2.2. LOW IPE 1.2.2.1. Low flow 
CONCENTRATION alarm 
OF REACTANT / I CONTAMINATION 1.2.2.2. 
TO UNITS Concentration 
DOWNSTREAM OR alarm 
REACTOR OUTLET 
1.2.3. LESS FLOW IPE 1.2.3.1. Low flow 
TO UNITS alarm 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
2. More 2.2. HIGH FLOW VUL 2.2.1. Incomplete EE 2.2.1.1. Flow 
Flow FROM conversion of reactants control 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.2.2. HIGH IPE 
CONCENTRATION 
OF REACTANT / 
CONTAMINATION 
TO UNITS 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLETS 
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2.2.3. HIGH FLOW IPE 2.2.3.1. Flow 
TO UNITS control 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
LIQUID REACTOR 
I OUTLET 1 
3. Less 3.2. LESS FLOW VUL 3.2.1. Reaction does EE 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
Flow FROM not proceed as alarm 
UPSTREAM required. Poor 
UNITS conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.2.2. LOW IPE 3.2.2.1. Low flow 
CONCENTRATION alarm 
OF REACTANT / 3.2.2.2. 
CONTAMINATION Concentration 
TO UNITS alarm 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
R OUTLET_ 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Reaction EE 
Temperature TEMPERATURE begins to runaway. Temperature 
FROM Possible control. 
UPSTREAM Explosion. 
UNITS 
1.1.1.2. Relief 
valve 
required. 
1.1.2. Reaction does EE 1.1.2.1. 
not proceed as Temperature 
required. Poor control 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW VUL 2.1.1. Reaction does EE 2.1.1.1. 
Temperature TEMPERATURE not proceed as Temperature 
FROM required. Poor control 
UPSTREAM conversion, side 
UNITS reactions etc. 
2.1.2. Reaction EE 2.1.2.1. 
does not proceed Temperature 
at required rate. control 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Reaction EE I. I. I. I. Pressure 
Pressure PRESSURE does not proceed control 
FROM as required. Poor 
UPSTREAM conversion, side 
UNITS reactions, etc. 
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2. Lower 2.1. LOW VUL 2.1.1. Reaction EE 2.1.1.1. Pressure 
Pressure PRESSURE does not proceed control 
FROM as required. Poor 
UPSTREAM conversion, side 
UNITS reactions etc. 
Node: 12Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Composition 
Intention: 
Node: BNeutralisation Reactor liquid outlet with level control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW VUL 1.2.1. Reactor EE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
TO overflows. alarm 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
1.2.2. NO FLOW IPE 1.2.2.1. Low flow 
FROM UNITS alarm 
UPSTREAM OF 
REACTOR FEED. 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW VUL 1.2.1. Reaction does EE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
FROM not proceed as alarm 
UPSTREAM required. 
UNITS 
1.2.2. LESS FLOW IPE 1.2.2.1. Low flow 
TOUNITS alarm 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
2. M)re 2.2. HIGH FLOW VUL 2.2.1. Incomplete EE 2.2.1.1. Flow 
Flow FROM conversion of reactants control 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
2.2.2. HIGH FLOW IPE 2.2.2.1. Flow 
TO UNITS control 
DOWNSTREAM OF 
LIQUID REACTOR 
OUTLET 
36 L ;s 3.2. LESS FLOW VUL 3.2.1. Reaction EE 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
Flow FROM does not proceed alarm 
UPSTREAM as required. Poor 
UNITS conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor liquid feed with concentration control 
Para rieter: Temperature 
fn-tention: 
Table Al. 2 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant - preHAZOPed results VUL filter. 
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1. Higher I. I. HIGH 
Temperature TEMPERATURE 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
VUL 1.1.1. Reaction EE 1.1.1.1. 
begins to runaway. Temperature 
Possible control. 
explosion. 
1.1.1.2. Relief 
valve 
reouired. 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW 
Temperature TEMPERATURE 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
Node: 14Neutralisation Reactor 
1.1.2. Reaction E 
does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
VUL 2.1.1. Reaction E 
does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
2.1.2. Reaction E 
does not proceed 
at required rate. 
iid feed with concentration control 
1.1.2.1. 
Temperature 
control 
E 2.1.1.1. 
Temperature 
control 
E 2.1.2.1. 
Temperature 
control 
Parameter: Composition 
intcntion: 
F-Node: 15Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream in withtemperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
intention: 
Node: 15Neutralisation Reactor stream in with temperature control 
Parameter: Temperature 
intention: 
Higher HIGH Reaction EE Temperature 
Temperature TEMPERATURE VUL does not proceed control 
FROM as required. Poor 
UPSTREAM conversion, side 
UNIT reactions, etc. 
Cooling capacity EE 
reduced. 
High cooling water 
demand. 
Rapid evaporation of IPE Temperature Only a problem 
storage tank contents. control for tanks with 
Increased vapour open vent. 
concentration around Consider 
storage tank, possibly installing 
rising to a hazardous appropriate 
level. detection 
equipment if 
Table Al. 2 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - VUL filtered. 
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Lower 
Temperature 
LOW 
TEMPERATURE 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
VUL 
Reaction 
does not proceed 
as required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
EE Temperature 
control. 
Reaction 
proceeds slower 
than expected. 
EE Temperature 
control. 
Node: 16Neutralisation Reactor Cooling stream out with temperature control 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Node: 17Neutralisation Reactor cooling via recycle 
parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Enable flow into or out of tank to maintain atmospheric pressure 
- - I I I I I T 
- Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Temperature 
Intention: Maintain temperature tank 
T I I I I I 
- Node: 18Treated Waste Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Pressure 
Intention: Maintain atmospheric pressure .n tank 
Node: 19Treated Waste Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
VUL 1.2.1. Possible 
inability to 
continue process 
at normal 
production ates 
EE 
1.2.2. Low tank 
level leading to 
EE 1.2.2.1. Low level 
alarm 
outlet pump 
cavitation. 
1.2.2.2. Level 
indicator 
2. More 
Flow 
2.1. HIGH FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
VUL 2.1.1. Inadequate 
venting. Vessel 
overpressure 
rupture. 
EE 2.1.1.1. Relief 
valve. 
2.1.2. Static 
build up. 
EE 2.1.2.1. Dip tubes 
for filling. 
2.1.2.1. 
Flammable fluids 
only. If filling is 
not done via dip 
tubes check 
design 
assumptions. 
Table Al. 2 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant - preHAZOPed results VUL filter. 
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3. Less 3.2. LOWFLOW VUL 3.2.1. Vessel takes 3.2.1.1. Level 
Flow FROM SOURCE longer to fill than indicator. 
normal. 
4. As Well 4.1. WRONG VUL 4.1.1. Material EE 4.1. LL Ensure 
As Flow MATERIAL AT incompatability appropriate 
SOURCE measures exist to 
check incoming 
material. 
4.2. VUL 4.2.1. Material EE 
CONTAMINATI incompatibility 
ON OF 
MATERIAL AT 
SOURCE 
5. Re erse 5. I. REVERSE VUL 5.1.1. Liquid siphoned EE 5.1.1.1. Siphon 
Flow FLOW AT out of tank. break on dip tubes. 
SOURCE 
5.1.1.2. Non-return 
valve 
Node- 19Treated Waste Storage tan k feed inlet without control valve. 
-parameter: Temperature 
Tn-tention. - 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. L Rapid EE 1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.1. For 
Temperature TEMPERATURE evaporation of Temperature system with vent 
FROM tank contents. indicator header system, 
UPSTREAM can system cope 
UNIT with increase in 
1.1.1.2. High venting due to 
temperature hot weather 
alarm acting on several 
tanks? 
1.1.2. Increased EE 1.1.2.1. 1.1.2.1. Only a 
vapour Temperature problem for tanks 
concentration indicator. with open vent. 
around tank, 1.1.2.2. High Consider 
possibly rising to temperature installing 
a hazardous level. alarm. appropriate gas 
detection 
equipment if 
L appropriate. 
without control valve. 
intention: 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH VUL I. I. I. Vessel IC I. I. I. I. Relief I. I. I. I. Ensure 
Pressure PRESSURE overpressure valve. adequate venting. 
FROM rupture 1.1.1.2. Pressure 
, SOURCE indicator. 
Table Al. 2 (cont. ) - Waste acid plant preHAZOPed results - VUL filtered. 
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0 Appendix 2- Benzene Plant Modular HAZOP 
This appendix has results for the modular HAZOP of a benzene plant. The plant is 
illustrated in figure A2.1. The results are presented in table A2.1. 
This is a plant described and illustrated by Douglas (198 8). This plant was used, in 
particular for assessing performance, during the development of the modular HAZOP 
methodology, the development of CHEQUER (Jefferson et al., 1995(b)) and for the 
STOPHAZ project (McCoy et al., 1999). This particular figure was drawn-up by S. A. 
McCoy. 
A31 
Figure A2.1 Benzene plant 
A32 
Modul Sub- Devia Causes Consequences Safe- Recommend 
e module -tion guards -ations 
TKIO1 Toluene No Battery limit supply failure Possible inability 
feed from flow Feed line blocked. to continue 
battery Level control valve fails process at normal 
I limit shut production rates 
F 
Low Battery limit supply low Vessel takes 
flow pressure longer to fill than 
Level control valve fails normal. 
part closed 
Feed line partially blocked 
High Battery limit high supply Inadequate Size vent 
flow pressure venting. 
Vessel 
adequately. 
Install relief 
overpressure valve. 
rupture. 
Static build up Use dip tubes 
for filling if 
susceptible to 
static. 
Level control valve fails As above. As above. 
open. 
Tank overflows Suitable 
overflow 
arrangements 
Tank to be 
bundedif 
necessary. 
Rever Back siphoning from tank Contamination of Use siphon 
se battery limit breaks on dip 
flow supply source. tubes. 
TKIO1 Toluene No Feed line blocked Possible inability 
Recycle flow to continue 
Feed process at normal 
production rates 
Less Feed line partially blocked Vessel takes 
flow longer than normal 
to fill 
Table A2.1 - Benzene plant modular HAZOP results. 
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Self High External fire Rapid evaporation Ensure 
tempe of tank contents. adequate fire 
rature Structural relief. 
weakening of 
tank. 
High ambient temperature Rapid evaporation Insulate tank. 
of tank contents. 
Low Low ambient temperature Vapour condenses. Insulate tank. 
tempe Air drawn into Use inert 
rature tank, possible blanket if 
flammable necessary. 
atmosphere. 
Vapour condenses. Insulate tank. 
Vacuum collapse. Size vent 
adequately. 
Install 
vacuum 
relief. 
TKI01 Vent No Vent line blocked Overpressure Maintain 
flow rupture flame 
arrestor. 
Minimise 
oppurtunities 
for vent 
blockage. 
Install relief 
valve. 
Vacuum collapse Maintain 
flame 
arrestor. 
Minimise 
oppurtunities 
for vent 
blockage. 
Install 
vacuum 
relief. 
Less Vent line partially blocked As for no flow. As for no 
flow flow. 
TKI01 Overflow No Overflow blocked Tank rupture on Level Ensure 
flow overfilling. control opportunities 
valve. for overflow 
blocking are 
minimised. 
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Less Overflow partially As for no flow. As for As for no 
flow blocked. no flow. flow. 
TKI01 Outlet No Outlet line blocked. Furnace tubes 
flow overheat. 
possible tube 
failure. 
Less Outlet line partially LESS FLOW TO Flow 
flow blocked. DOWNSTREAM control 
UNIT valve. 
More Outlet line ruptured Tank contents lost Bund tank. 
flow to environment. Install 
emergency 
isolation 
valve. 
1-0 -1 Fuel gas No Burner control fails shut LESS 
in flow TEMPERATURE 
HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
More Burner control fails open MORE 
flow TEMPERATURE 
HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
Furnace tubes Burner 
overheat. control 
Furnace tubes fail. system 
Burners fail to ignite Release of Burner Use 
flammable gas. control explosion 
Explosion risk. system doors 
Less Burner control fails partly Flame fails. Burner 
flow open. Explosive control 
Burners partially blocked. atmosphere system 
develops. 
LESS 
TEMPERATURE 
HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
Table A2.1 (cont. ) - Benzene plant modular HAZOP results. 
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Stack No Stack blocked. Flame fails. Burner 
flow Damper fails shut. Flammable gas control 
released to system 
atmosphere. 
Damper fails open. MORE 
TEMPERATURE 
HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
Stack partially blocked or LESS 
damper fails partially TEMPERATURE 
open. HEATED 
PRODUCTOUT 
Hot High Temperature control fails MORE 
product tempe high TEMPERATURE 
rature HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
Low Temperature control fails LESS 
tempe low TEMPERATURE 
rature HEATED 
PRODUCT OUT 
P101 Inlet/outl No Pump fails. NO FLOW 
et flow FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
Furncae tubes 
overheat. Possible 
tube failure. 
Flow control valve fails Full head pressure Kick 
closed. developed. back 
Pump overheats. line. 
Seals damaged. 
More Spare pump running in MORE FLOW TO Ensure 
flow error. DOWNSTREAM maintenance 
UNIT instructions 
preclude 
running 
parallel 
pumps 
incorrectly. 
Flow 
controller. 
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MORE FLOW As above. 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
Pump seals fail Environmental Use canned 
contamination. pumps if 
necessary. 
Consider 
requirement 
for remote 
isolation. 
MORE FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
LESS FLOW TO 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
Flow control valve fails MORE FLOW TO 
open. DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT 
MOREFLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
Less Flow control valve fails LESS FLOW TO 
flow part open DOWNSTREAM 
UNITS 
LESS FLOW 
FROM 
UPSTREAM 
UNITS 
E101 Heated As Heat exchanger interface CONTAMINATI 
Stream well failure ON 
out as DOWNSTREAM 
flow 
Cooled As Heat exchnager interface CONTAMINATI 
Stream well failure ON 
Out as DOWNSTREAM 
flow 
Table A2.1 (cont. ) - Benzene plant modular HAZOP results. 
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1-1101 Fuel Gas No Burner control fails shut LESS 
In flow TEMPERATURE 
More Burner control fails open Furnace tubes Temper Is there a 
flow overheat. Furnace ature need for high 
tubes fail. Serious indicato temperature 
explosion risk. r. alarm, high 
0 temperature 
Snuff ing trip? 
steam. 
0 
Damper 
control. 
Burners fail to ignite Explosion risk. Flame 
failure 
alarm. 
0 
Burner 
control 
system. 
Less Burner control fails to Flame fails. Flame 
flow open sufficiently Explosive failure 
atmosphere alarm. 
develops. Burner 
control 
system. 
LESS Damper 
TEMPERATURE control. 
Less Burners partially blocked. LESS Damper 
pressu TEMPERATURE control. 
re 
Stack No Stack blocked. LESS 
flow Damper fails shut. TEMPERATURE 
Flame fails. Flame 
Explosive failure 
atmosphere alarm. 
develops. 0 
Burner 
control 
system. 
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More Stack damper fails open MORE 
flow TEMPERATURE 
ess Stack partially blocked. LESS 
flow 0 TEMPERATURE 
Stack damper fails to open 
sufficiently. 
Feed More Furnace tubes leak. Explosion risk. 
flow 
11101 Reactor Low Leak to environment Environmental 
feed from pressu damage. 
HIOI re Fire / explosion 
risk. 
Recycle No Temperature control valve High temperature. High 
feed flow fails shut. 0 tempcrat 
Possible runaway ure 
reaction. alarm. 
0 
Temper 
ature 
indicato 
r. 
HIGH 
TEMPERATURE 
High Temperature control valve Low temperature. 
flow fails open Slow conversion. 
Outlet Less Outlet line partially LESS FLOW 
flow blocked by catalyst 
Clol Inlet No Compressor failure NO FLOW 
flow I I I I 
Table A2.1 (cont. ) - Benzene plant modular HAZOP results. 
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Less 
flow 
Compressor operating 
incorrectly 
LESS FLOW 
Outlet Conta, 
minati 
on 
Compressor oil lube 
contaminates recycle 
stream 
CONTAMINATI 
ON 
A40 
Appendix 3- Modular HAZOP Library 
The following pages provide some examples of components of a module library. These 
components could include descriptions of the modules and sub-modules including their 
design and operation philosophy, line diagrams and, of course, the preIIAZOPed results. 
The first part of this appendix describes the models and the second part contains the 
preHAZOPed results. The nodes referred to in the description of the model sub-modules 
refer to the preHAZOPed results. 
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AM Cooling Water Supply System 
A3.1.1 Sub-Modules Required 
Cooling Water Tower. 
Water top up. 
Cooling Water Pond. 
Cooling Water Supply Main. 
Cooling Water Return. 
Cooling Water Purge. 
Cooling Water Dosing. 
A3.1.2 Specific Sub-Modules Available 
The following specific sub-modules have been developed. 
A3.1.2.1 Cooling Water Tower 
Single tower with fan. 
Multiple towers with fans. 
A3.1.2.2 Water Top Up 
Pumped water top-up from reservoir. 
Water top up from header tank. 
Water top up from main. 
A3.1.2.3 Cooling Water Pond 
0 Cooling Water Pond. 
(Node 1) 
(Node 10) 
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A3.1.2.4 Cooling Water Supply Main 
9 Cooling water supply main with multiple running pumps. 
A3.1.2.5 Cooling Water Return 
0 Cooling water return. 
A3.1.2.6 Cooling Water Purge 
Cooling water purge, manually adjusted. 
Cooling water purge, automatic control. 
A3.1.2.7 Cooling Water Dosing 
(Node 5) 
(Nodc 2) 
(Node 8) 
(Node 9) 
Choose sufficient dosing sub-modules to minimise problems due to corrosion, scaling, and 
micro-bio logical fouling. 
NALCO A. Z. LITE Scale and corrosion, automatic control. (Node 6) 
NALCO A. Z. LITE Scale and corrosion, manual control. (Node 7) 
Acid dosing, automatic control. (Node 11) 
Acid dosing, manual control. (Node 12) 
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A3.2 Reactor Modules 
There are number of different types of reactor module. These exist mainly to differentiate 
between the different types of reaction that will occur, such as exothermic or endothermic 
and gas phase or liquid phase. 
The sub-modules required will be different depending on the particular reactor module 
used. 
A3.2.1 Exothermic Liquid Phase Reactor 
Figure AM illustrates how an exothermic reactor made up of a variety of different sub- 
modules taken from the module library for the reactor. This is an example to illustrate how 
the sub-modules can be added together to produce a fairly complex module. 
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------------ 
----------------- 
Reactor cooling via 
jacket 
-------------- 
Cooling 
stream out 
Cooling 
water out 
=-j 
Reactor twin feed, one feed 
with flow control, one with 
concentartion control 
F 
Recycle 
Cooling 
water in 
Cooling 
stream in 
Reactor cooling via 
external recycle 
Figure AM -Example reactor module made up of variety of sub-modules. 
Vapour 
Outlet 
Reactor JTLIquid stirrer Outlet 
Vapour product 
outlet with 
pressure contro 
--U 
II 
Reactor liquid 
product outlet, 
standard pump 
with level contr 
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A3.2.2 Required sub-modules 
Reactor vessel. 
Reactor liquid feed(s). 
Reactor liquid outlet. 
Reactor cooling system. 
Reactor vent system. 
A3.2.3 Additional generic sub-modules 
Stirrer. 
Catalyst. 
A3.2.4 Exothermic Liquid Phase Reactor Specific Sub-Modules 
A3.2.4.1 Reactor Vessel 
Reactor vessel sub-module is illustrated in figure A3.2. 
Feed Vapour II 
Outlet 
Recycle Liquid j 
Outlet 
Figure A3.2 - Reactor vessel sub-module. 
A3.2.4.2 Reactor Liquid Feed 
The following sub-modules are available: 
0 Reactor liquid feed with flow control. (Node 1) 
A46 
Reactor liquid feed with concentration control. (Node 12) 
Reactor liquid feed with level control. 
Use as many as are required to represent different reactor feeds. Figure AM illustrates an 
arrangement of reactor feeds comprising one feed with flow control and one feed with 
concentration control comprising the appropriate sub-modules. 
------------- Reactor twin feed, one feed 
with flow control, one with 
concentartion control 
----------------------------------------------------- 
................. 
......... > 
Feed Vapour 
Outlet 
........ ................ > 
.................. 
Recycle Liquid 
Outlet 
............... 
Figure A3.3 - Reactor twin feed with flow and concentration control. 
A3.2.4.3 Reactor Liquid Outlet 
Use one of the following nodes: 
Reactor liquid outlet with level control. (Figure A3.4) (Node 11) 
Reactor liquid outlet with flow control. (Node 3) 
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0-1, 
....... ........ 
.......... X F d 
-- --- 
......... > Vapour 
----------- 
ee Outlet 
......... 
Reactor liquid 
Recycle Liquid tj product outlet, Outlet st PL standard pump 
....... ......... with 
level control 
Figure A3.4 - Reactor sub-module - liquid outlet with level control. 
.......... > 
Feed 
Reactor cooling 
via jacket 
Recycle 
Cooling 
water In 
......... > Vapour 
utlet 
.......... > Liquid 
Outlet 
............. 
cooliýg 
water out 
Figure A3.5 - Reactor cooling via jacket. 
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A3.2.4.4 Reactor Cooling System 
The choice of nodes differs depending on the cooling system equipment used. One cooling 
stream in and one cooling stream out node will both be required. One other node is 
required to represent the interface equipment, either a reactor jacket or an external heat 
exchanger. 
Cooling stream in with temperature control. (Node 4) 
Cooling stream in without control valve. (Node 13) 
Cooling stream out. (Node 5) 
Reactor cooling by jacket. (Figure A3.5) 
Reactor cooling via external recycle. (Figure A3.6) (Node 6) 
............... 
.......... 
Feed 
L- 
Recycle 
.......... > 
Vapour 
Outlet 
Liquid 
Outlet 
Ile ................ I 
Cooling 
stream out 
III 
Coolinq 
stream in 
Reactor cooling via 
external recycle 
A3.6 - Reactor cooling via external recycle. 
A3.2.4.5 Reactor Vent System 
Choice of nodes depends on the gas outlet or venting arrangement. 
For a simple vent to atmosphere use the following node: 
0 Reactor vent to atmosphere. (Node 14) 
For a nitrogen blanketed vent system use the appropriate combination of the following 
nodes: 
Nitrogen vent supply, continuous feed through RO. (Node 15) 
Nitrogen vent supply with pressure control. (Node 16) 
Vent to header without control valve. (Node 17) 
Vent to header with pressure control. (Figure A3.7) (Node 18) 
Nodes 
............ 
>: . 
Feed Vapour 
Outlet 
'**"*'*** >. : .......... > 
Recycle Liquid 
Outlet 
................ 
Figure A3.7 - Reactor sub-module - Vent to header with pressure control. 
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A3.2.4.6 Stirrer 
Use the followmg node: 
0 Reactor Stirrer. (Figure A3.8) 
Feed 
Recycle Reactor 
stirrer 
> 
Vapour 
Outlet 
.......... Liquid 
Outlet 
Figure A3.8 - Reactor sub-module - stirrer. 
A3.2.4.7 Catalyst 
Use the following node: 
0 Fixed solid catalyst bed. 
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Siphon 
Break 
Feed' Hole 
Storage Tank Feed 
With Level Control 
Figure A3.9 - Storage tank sub-modules - feed with level control. 
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A3.3 Atmospheric Storage Tank Module 
A3.3.1 Required sub-modules 
Storage tank vessel. 
Storage tank feed(s). 
Storage tank outlet. 
Storage tank vent system. 
Storage tank overflow. 
A3.3.2 Additional sub-modules 
None. 
A3.3.3 Available Specific Sub-Modules 
A3.3.3.4 Storage Tank Vessel 
Use the following node: 
0 Storage tank vessel. 
A3.3.3.5 Storage Tank Feed 
(Node 5) 
The following nodes may be used. Use as many as are required to represent different 
reactor feeds. 
Storage tank feed with flow control. 
Storage tank feed with level control. (Figure A3.9) (Node 1) 
Storage tank feed without control valve. (Figure A3.10) (Node 13) 
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StoragE 
Withou, 
Figure A3.10 - Storage tank sub-module - feed without control. 
Kickback line 
Figure A3.11 - Storage tank sub-module - outlet via parallel pumps. 
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I 
LJi 
A3.3.3.6 Storage Tank Outlet 
Use one of the following nodes: 
Storage tank outlet with flow control. 
Storage tank outlet without control valve. (Figure AM 1) 
A3.3.3.7 Storage Tank Vent System 
Choice of nodes depends on the venting arrangement. 
For a simple vent to atmosphere use the following node: 
0 Storage tank vent to atmosphere. 
(Nodc 4) 
(Node 2) 
For a nitrogen blanketed vent system, such as that illustrated in figure A3.12, use one 
blanket supply node and one vent to header node from the following nodes: 
Nitrogen blanket supply, continuous feed through RO. (Node 6) 
Nitrogen blanket supply with pressure control (Node 7) 
Vent to header without control valve (Node 8) 
Vent to header with pressure control (Node 9) 
A3.3.3.8 Storage Tank Overflow 
0 Storage tank overflow (Node 3) 
A55 
Figure A3.12 -Nitrogen blanket system. 
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A68 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 95 
Node: 1 Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Pago .1 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow i. i. Feed line IC 1.1.1. Reaction does EE Low flow 
blocked. not proceed as alarm 
Control valve fails required. Poor 
shut. conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
1.1.2. NO FLOW FROM DPE 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
UPSTREAM UNITS alarm 
2. More 2.1. control valve IC 2.1.1. Incomplete Ez 
Flow fails open conversion of 
reactants 
2.1.2. HIGH FLOW TO IPE 
UNIT DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
2.1.3. HIGH FLOW FROM DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Reaction does ZZ 3.1.1.1. Flow control 
Flow partially blocked not proceed as 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.1.2. LESS FLOW TO IPE 3.1.2.1. Flow control 
UNIT DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
3.1.3. LESS FLOW FROM DPE 3.1.3.1. Flow control 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3.2. Control valve IC 3.2.1. Reaction does Ev- 3.2.1.1. Flow control 
fails insufficiently not proceed as 
open required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.2.2. LESS FLOW TO XPE 3.2.2.1. FLow control 
UNIT DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
3.2.3. LESS FLOW FROM DP-- 3.2.3.1. Flow control 
UPSTREAM UNIT 
I 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 9S 
Node: I Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Pressure 
D--VIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUZNCES CAT SA-5-D7JARDS CAT RECOMMMATIONS 
2. Lower 2.2. Feed line IC 2.2.1. Reactiona does Ez 2.2.1.1. Pressure 
Pressure leaking. not proceed as control 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 2.2.1.2. FLow control 
reactions etc. 
2.2.2. Environmental Ez 
-j 
II I damage. 
mAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.2 - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A69 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 95 
Node: 2 Vapour Out 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT I SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. so Flow 1.1. Vapour out line IC 1.1.1. Reaction does EZ Low flow 
blocked. not proceed as alarm 
Control valve fails required. Poor 
shut. conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
1.1.2. NO FLOW AT IPE 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alram 
REACTOR FEED 
1.1.3. NO FLOW TO DPE 1.1.3.1. Low flow 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS alarm 
2. More 2.1. Control valve IC 2.1.1. Insufficient EE 2.1.1.1. High flow 
Flow fails open conversion of alarm 
reactants. 
2.1.2. MORE FLOW FROM IPZ 2.1.2.1. High flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR FEED 
2.1.3. MORE FLOW TO DPE 2.1.3.. 1. High flow 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS alarm 
3. Less 3.1. Vapour outlet IC 3.1.1. Reaction does EE 3.1.1.1. Flow control 
Flow line partially blocked not proceed as 
required. Poor 3.1.1.2. Low flow 
conversion, side alarm 
reactions, etc. 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW TO DPE 3.1.2.1. Flow control 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS 
3.1.2.2. Low flow 
alarm 
3.1.3. LOW FLOW FROM IPE 3.1.3.1. Flow control 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF 
REACTOR FEED 3.1.3.2. Low flow 
alarm 
3.2. Control valve IC 3.2.1. Reaction does Ez 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
fails insufficiently not procedd as alarm 
open required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.2.2. LOW FLOW TO DPE 3.2.2.1. Low flow 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS alarm 
3.2 3. LOW FLOW FROM IPE 3.2.3.1. Low flow 
UNHS UPSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR FEED 
I I I 
Fevision: 0 24 Mar 9S 
Node: 2 Vapour Out 
Parameter: Pressure 
D-TVZATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
2. Lower 2.1. Vapour out line IC 2.1-1. Environmental EE 
Pressure leaks to atmosphere damage 
2.1.2. Reaction does EE 
not proceed an 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
FAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.2 (cont. ) - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A70 
Worksheet 
company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 95 
Node: 3 Reactor liquid outlet with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Page :3 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No 1.1. Outlet line IC 1.1.1. Reactor EE Low flow 
Flow: blocked overflows alram 
1.1.1.2. High level 
alarm 
1.1-2. Reaction does EE 1.1.2.1. Low flow 
not proceed an alarm 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
effects, etc. 
1.1.3. NO FLOW FROM XPE 1.1.3.1. Low flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR FEED 
VAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.2 (cont. ) - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A71 
Worksheat 
Company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 04 Sep 9S 
'; ode: 10 Reactor vessel self 
Parameter: Maintenance 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. 1.1. Incorrect IC 1.1.1. Toxic dust ZZ permit to Ensure 
Catalyst procedures. hazard. work. reaction vessel can be 
Removal Reactor improperly isolated and cleaned 
MainCenanc isolated. 1.1.1.2. Vessel prior to personnel 
e Spent catalyst isolated by slip enetering vessel. 
disposed of plates and removable Ensure personnel 
incorrectly. spools /elbows. entering vessel have 
all necessary 
protective equipment 
and are trained in its 
use. 
Ensure correct 
equipment is available 
for safe removal of 
spent catalyst. 
Ensure spent catalyst 
can be disposed of 
safely and in 
accordance with 
statutory 
requirements. 
I: AZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.2 (cont. ) - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A72 
worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 95 
Node tI Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter: Flow 
Page t 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW FROM VUL 1.2.1. Reaction does EE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
UPSTREAM UNITS not proceed as alarm 
required. 
1.2.2. NO FLOW TO IPE 1.2.2.1. Low flow 
UNITS DOWNSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR OUTLET 
2. More 2.2. HIGH FLOW FROM VUL 2.2.1. Incomplete EE 2.2.1.1. Flow control 
Flow UPSTREAM UNITS conversion of 
reactants 
2.2.2. HIGH FLOW TO XPE 2.2.2.1. Flow control 
UNIT DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
3. Less 3.3. LESS FLOW FROM VUL 3.3.1. Reaction does ZZ 3.3.1.1. Flow control 
Flow UPSTREAM UNITS not proceed as 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.3.2. LESS FLOW TO IPE 3. i. 2.1. Flow control 
WIT DOWNSTREAM OF 
REACTOR OUTLET 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 9S 
Node: I Reactor liquid feed with flow control 
Parameter; Temperature 
DEVIATION CALTSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOtOZENDATZONS 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH TEMPERATURE VUL 1.1.1. Reaction begins EE Temperature 
Temperatur FROM UPSTREAM UNITS to runaway. Possible control. 
e explosion. 
1.1.1.2. Relief valve 
required. 
1.1.2. Reaction does ZE 1.1.2.1. Temperature 
not proceed as control 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW TEMPERATURE VUL 2.1.1. Reaction does ZZ 2.1.1.1. Temperature 
Temperatur FROM V? STR EAM UNITS not proceed an control 
0 required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
2.1.2. Reaction does ZZ 2.1.2.1. Temperature 
not proceed at control 
required rate. 
I I I 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 9S 
Node: I Reactor liquid feed-with flow control 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT S; ýF-tatr-RDS CAT 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH PRESSURE VUL 1.1.1. Reaction does EZ Pressure 
pressure FROM UPSTREAM UNITS not proceed as control 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW PRESSURE FROM VUL 2.1.1. Reaction does EZ 2.1.1.1. Pressure 
Pressure UPSTREAM UNITS not proceed as control 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table AM - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (VUL filtered). 
A73 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Exothermic Reactor 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 9S 
Node: 2 Vapour Out 
parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW TO VUL 1.2.1. Reaction does EE 1.2.1.1. Low flow 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS not proceed as alarm 
required. Poor T 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
1.2.2. NO FLOW AT IPE 1.2.2.1. Low flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR FEED 
2. More 2.2. HIGH FLOW TO VUL 2.2.1. Insufficient EE 2.2.1.1. High flow 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNITS conversion of alarm. 
reactants 
2.2.1.2. Flow control 
2.2.2. MORE FLOW FROM IPE 2.2.2.1. High flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alarm 
REACTOR FEED 
2.2.2.2. Flow control 
3. Less 3.3. LOW FLOW AT VUL 3.3.1. Reaction does EE 3.3.1.1. Low flow 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNITS not proceed as alarm 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions etc. 
3.3.2. LOW FLOW FROM IPE 3.3.2.1. Low flow 
UNITS UPSTREAM OF alarm. 
REACTOR FEED 
Revision: 0 24 Mar 95 
Node: 2 Vapour Out 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH PRESSURE AT VUL 1.1.1. Reaction does EZ 
Pressure DOWNSTREAM UNIT not proceed as 
required. Poor 
conversion, side 
reactions, etc. 
2. Lower 1 2.2. LOW PRESSURE AT VUL 2.2.1. Reaction does EE 
Pressure DOWNSTREAM UNIT not proceed as I 
I I required I I 1- 1 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.3 (cont. ) - Exothermic reactor sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (VUL filtered). 
A74 
Workshect 
Company: 
Facility: Pagai I 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: I Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUS ES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
2. More 2.2. Batch meter IC 2.2.1. Tanker LOC 2.2.1.1. overfilling 
Flow control valve fails overfilled alarm 
open. 
operator enters wrong 2.2.1.2. Pressure trip 
amount into batch 
meter control. 
2.3. Hose ruptured. IC 2.3.1. Leak to LOC 2.2.1-1. Ensure hoses 
environment. are stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.4. Tanker moves off IC 2.4.1. Leak to LOC 2.4.1.1. Dry break 2.4.1.1. Loading bay 
while loading environment. couplings. to be on level ground. 
operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.4.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay 
Driver drives off, immobilisation at a reasonable 
tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
Revision: 0 12 Jun 95 
Node: I Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Composition 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAE-EGL-ARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Other 1.1. Wrong tanker IC 1.1.1. Material LOC Use different 
Than connected incompatibility. connectors where 
Compositio material 
n incompatibilty is a 
problem to so wrong 
tanker cannot be 
connected easily. 
1.2. Wrong material ill IC 1.2.1.1.2.1. Material LOC 1.2.1.1. Check tanker 
tanker incompatibility. contents before 
unloading if material 
incompatibility is a 
problem. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table AM - Road tanker sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A75 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Pagel 2 
Revision: 0 12 Jun 95 
Node: 2 Pumped outlet from tanker, no control (tanker offloading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFETUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Tanker outlet IC I. I. I. Tanker not LOC 
line blocked. emptied an required. 
1.1.2. NO FLOW TO PE 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
2. More 2.1. Hose ruptured. IC 2.1-1. Leak to LOC 2.1-1.1. Ensure hoe*@ 
Flow environment. are stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.2. Tanker moves off Ic 2.2.1. Leak to LOC 2.2.1.1. Dry break 2.2-1.1. Loading bay 
while offloading environment. coupling*. to be on level ground. 
operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.2.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay 
Driver drives off, immobilisation at a reasonable 
tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
3. Less 3.1. Tanker outlet IC 3.1-1. Tanker takes LOC 
Flow line partially longer to empty than 
blocked. normal 
3.1.2. LESS FLOW TO PE 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
4. Reverse 4.1. Discharge pump IC 4.1.1. REVERSE FLOW AT PE 4.1.1.1. Non-return 
Flow fails DOWNSTREAM UNIT valve 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.4 (cont. ) - Road tanker sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A76 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Pagel a 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: I Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. NO FLOW FROM VUL 1.1.1. Tanker not LOC 
UPSTREAM UNIT filled an required. 
2. More 2.1. MORE FLOW FROM VUL 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT 
3. Less 3.1. LESS FLOW FROM VUL 3.1.1. Tanker takes LOC 3.1.1.1. Orverdus 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT longer to fill than filling alarm. 
normal. 
Revision: 0 12 Jun 95 
Node: I Inlet to tanker, controlled by batch meter (tanker loading operations) 
Parameter: Pressure 
D-SVIATION 
I CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH PRESSURE VUL 1.1.1. Tanker LOC Relief valve 
Pressure FROM UPSTREAM UNIT overpressure rupture. 
2. Lower 2.1. LOW PRESSURE FROM VUL 2.1.1. Vessel takes LOC 
Pressure UPSTREAM UNIT longer to fill than 
I I normal 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.5 - Road tanker sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (VUL filtered). 
A77 
Workshe*t 
Company: 
Facility: Page: 2 
Revision: 0 12 Jun 95 
Node: 2 Pumped outlet from tanker, no control (tanker offloading operations) 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW AT VUL 1.2.1. Tanker not LOC 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT emptied as required 
3. Lose 3.2. LESS FLOW TO VUL 3.2.1. Tanker takes LOC 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT longer to empty than 
normal 
4. Reverse 4.2. REVERSE FLOW FROM VUL 4.2.1. Tanker LOC 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT overfills. 
I II Environmental damage. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.5 (cont. ) - Road tanker sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (VUL filtered). 
A78 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: I storage tank feed inlet with level control an tank. 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 1 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Feed line IC I. I. I. Possible ZZ 
blocked. inability to continue 
Level control valve process at normal 
fails shut. production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank level EE 1.1.2.1. Low level CON 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.1.2.2. Level CON 
indicator 
1.1.3. NO FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
2. More 2.1. Control valve IC 2.1.1. Inadequate EZ 2.1.1.1. Relief valve. 2.1.1.1. Size vent 
Flow "ails open venting. Vessel adequately 
overpressure rupture. 
2.1.2. Static build ZZ 2.1.2.1. Dip tubes for 2.1.2.1. Flammable 
up. filling. fluids only. 
if filling is not done 
via dip tubes check 
design assumptions. 
2.1.3. MORE FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel takes EZ 3.1.1.1. Level CON 
Flow partially blocked. longer to fill than indicator. 
Control valve fails normal 
insufficiently open. 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW AT DPE 3.1.2.1. Level CAU 
UPSTREAM UNIT indicator. 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: I Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFE=RDS CAT RECOZOMMATIONS 
1. Higher 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion of EZ 1.2.1.1. Hydraulic CON 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
Pressure isolated. locked in fluid causes pressure relief operating instructions 
hydraulic overpressure preclude deliberate 
rupture of line. isolation of line 
without having first 
drained line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure design 
minimises opportunit*s 
for isolation in error 
due to control valves 
failing etc. 
1.3. Level. control IC 1.3.1. LIQUID HAMMER. DP-T 1.3.1.1. Only a 
valve closes quickly. HIGH PRESSURE TO problem for long 
Manual valve on UPSTREAM UNITS. pipelines. 
storage tank inlet Ensure closing time on 
closes quickly. control valves and 
Manual valves is long 
enough to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A79 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 2 storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 2 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMMATIONS 
1. No/Less I. I. Vent line blocked IC I. I. I. Tank EE Relief valve CON Minimise 
Flow or partially blocked overpressure rupture opportunities for vent 
on filling blockage 
1.1.1.2. Ensure flame 
arrestor is maintained 
correctly. 
1.1.2. Tank vacuum EZ 1.1.2.1. Vacuum relief CON 1.1.2.1. Minimise 
collapse on discharge valve. opportunities for vent 
blockage. 
1.1.2.2. Ensure flame 
arrestor is maintained 
correctly 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A80 
worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 3 Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQtMNCES CAT SAFEGUXUS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No/Less 1.1. Overflow blocked IC 1.1.1. No/partial tank EE Level control CON Ensure 
Flow or partially blocked overflow available. opportunities for 
Possible tank rupture 1.1.1.2. Level CON overflow blocking are 
on overfilling indicator minimised. 
1.1.1.3. High level CON 
alarm 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A81 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility. 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
P&90: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT I SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Outlet line IC I. I. I. NO FLOW TO DPE Low flow CAU 
blocked between tank DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm 
and Pump. 
Pump fails. 
1.2. Flow control IC 1.2.1. NO FLOW TO DPE 1.2.1.1. Low flow CAU 
valve fails shut. DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm 
Outlet line blocked 
downstream of pump. 1-2.2. Full head pump EE 1.2.2.1. Kick back 1.2.2.1. Consider 
pressure developed. line. designing equipment to 
High pressure rupture withstand maximum pump 
risk to outlet line. 1.2.2.2. Low flow delivery pressure. 
Puýnp overheats, seals alarm. 
damaged, possible 
leak. 
2. More 2.1. Control valve IC 2.1.1. HIGH FLOW TO DPE 
Flow fails open DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
2.2. Spare pump IC 2.2.1. HIGH FLOW TO DPE 2.2.1.1. Flow control CON 2.2.1.1. Ensure 
running in error DOWNSTREAM UNIT operating and 
maintenance 
instructions preclude 
running parallel pumps 
incorrectly. 
2.3. Outlet line IC 2.3.1. Tank contents EE 2.3.1.1. Emergency CON 2.3.1.1. Ensure tank 
ruptured lost to environment isolation valve is adequately bunded. 
2.3.1.2. Locate 
isolation valve as 
near as possible to 
tank. 
2.3.1.3. Consider need 
for remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
2.4. Pump seals fail. IC 2.4.1. Environmental EE 2.4.1.1. Emergency CON 2.4.1.1. Use canned or 
contamination isolation valve. seal-less pump if 
appropriate. 
2.4.1.2. Pump to be 
adequately bunded. 
2.4.1.3. Consider need 
for remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
3. Less 3.1. Outlet line IC 3.1.1. LESS FLOW TO DPE 3.1.1.1. Flow control CON 
Flow partially blocked. DOWNSTREAM UN. IT * 
Pump running 3.1.1.2. Low flow CON 
incorrectly. alarm 
3.2. Control valve IC 3.2.1. LESS FLOW TO DPE 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
fails insufficiently DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm. 
open. 
4. As Well 4.1. Contamination of IC 4.1.1. CONTAMINATION DPE 
As Flow tank contents OF DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
S. Reverse 5.2. Outlet line IC 5.2.1. REVERSE FLO W DPE 
Flow 
1 
ruptured. 
f I 
FROM DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEV I AT I ON CAUSES CAT 
I CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFIrcu; URDS CAT RZC01'CIMMATIONS 
2. Lower 2.1. Storage tank IC 2.1.1. Low tank level DPE 2.1.1.1. Low flow CAU 
Pressure inlet line blocked. leading to Low alarm 
Level control valve PRESSURE AT DOWNSTREAM 
fails shut. UNIT 2.1.1.2. Low level CON 
alarm 
2.1.1.3. Level CON 
indicator 
I II 
F=OP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A82 
worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: S Storage tank self 
Parameter: Temperature 
Page- 5 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMM-DATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Fire IC 1.1.1. Rapid ZE Emergency CON 
Temperatur evaporation of tank fire relief valve. 
0 contents. 
1.1.2. Structural ZE 1.1.2.1. Ensure 
weakening of tank. adequate fire relief 
equipment exists. 
1.2. High ambient IC 1.2.1. Rapid EZ 1.2.1.1. Temperature CAU 1.2.1.1. Lag tank to 
temperature evaporation of tank indicator protect against high 
contents ambient temperature if 
necessary. 
1,2.2. Possible pump EZ 1.2.2.1. Temperature 
cavitation indicator. 
2. Lower 2.1. Cold weather IC 2.1.1. Possible EZ 2.1.1.1. Temperature CAU 2.1.1.1. Lag tank to 
Temperatur freezing of contents indicator protect against cold 
ambient temperature if a necessary. 
2.1.1.2. Install trace 
Z eating if necessary. 
2.1.2. Rapid EZ 2.1.2.1. Install CON 
condensation of vacuum relief. 
vapour. Possible 
vacuum collapse. 2.1.2.2. Temperature CAU 
indicator 
2.1.3. Condensation of EE 2.1.3.1. Temperature CAU 2.1.3.1. Use inert 
vapour draw* air into indicator blanket if necessary. 
tank. See blanket in and 
vent out ncdes. 
2.1.4. Pump seals EZ 2.1.4.1. Temperature CA, 
damaged indicator 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 5 Storage tank self 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECO10=3ATIONS 
Fluid for IC 1.1.1. Tank ET Design tank 
Pressure hydraulic test is overpressure rupture to contain all 
denser than fluid tank appropriate fluids. 
designed for 
p. evision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: S Storage tank self 
Parameter: Level 
D--rVIA-4IODT CAUS Z, S CAT CONSZQ7ENCz3 CAT SAF-r. =RDS CATI R-ECOM --%-. )AT IONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Level control IC 1.1.1. Tank contents Ez Overflow CON Overflow to 
Levei fails lost to environment be below tank roof. 
Wrong level sensed due 1.1.1.2. High level CAU 
to tank being filled alarm 1.1.1.2. Tank to be 
with less dense adecr4ately bunded. 
material than 1.1.1.3. Level CATJ 
anticipated. indicator 
F; kZOP-PC 3.0.1 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A83 
. Worksheat 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 6 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT I SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDXTIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. Vent in line IC 1.1.1. Tank vacuum EE Vacuum relief CON Minimiso 
blocked collapse valve opportunities for line 
blockage. 
3. Less 3.1. Vent in line IC 3.1.1. Tank vacuum EE 3.1.1.1. Vacuum relief CON Minimise 
Flow partially blocked collapse valve opportunities for line 
blockage 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT -CONSEatr&NCES CAT SAFEG=DS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Pressure control IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Install 
Pressure failure of blanket overpressure rupture relief valve 
2. Lower 2.1. Vent in line IC 2.1.1. Vacuum collapse EE 2.1.1.1. Ensure vent 
Pressure blocked or partially in line is not prone 
blocked to blocking 
2.1.1.2. Install 
vacuum relief 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A84 
Workshaet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENI)ATIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. Vent out line IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Ensure vent 
blocked overpreassure rupture out line is not prone 
to blocking 
1.1.1.2. install 
relief valve 
2. More 2.1. Vent out line IC 2.1.1. Rapid EE 
Flow open in error evaporation of tank 
contents 
3. Less 3.1. Vent out line IC 3.1.1. Tank EE 3.1.1.1. Ensure vent 
Flow partially blocked overpressure rupture out line is not prone 
to blocking 
3.1.1.2. Install 
relief valve 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUEENCES CAT SATEGUAMS CAT RECOK'-MNDATIONS 
i. Higher I. I. Vent out line IC 1.1.1. Overpressure EE Install 
Pressure blocked or partially rupture relief valve 
blocked 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A85 
Worksheet 
Revision: 0 26 Jun 9S 
Node: 3 Storage tank outlet via batch meter to tanker 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT 
I 
CONSEQUENCES CAT SATEGUAIMS C. AT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Outlet line IC 1.1.1. Tanker not EE 
blocked between pump filled as required. 
and tanker. 
SaEEh meter control 1.1.2. Full head pump EE 1.1.2.1. Kick back 
valve fails closed. pressure developed. line 
Pump overheats, seals 
damaged, possible 
leak. 
1.2. Pump fails. IC 1.2.1. Tanker not EE 
Outlet line blocked filled as required. 
between storage tank 
and pump. 
2. More 2.1. Outlet line IC 2.1.1. Tank contents E-: ' 2.1.1.1. Emergency 2.1-1-1. Ensure tank 
Flow ruptures. lost to environment. isolation valve is adequately bunded. 
Tanker filling hose 
ruptured. 2.1.1.2. Locate 
isolation valve as 
near as possible to 
tank. 
2.1-1-3. Consider need 
! or remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
2.1.1.4. Ensure tanker 
filling hose* are 
stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.2. Batch meter IC 2.2-1. Tanker E-- 2.2.1.1. overfilling 2.2-1.1. Consider 
control valve fails overfilled alarm effects &. change in 
open. six* of standard 
Operator enters wrong 2.2.1.2. Pressure trip tanker will have on 
amount into batch tanker loading 
meter control. operations. 
Tanker smaller than 
ey. pected. 
Tanker already 
partially filled. 
2.3. Tanker moves off IC 2.3.1. Leak to EZ 2.3.1.1. Dry break 2.3.1.1. Loading bay 
while loading environment. couplings. to be on level ground. 
operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.3.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay 
Driver drives off, immobilization at a reasonable 
tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
3. Less 3.1. Outlet line IC 3.1.1. Tanker takes EZ 3.1.1.1. overdue 3.1.1.1. Ensure 
Flow partially blocked. longer to fill than filling alarm. operators do not rely 
Batch meter control normal. solely on time taken 
valve fails to fill tanker as an 
insufficiently open. indicator as to when 
Pump running to disconnect filling 
incorrectly. hose. 
Revision: 0 26 Jun 95 
Node: 8 Storage tank outlet via batch meter to tanker 
Parameter: Composition 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT I SAFE(YJA-RDS CAT RECOV. vF-'IDATIONS 
1. Other 1.1. Wrong tanker IC 1.1.1. Material Em- 1.1-1.1. Use different 
Than connected incompatibility. connectors where 
compositio material 
n incompat. bilty is a 
problem to so wrong 
tanker cannot be 
connected easily. 
1.2. Wrong material in IC 1.2.1. Material TZ 1.2.1.1. Check tanker 
tanker incompatibility. contents before 
unloading if material 
incompatibility in a 
1 f problem. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A86 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 0 26 Jun 9S 
Node: 9 Storage tank inlet from tanker 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMMATIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. Tanker outlet IC I. I. I. Possible EE 
line blocked. inability to continue 
process at normal 
production rates. 
1.1.2. Low tank level EE 
leading to outlet pump 
cavitation 
2. More 2.1. Hose ruptured. IC 2.1.1. Leak to EZ 2.1-1-1. Ensure hoses 
Flow environment. are stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.2. Tanker moves off IC 2.2.1. Leak to EZ 2.2.1.1. Dry break 2.2-1-1. Loading bay 
while offloading environment. couplings. to be an level ground. 
. operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.2.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay 
Driver drives off, immabilisation at a reasonable 
tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
2.3. Larger tanker IC 2.3.1. Possible ZZ 2.3.1.1. Consider 
than expected. inability to offload effects change in 
tanker completely standard size of tank 
without overfilling will have on tanker 
storage tank. offloading operations. 
3 Less 3.1. Tanker outlet IC 3.1.1. Tank takes E-1 3.1.1.1. Ensure How line partially longer to fill than operators do not rely 
blocked. normal. solely on time taken 
to empty tanker as an 
indicator as to when 
to disconnect hose. 
4. Reverse 4.1. Discharge pump IC 4.1.1. Reverse flow EZ 4.1.1.1. I; on-r*turn 
Flow fails from storage tank. valve 
Tanker overfilling. 
4.1.1.2. Siphon break 
on dip tubes. 
u=OP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
A87 
worksheat 
Company: 
Facility: Paget 10 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 9S 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CATUTS ES CAT CONSEQUENCF-S CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. reed line IC 1.1-1. Possible ZE 
blocked. inability to continue 
process at normal 
production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank level EE 1.1.2.1. Low level CON 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.1.2.2. Level CON 
indicator 
1.1.3. NO FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel takes EE 3.1.1.1. Level CON 
Flow partially blocked. longer to fill than indicator. 
normal 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW FROM DPE 3.1.2.1. Level CAU 
UPSTRZX*4 UNIT indicator. 
T 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 9S 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion of IC 1.2.1.1. Hydraulic 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
Pressure isolated. locked in fluid causes pressure relief operating instructions 
hydraulic overpressure preclude deliberate 
rupture of line. isolation of line 
without having first 
drained line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure design 
minimises opportunites 
for isolation in error 
due to control valves 
failing etc. 
1.3. Manual valve on IC 1.3.1. LIQUID HAMMZR. 1.3.1.1. Only a 
storage tank inlet HIGH PRESSURE TO problem for long 
closes quickly. UPSTREAM UNITS. pipelines. 
Ensure closing time on 
control valves and 
manual valves in long 
enough to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.6 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
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Table A3.7 (cont. ) - Thermal oxidiser sub-modules - preHAZOPed results. 
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Table A3.7 (cont. ) - Thermal oxidiser sub-modules - preHAZOPed results. 
X 
Z, 
A94 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Nods: 1 Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CATI CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Feed line IC 1.1.1. Possible EE 
blocked. inability to continue 
Level control valve process at normal 
fails shut. production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank level EE 1.1.2.1. Low level CON 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.1.2.2. Level CON 
indicator 
1.1.3. NO FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
2. More 2.1. Control valve IC 2.1.1. Inadequate EE 2.1.1.1. Relief valve. 2.1.1.1. Size vent 
Flow fails open venting. Vessel adequately 
overpressure rupture. 
2.1-2. Static build EE 2.1.2.1. Dip tubes for 2.1.2.1. Flammable 
UP. filling. fluids only. 
If filling is not done 
via dip tubes check 
design assumptions. 
2.1.3. MORE FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel takes EE 3.1.1.1. Level CON 
Flow partially blocked. longer to fill than indicator. 
Control valve fails normal 
insufficiently open. 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW AT DPE 3.1.2.1. Level CAU 
UPSTREAM UNIT indicator. 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: I Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion of EE 1.2.1.1. Hydraulic CON 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
Pressure isolated. locked in fluid causes pressure relief operating instructions 
hydraulic overpressure preclude deliberate 
rupture of line. isolation of line 
without having first 
drained line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure design 
minimizes opportunites 
for isolation in error 
due to control valves 
failing etc. 
1.3. Level control IC 1.3.1. LIQUID HAMMER. DPE 1.3.1.1. Only a 
valve closes quickly. HIGH PRESSURE TO problem for long 
Manual valve on UPSTREAM UNITS. pipelines. 
storage tank inlet Ensure closing time on 
closes quickly. control valves and 
manual valves is long 
enough to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
KAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.8 - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
- A95 - 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jurx 95 
Rode: 2 Storage tank vent to atmosphere 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 
DEVIATION CAUSES CATI CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No/Less 1.1. Vent line blocked IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Relief valve CON Minimize 
Flow or partially blocked overpressure rupture opportunities for vent 
on filling blockage 
1.1.1.2. Ensure flame 
arrestor is maintained 
correctly. 
1.1.2. Tank vacuum EE 1.1.2.1. Vacuum relief CON 1.1.2.1. Minimize 
collapse on discharge valve. opportunities for vent 
blockage. 
1.1.2.2. Ensure flame 
arrestor is maintained 
correctly 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.8 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
- A96 - 
worksheat 
Co,, TLpany: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 3 Storage tank overflow 
Parameter: Flow 
Page 13 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No/Less 1.1. Overflow blocked IC 1.1.1. No/partial tank EE Level control CON Ensure 
Flow or partially blocked overflow available. opportunities for 
Possible tank rupture 1.1.1.2. Level CON overflow blocking are 
on overfilling indicator minimized. 
1.1.1.3. High level CON 
alarm 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.8 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
- A97 - 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Page: 4 
Revision% 02 Jun 95 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Outlet line IC 1.1.1. NO FLOW TO DPE Low flow CAU 
blocked between tank DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm 
and pump. 
Pump fails. 
1.2. Flow control IC 1.2.1. NO FLOW TO DPE 1.2.1.1. Low flow CAU 
valve fails shut. DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm 
Outlet line blocked 
downstream of pump. 1.2.2. Full head pump EE 1.2.2.1. Kick back 1.2.2.1. Consider 
pressure developed. line. designing equipment to 
High pressure rupture withstand maximum pump 
risk to outlet line. 1.2.2.2. Low flow delivery pressure. 
Pump overheats, seals alarm. 
damaged, possible 
leak. 
2. More 2.1. Control valve IC 2.1.1. HIGH FLOW TO DPE 
Flow fails open DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
2.2. Spare pump IC 2.2.1. HIGH FLOW TO DPE 2.2.1.1. Flow control CON 2.2.1.1. Ensure 
running in error DOWNSTREAM UNIT operating and 
maintenance 
instructions preclude 
running parallel pumps 
incorrectly. 
2.3. Outlet line IC 2.3.1. Tank contents EE 2.3.1.1. Emergency CON 2.3.1.1. Ensure tank 
ruptured lost to environment isolation valve is * adequately 
bunded. 
2.3.1.2. Locate 
isolation valve as 
near an possible to 
tank. 
2.3.1.3. Consider need 
for remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
2.4. Pump seals fail. IC 2.4.1. Environmental EE 2.4.1.1. Emergency CON 2.4.1.1. Use canned or 
contamination isolation valve. seal-less pump if 
appropriate. 
2.4.1.2. Pump to be 
adequately bunded. 
2.4.1.3. Consider need 
for remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
3. Less 3.1. Outlet line IC 3.1.1. LESS FLOW To DPE 3.1.1.1. Flow control CON 
Flow partially blocked. DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
Pump running 3.1.1.2. Low flow CON 
incorrectly. alarm 
3.2. Control valve IC 3.2.1. LESS*FLOW To DPE 3.2.1.1. Low flow 
fails insufficiently DOWNSTREAM UNIT alarm. 
open. 
4. As Well 4.1. Contamination of IC 4.1.1. CONTAMINATION DPE 
As Flow tank contents OF DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
S. Reverse 5.2. Outlet line IC S. 2.1. REVERSE FLO W DPE 
Flow ruptured. FROM DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CATI CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
2. Lower 2.1. Storage tank IC 2.1.1. Low tank level DPE 2.1.1.1. Low flow CAU 
Pressure inlet line blocked. leading to LOW alarm 
Level control valve PRESSURE AT DOWNSTREAM 
fails shut. UNIT 2.1.1.2. Low level CON 
alarm 
2.1.1.3. Level CON 
indicator I II 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.8 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (IC filtered). 
- A98 - 
Worksheet 
company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Tun 95 
Node: 5 Storage tank self 
Parameter: Temperature 
Page 13 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
i. Higher 1.1. Fire IC 1.1.1. Rapid EE Emergency CON 
Temperatur evaporation of tank fire relief valve. 
a contents. 
1.1.2. Structural EE 1.1.2.1. Ensure 
weakening of tank. adequate fire relief 
equipment exists. 
1.2. High ambient IC 1.2.1. Rapid EE 1.2.1.1. Temperature CAU 1.2.1.1. Lag tank to 
temperature evaporation of tank indicator protect against high 
contents ambient temperature if 
necessary. 
1.2.2. Possible pump ES 1.2.2.1. Temperature 
cavitation indicator. 
2. Lower 2.1. Cold weather IC 2.1.1. Possible EE 2.1.1.1. Temperature CAU 2.1.1.1. Lag tank to 
Temperatur freezing of content* indicator protect against cold 
e ambient temperature if 
necessary. 
2.1.1.2. Install trace 
heating if necessary. 
2.1.2. Rapid EE 2.1.2.1. Install CON 
condensation of vacuum relief. 
vapour. Possible 
vacuum collapse. 2.1.2.2. Temperature CAU 
indicator 
2.1.3. Condensation of EE 2.1.3.1. Temperature CAU 2.1.3.1. Use inert 
vapour draws air into indicator blanket if necessary. 
tank. See blanket in and 
vent out nodes. 
2.1.4. Pump seals EE 2.1.4.1. Temperature CAU 
damaged indicator 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 5 Storage tank self 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Fluid for IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Design tank 
Pressure hydraulic test is overpressure rupture to contain all 
denser than fluid tank appropriate fluids. 
designed for 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 5 Storage tank self 
Parameter: Level 
DEVIATION CAUSES CATI CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMMMATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Level control IC 1.1.1. Tank contents EE Overflow CON Overflow to 
Level fails lost to environment be below tank roof. 
Wrong level sensed due 1.1.1.2. High level CAU 
to tank being filled alarm 1.1.1.2. Tank to be 
with less dense adequately bunded. 
material than 1.1.1.3. Level CAU 
anticipated. indicator 
I 
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Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Flow 
Page: 9 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Vent in line IC 1.1.1. Tank vacuum EE Vacuum relief CON Minimise 
blocked collapse valve opportunities for line 
blockage. 
3. Less 3.1. Vent in line IC 3.1.1. Tank vacuum EE 3.1.1.1. Vacuum relief CON 3.1.1.1. Minimiss 
Flow partially blocked collapse valve opportunities for line 
blockage 
Revision: 02 Jun, 95 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. Pressure control IC I. I. I. Tank EE Install 
Pressure failure of blanket overpressure rupture relief valve 
2. Lower 2.1. Vent in line IC 2.1.1. Vacuum collapse EE 2.1.1.1. Ensure vent 
Pressure blocked or partially in line is not prone 
blocked to blocking 
2.1.1.2. Install 
vacuum relief 
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Company* 
Facility: 
Revioion: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Flow 
Worksheat 
Pages 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. Vent out line IC 1.1.1. Tank EE Ensure vent 
blocked overpresesure rupture out line in not prone 
to blocking 
1.1.1.2. Install 
relief valve 
2. More 2.1. Vent out line IC 2.1.1. Rapid EE 
Flow open in error evaporation of tank 
contents 
3. Less 3.1. Vent out line IC 3.1.1. Tank EE 3.1.1.1. Ensure vent 
Flow partially blocked overpressure rupture out line is not prone 
to blocking 
3.1.1.2. Install 
relief valve 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CATI CONSEQUENCES 
I CATI SAFEGUARDS I CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher I. I. Vent out line IC I I. I. I. erpressure EE Install 
Pressure blocked or partially rupture 
I 
relief valvo 
I I 
blocked 
-.. 
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Company: 
Facility: 
Worksheet 
'., 
. 
'I Revision- 0 26 Jun 9S 
Hode: 8 Storage tank outlet via batch meter to tanker 
Parameter: Flow 
Page 18 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES ICAT I SAFEGUARDS ICAT I RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow I. I. Outlet line IC 1.1.1 Tanker not EE 
blocked between pump as required. 
and tanker. 
BaEEh meter control 1.1-2. Full head pump EE 1.1.2.1. Kick back 
valve fails closed. pressure developed. line 
Pump overheats, seals 
damaged, possible 
leak. 
1.2. Pump fails. IC 1.2.1. Tanker not EE 
Outlet line blocked filled as required. 
between storage tank 
and pump - 
2. More 2.1. Outlet line IC 2.1.1. Tank contents EE 2.1.1.1. Emergency 2.1-1.1. Ensure tank 
Flow ruptures. lost to environment. isolation valve is adequately bunded. Tanker filling hose 
ruptured. 2.1.1.2. Locate 
isolation valve as 
near as possible to 
tank. 
2.1.1.3. Consider need 
for remote operation 
of isolation valve. 
2.1.1.4. Ensure tanker 
filling hoses are 
stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.2. Batch meter IC 2.2.1. Tanker EE 2.2.1.1. Overfilling 2.2-1.1. Consider 
control valve fails overfilled alarm effects a change in 
open. size of standard Operator enters wrong 2.2.1.2. Pressure trip tanker will have on 
amount into batch tanker loading 
meter control. operations. Tanker smaller than 
expected. 
Tanker already 
partially filled. 
2.3. Tanker moves off IC 2.3-1. Leak to EE 2.3.1.1. Dry break 2.3.1.1. Loading bay 
while loading environment. couplings. to be on level ground. 
operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.3.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay Driver drives off, immobilisation at a reasonable tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
3. Less 3.1. Outlet line IC 3.1-1. Tanker takes EE 3.1.1.1. Overdue 3.1.1.1. Ensure 
Flow partially blocked. longer to-fill than filling alarm. operators do not rely Batch meter control normal. solely on time taken valve fails to fill tanker as an insufficiently open. indicator as to when Pump running to disconnect filling l incorrectly. a ho a. 
ACV. 16.10121. v 16 0w Un v -ý 
Node: 8 Storage tank outlet via batch meter to tanker 
Parameter: Composition 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Other 1.1. Wrong tanker IC 1.1.1. Material EE Use different 
Than connected incompatibility. connectors where compositio material 
n incompatibilty in a 
problem to so wrong 
tanker cannot be 
connected easily. 
1.2. Wrong material in IC 1.2.1. Material EE 1.2.1.1. Check tanker tanker incompatibility. contents before 
unloading if material 
incompatibility is a 
problem. 
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Worksheat 
Company: 
Facility: Page: 9 
Revision: 0 26 Jun 9S 
Node: 9 Storage tank inlet from tanker 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Tanker outlet IC 1.1.1. Possible EE 
line blocked. inability to continue 
process at normal 
production rates. 
1.1-2. Low tank level EE 
leading to outlet pump 
cavitation 
2. More 2.1. Hose ruptured. IC 2.1.1. Leak to EE 2.1.1.1. Ensure hoses 
Flow environment. are stored correctly, 
inspected frequently 
and changed regularly. 
2.2. Tanker moves off IC 2.2.1. Leak to EE 2.2.1.1. Dry break 2.2.1.1. Loading bay 
while offloading environment. coupling*. to be on level ground. 
operation still in Ensure tanker can be 
progress. 2.2.1.2. Tanker parked securely in bay 
Driver drives off, immobilination at a reasonable 
tanker not parked interlock. distance from other 
securely, or tanker in traffic. 
conflict with other 
traffic. 
2.3. Larger tanker IC 2.3.1. Possible EE 2.3.1.1. Consider 
than expected. inability to offload effect* change in 
tanker completely standard size of tank 
without overfilling will have on tanker 
storage tank. offloading operations. 
3. Less 3.1. Tanker outlet IC 3.1.1. Tank takes EE 3.1.1.1. Ensure 
Flow line partially longer to fill than operators do not rely 
blocked. normal. solely on time taken 
to empty tanker as an 
indicator as to when 
to disconnect hose. 
4. Reverse 4.1. Discharge pump IC 4.1.1. Reverse flow EE 4.1.1.1. Non-return 
Flow fails from storage tank. valve 
Tanker overfilling. 
4.1.1.2. Siphon break 
on dip tubes. 
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Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 95 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Pag*t 10 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.1. Feed line IC 1.1.1. Possible EE 
blocked. inability to continue 
Process at normal 
production rates 
1.1.2. Low tank level EE 1.1.2.1. Low level COX 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.1.2.2. Level CON 
indicator 
1.1.3. NO FLOW AT DPE 
UPSTREAM UNITS 
3. Less 3.1. Feed line IC 3.1.1. Vessel takes EE 3.1.1.1. Level CON 
Flow partially blocked. longer to fill than indicator. 
normal 
3.1.2. LOW FLOW FROM DPE 3.1.2.1. Level CXU 
UPSTREAM UNIT indicator. 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 9S 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.2. Feed line IC 1.2.1. Expansion of IC 1.2.1.1. Hydraulic 1.2.1.1. Ensure 
Pressure isolated. locked in fluid causes pressure relief operating instructions 
hydraulic overpressure preclude deliberate 
rupture of line. isolation of line 
without having first 
drained line. 
1.2.1.2. Ensure design 
minimises opportunites 
for isolation in error 
due to control valves 
failing etc. 
1.3. Manual valve on IC 1.3.1. LIQUID HAMMER. 1.3.1.1. Only a 
storage tank inlet HIGH PRESSURE TO problem for long 
close* quickly. UPSTREAM UNITS. pipelines. 
Ensure closing time on 
control valves and 
manual valves is long 
enough to avoid liquid 
hammer. 
-- 
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Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: Paget I 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 1 Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Flow 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW FROM VUL 1.2.1. Possible 
SOURCE inability to continue 
process at normal 
production rates 
1.2.2. Low tank level 1.2.2.1. Low level 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.2.2.2. Level 
indicator 
2. More 2.2. HIGH FLOW FROM VUL 2.2.1. Inadequate 2.2.1.1. Relief valve. 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT venting. Vessel C r. 
overpressure rupture. 
2.2.2. Static build 2.2.2.1. Dip tubes for 2.2.2.1. Flammable 
UP- filling. fluids only. 
If filling is not done 
via dip tube* chock 
design assumptions. 
3. Less 3.2. LOW FLOW FROM VUL 3.2.1. Vessel takes 3.2.1.1. Level 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT longer to fill than sr. indicator. 
normal. 
4. As Well 4.1. WRONG MATER IAL VUL 4.1.1. Material 4.1.1.1. Ensure 
As Flow FROM UPSTREAM UNIT incompatability ec appropriate measures 
exist to check 
incoming material. 
4.2. CONTAMINATED VUL 4.2.1. An above 
MATERIAL FROM UPSTREAM 
UNIT 
S. Reverse 5.1. REVERSE FLOW AT VUL 5.1.1. Liquid siphoned 5.1.1.1. Siphon break CON 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT out of tank. on dip tubes. 
S. 1.1.2. Non-return CAU 
valve 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: I Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Temperature 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher I. I. HIGH TEMPERATURE VUL 1.1.1. Rapid Temperature CAU For system 
Temperatur FROM UPSTREAM UNIT evaporation of tank CE indicator with vent header 
e contents. system, can System 
1.1.1.2. High CAU cope with increase in 
temperature alarm venting due to hot 
weather acting on 
several tanks? 
1.1.2. Increased 1.1.2.1. Temperature 1.1.2.1. Only a 
vapour concentration indicator. problem for tanks with 
around tank, possibly open vent. 
rising to a hazardous 1.1.2.2. High Consider installing 
level. temperature alarm. appropriate gas 
detection equipment if 
appropriate. 
Revision: 02 Jurx 95 
Node: I Storage tank feed inlet with level control on tank. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUS ES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH PRESSURE AT VUL 1.1.1. Vessel 1.1-1-1. Relief valve. CON Ensure 
Pressure UPSTREAM UNIT overpressure rupture 8z F- adequate venting. 
1.1.1.2. Pressure CAU 
indicator. 
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Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Flow 
Page 8 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.3. NO FLOW AT VUL 1.3.1. Full head pump - 1.3.1.1. High CON 1.3.1.1. Design 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS pressure developed. re pressure/low flow pump equipment to withstand High Pressure rupture cut out switches. maximum pump delivery 
risk to downstream pressure. 
equipment. 1.3-1.2. Kick back CON 
Pump overheats, seals line 
damaged, possible 
leak. 1.3.1.3. Integral pump CON 
high pressure relief 
valve 
1.3-1.4. Pressure CON 
indicator 
1.3.1. S. Low flow CON 
alarm 
1.4. NO FLOW AT VUL 1.4.1. Full head pump LPE 1.4.1.1. Kick back 1.4.1.1. Consider 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS pressure developed. line. designing equipment to 
HIGH PRESSURE TO withstand maximum pump 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS 1.4.1.2. Low flow delivery pressure. 
alarm. 
2. More 2. S. LESS PRESSURE AT VUL 2. S. 1. HIGH FLOW To LPE 2. S. 1.1. Flow control CON 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
3. Less 3.3. HIGH PRESSURE AT VUL 3.3.1. LOW FLOW TO LPE 3.3.1.1. Flow control CON 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
S. Reverse 5.1. Pump failure and VUL S. I. I. Material S. 1.1.1. Non-return CAU 
Flow REVERSE FLOW FROM incompatability valve. 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT. 
Revision: 02 aun 95 
Node: 4 Storage tank outlet 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. NO FLOW AT VUL 1.1.1. Full head pump LPE 1.1 * 1.1. Kick back Consider 
Pressure DOWNSTREAM UNIT pressure developed. line designing equipment to 
HIGH PRESSURE TO withstand maximum pump 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT 1.1.1.2. Low flow delivery pressure. 
alarm. 
2. Lower 2.2. LESS FLOW AT VUL 2.2.1. HIGH PRESSURE LPE 2.2.1.1. Flow control CAU 
Pressure DOWNSTREAM UNIT AT DOWNSTREAM UNIT 
2.2.1.2. Low flow CAU 
alarm 
2.2.1.3. Pressure CON 
indicator 
2.3. HIGH FLOW AT VUL 2.3.1. LOW PRESSURE AT LPE 2.3.1.1. Flow control CAU 
DOWNSTREAM UNITS DOWNSTREAM UNITS 
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. 
Table A3.8 (cont. ) - Storage tank sub-modules - preHAZOPed results (VUL filtered). 
- A106 - 
Worksheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 9S 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Flow 
i 
Page 13 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW FROM VENT VOL 1.2.1. Tank vacuum 1.2.1.1. Vacuum relief CON 1.2.1.1. Ensure source 
IN SOURCE collapse it r- valve is sufficiently . reliable. 
2. More 2.1. HIGH FLOW FROM VUL 2.1.1. Rapid 
Flow VENT IN SOURCE evaporation of tank ec contents 
3. Less 3.2. LOW FLOW FROM VUL 3.2.1. Tank vacuum 3.2.1.1. Vacuum relief 
Flow VENT IN SOURCE collapse F-9 valve 
4. As Well 4.1. WRONG MATER IAL VUL 4.1.1. Material 4.1.1.1. Ensure risk 
As Flow FROM VENT IN SOURCE incompatability of wrong material in 
source in sufficiently 
small. 
4.1.2. Possible 
explosion risk 
4.2. CONTAMINATION OF VUL 4.2.1. Material 
VENT IN SOURCE incompatability 
S. Reverse 5.1. LOW PRESSURE AT VUL 5.1.1. CONTAMINATION LPE Install non- 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT OF VENT IN SOURCE return valve 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 6 Storage tank vent in from inert blanket supply. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
2. Lower 2.2. LOW PRESSURE FROM VUL 2.2.1. Vacuum collapse 2.2.1.1. Check 
Pressure VENT IN SOURCE Cc reliability of vent in 
source 
2.2.1.2. Install 
vacuum relief 
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Worksheat 
Company, 
Facility: 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Flow 
Pag* 14 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
3. Less 3.2. LOW FLOW TO VUL 3.2.1. Tank Cc 3.2.1.1. Install 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT overpressure rupture relief valve 
4. Reverse 4.1. HIGH PRESSURE AT VUL 4.1.1. Material CE 
Flow DOWNSTREAM UNIT incompatability 
4.1.2. Explosion risk F-9 
Revision: 02 Jun 95 
Node: 7 Storage tank vent out to vent header 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION. CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.2. NO FLOW AT VUL 1.2.1. Overpressure F-9 1.2.1.1. Install 
Pressure DOWNSTREAM UNIT. rupture relief valve 
LESS FLOW AT 
DOWNSTREAM UNIT. 
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Workaheet 
Company: 
Facility: 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 95 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Flow 
Page 15 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CATI SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. No Flow 1.2. NO FLOW FROM VUL 1.2.1. Possible cc 
UPSTREAM UNIT inability to continue 
process at normal 
production rates 
1.2.2. Low tank level SE 1.2.2.1. Low level 
leading to outlet pump alarm 
cavitation. 
1.2.2.2. Level 
indicator 
2. More 2.1. HIGH FLOW FROM VUL 2.1.1. Inadequate 'C-C 2.1.1.1. Relief valve. 
Flow UPSTREAM UNIT venting. Vessel 
overpressure rupture. 
2.1.2. Static build F_ 2.1.2.1. Dip tubes for 2.1.2.1. Flammable 
UP. filling. fluids only. 
if filling is not done 
via dip tubes check 
design assumptions. 
3. Less 3.2. LOW FLOW FROM VUL 3.2.1. Vessel takes 3.2.1.1. Level 
Flow SOURCE longer to fill than indicator. 
normal. 
4. As Well 4.1. WRONG MATERIAL AT VUL 4.1.1. Material 4.1.1.1. Ensure 
As Flow SOURCE incompatability appropriate measures 
exist to check 
incoming material. 
VUL As above 
4.2. CONTAMINATION OF VUL 4.2.1. Material 
MATERIAL AT SOURCE incompatibility 
5. Reverse 5.1. REVERSE FLOW AT VUL 5.1.1. Liquid siphoned 1EI; Siphon break CON 
Flow SOURCE out of tank. on dip tubes. 
5.1.1.2. Non-return CAU 
valve 
Revision: 0 21 Jul 9S 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Temperature 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CATI RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH TEMPERATURE VUL 1.1.1. Rapid Temperature For system 
Temperatur FROM UPSTREAM UNIT evaporation of tank indicator with vent header 
e contents. system, can system 
1.1.1.2. High CAU cope with increase in 
temperature alarm venting due to hot 
weather acting on 
several tanks? 
1.1.2. Increased 1.1.2.1. Temperature 1.1.2.1. Only a 
vapour concentration indicator. problem for tanks with 
around tank, possibly open vent. 
rising to a hazardous 1.1.2.2. High Consider installing 
level. temperature alarm. appropriate gas 
detection equipment if 
I jappropriate. 
Revision: 0 21 Tul 95 
Node: 11 Storage tank feed inlet without control valve. 
Parameter: Pressure 
DEVIATION CAUSES CAT CONSEQUENCES CAT SAFEGUARDS CAT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Higher 1.1. HIGH PRESSURE VUL 1.1.1. Vessel Relief valve. CON Ensure 
Pressure FROM SOURCE overpressure rupture adequate venting. 
1.1.1.2. Pressure CAU 
indicator. 
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